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A B S T R A C T
This t h e s i s  i n v e s t i g a t e s  the conduct of 
u n c o n v e n t i o n a l  war far e as p e r for me d by one of the many 
t e a m s  of A l lied saboteurs  p a r a c h u t e d  deep be hind enemy 
li n e s  in G e r m a n - o c c u p i e d  c o u n t r i e s  during W o rl d War II.
Th e team s t u d i e d  as an ex ample of this type of w a r f a r e  was 
the Of fice of Strate gi c S e r v i c e s  N o r w e g i a n  Spe cial 
O p e r a t i o n s  Gro up (O.S.S. N O R S O  Group) in O p e r a t i o n  RYPE.
Its m i s s i o n  was to di srupt G e r m a n  troop m o v e m e n t s  in 
No rw ay . Its e f f e c t i v e n e s s  will be judged t a c t i c a l l y  and 
a l s o  in the s t r a te gi c e n v i r o n m e n t  of the Al lied war effort, 
of whi ch it was a p a r t .
Br i t i s h  Pr ime  M i n i s t e r  Wi n s t o n  C h u r chill,  after the 
fall of F r a n c e  to Nazi G e r many in June, 1940, e s t a b l i s h e d  
the Spec ial  O p e r a t i o n s  E x e c u t i v e  (S.O.E.) to train r e f u g e e s  
fr o m  G e r m a n - o c c u p i e d  n a t i o n s  how to conduct sab o t a g e  so 
they could re tu rn to their ho me lan ds, "to set Eu ro pe  
a b l a z e . "  In the U.S.A., W i l l i a m  "Wild B i ll" Do nov an  
e s t a b l i s h e d  the of fice of C o o r d i n a t o r  of I n f o r m a t i o n  in 
1941 (later to become the Of fice of S t r at egic S e r v i c e s  in 
1943), al on g with Special O p e r a t i o n s  (S.O.) equ i v a l e n t  to
the B r i t i s h  S. O. E.)  to train both Ame r i c a n s  and E u r o p e a n  
r e f u g e e s  ill the U n i t e d  Stat es  in u n c o n v e n t i o n a l  war fare.
The O.S.S. N O R S O  Group was co mposed of eighty men, 
i n c l u d i n g  s t r an ded N o r w e g i a n  marin er s, as well as A m e r i c a n s  
of S c a n d i n a v i a n  de sc ent . They trained in the U n ited  State s 
and Great Britain in guerrilla warfare before flying  from 
S c o t l a n d  in March, 1945, to p a r a c h u t e  into n o r t h e r n  Norway.
The air s u p p o r t  for O p e r a t i o n  RYPE got off to a very 
bad start. Of the ei ghty men trai ned for the mission, 
t h i r t y - s i x  were c h o s e n  to par a c h u t e  into Norway. Of these, 
five were a c c i d e n t a l l y  dr op ped into neutral Sweden! Ten 
p a r a t r o o p e r s  and f o u r t e e n  air me n were killed tr ying to get 
into N o r w a y .
The field o p e r a t i o n s  of the RYPE mi s s i o n  went quite 
well. On April 14, 1945, RY P E  de s t r o y e d  the No r d l a n d 
R a i l w a y  br idg e at T a n g e n  in the Nor th T r o n d e l a g  Distric t.  
Ten days later, R YPE  d e s t r o y e d  t w o - a n d - o n e  half k i l o m e t e r s  
in a re mote area in the Luru Valley. Upon c o m p l e t i o n  of 
thes e s a b o t a g e  op er a t i o n s ,  the men s u c c e s s f u l l y  out s k i e d  
the p u r s u i n g  G e r m a n  ski patrols. The RYPE m i ss io n was an 
u n q u a l i f i e d  success. In c o n j u n c t i o n  with other Allie d 
s p o n s o r e d  teams in the area, it helpe d prevent 15 0,000  
G e r m a n  S.S. m o u n t a i n  troops, then r e t r e a t i n g  in the face of 
R u s s i a n  attacks, from r e t u r n i n g  to a b e l e a g u e r e d  f a t h e r l a n d  
w h e r e  Nazi G e r m a n y  was about to collapse.
I m p o r t a n t  le ssons were lea rne d by the O.S.S. f ro m the 
R Y P E  m i s s i o n  as to its c o m p o s i t i o n  for future o p e r a t i o n s  
and they are still evident in special forces d o c t r i n e  as we 
m o v e  into the 1990s. The p l a n n e r s  of O p e r a t i o n  R Y P E  did 
not take M u r p h y ’s Law into c o n s i de ra tion: if s o m e t h i n g  can
go wrong, it will. P l a n n e r s  o± future special forc e s  
o p e r a t i o n s  must a n t i c i p a t e  the worst in d i f f i c u l t  m i s s i o n s  
and be c a u t i o u s  in a s s i g n i n g  brave men to them.
I N T R O D U C T I O N  
G E N E R A L  S U M M A R Y  OF O P E R A T I O N  RYPE
O p e r a t i o n  RYPE was one of many su cc e s s f u l  s a b o t a g e  
a c t i o n s  c o n d u c t e d  by Al lie d teams a g a in st the Axis po wer s 
d u r i n g  W o r l d  War II. RYPE (named for the white g r ous e that
w o uld c h a n g e s  its col or to brown in summer) was no i s o l a t e d
/
ca se  of s a b o ta ge . It was part of a grand Allied scheme  of 
u n c o n v e n t i o n a l  m i l i t a r y  ac ti ons a g a inst the A x i s , a l l  of 
w h i c h  we r e  c a r ef ully o r c h e s t r a t e d  by Allied  Joint 
C o m m a n d e r s  from Lo nd on  and W a s h i n g t o n .  The R YP E team began 
t r a i n i n g  in 1943 at Camp Hale, Co l o r a d o  and c o m p l e t e d  its 
m i s s i o n s  in Norw a y  in June, 1945.
The R Y P E  party of t w e n t y - f o u r  blew up the T a n g e n  
R a i l r o a d  B r i d g e  in G e r m a n - o c c u p i e d  no rth er n No rway on April 
15, 1945. Eight days later, R Y P E  de st royed 2-1/2 
k i l o m e t e r s  of nearby r a i lw ay s with 240 c h a rges of pl as tic 
e x p l o s i v e s .  T h ese a c t i o n s  slowed the r e d e p l o y m e n t  of 
1 5 0 , 0 0 0  G e r m a n  tr oops from n o r t h e r n  Norway s o u t h w a r d  to 
G e r ma ny to re i n f o r c e  German lin es on the E a s tern and 
W e s t e r n  F r o n t s  of a b e l e a g u e r e d  fatherland. Even at this 
time, the A l l i e s  re mained con c e r n e d  that the G e r m a n s  might 
m ak e N o r w a y  the b a t t l e g r o u n d  in a last stand by their war 
ma ch in e. RY P E  had orders, should that happen, to train and
1
2s u p p l y  local r e s i s t a n c e  groups. In the event of total 
G e r m a n  c a p i t u l a t i o n ,  RY P E  had ord ers to re s t o r e  order in 
n o r t h e r n  No rway and to accept the su r r e n d e r  of German  
f o r c e s  there.
On May 6, 1945, Ge r m a n y  c ap it ulated . On M a y , ; 11, 
1945, RYP E -personnel took the s u r r e n d e r  of German 
c o m m a n d e r s  in no r t h e r n  Norway. The RYPE party p a r t i c i p a t e d  
in sever al  local v i c t o r y  p a r ad es to d e m o n s t r a t e  to both 
N o r w e g i a n  and G e r man s a l i k e  the early Allied pr e s e n c e  
there. The ir  m i s s i o n  done, the RYP E units return ed  to 
L o n d o n  on June 28, 1945 to beg in a w e l l - d e s e r v e d  furlough.
The o b j e c t i v e s  of this t h e s i s  are: (1) to a p p r e c i a t e
by a study of R YPE the craft of u n c o n v e n t i o n a l  w a r f a r e  
a g a i n s t  one of the str o n g e s t  c o n v e n t i o n a l  ar mies of its 
time, the Ge rm an  W e h r m a c h t ;  (2) to d e m o n s t r a t e  that d u r i n g  
W o r l d  War II, u n c o n v e n t i o n a l  w a r f a r e  was part of a grand 
A l l i e d  sc heme of u n c o n v e n t i o n a l  m i l i t a r y  strategy; (3) to 
u n d e r s t a n d  RYPE as part of an A l lied w o r l d w i d e  sc e n a r i o  of 
d e c e p t i o n  and how R Y P E ’s m i s s i o n  cha nge d with the Germ an 
c a p i t u l a t i o n  in May 1945; and (4) to a n al yz e the long and 
short term p r o b l e m s  of r e s u p p l y i n g  RYPE and the cost in 
l i ve s and m a t e r i a l s  in v o l v e d  in o p e r a t i o n s  like RYPE.
Du ri ng  Wo rl d War II, the A l li es  trained f u g i ti ves 
from  G e r m a n - o c c u p i e d  c o u n t r i e s  in Europ e to return to their 
h o m e l a n d s  by par a c h u t e  to c o n d u c t  sabo ta ge behind enemy 
lines. The N O R S O  G r o u p  of the O.S.S. (Office of St r a t e g i c
3S e r v i c e s  and f o r e r u n n e r  of the C.I.A.) r e s e m b l e d  the later 
Gr een B e r e t s  and Delta  Forces. It drew e i g h t y - f o u r  me m b e r s  
from the U.S. Arm y 99th In fantry Bat t a l i o n  (Se pa rate) , a 
unit forty p e rc en t c o m p o s e d  of N o r w e g i a n  m e r c h a n t  m a r i n e r s  
s t r a n d e d  w i t h o u t  a home port in North Am er ic a after  the 
Ge r m a n  o c c u p a t i o n  of N o r w a y  began on April 9, 1940. The 
rest of the 99th were A m e r i c a n  v o l u n t e e r s  of S c a n d i n a v i a n  
d e s c e n t  .
In 1943, w h i l e  in tr ai n i n g  at Camp Hale, m e m b e r s  of
/
the 99th were i n t e r v i e w e d  by the O.S.S. and asked if they 
w o u l d  v o l u n t e e r  for "extra h a z a r d o u s  duty be hi nd  enemy 
lin es  in N o r w a y . "  Out of one th ous and men of the 99th, 
e i g h t y - f o u r  v o l u n t e e r s  were c h o s e n  for the N o r w e g i a n  
Sp e c i a l  O p e r a t i o n s  of the O.S.S. (O.S.S. N O R S O  Group) and 
began v i g o r o u s  t r a i n i n g  in c o m m a n d o  tact ics  in Am e r i c a n  and 
B r i t i s h  m i l i t a r y  f a c i liti es .
After "D" Day, the O.S.S. N O R S O  Group tea ms d r o pped 
b e h i n d  enemy lines in Fran ce to disrupt Ge rm an troop 
m o v e m e n t s .  Th es e teams, a u g m e n t e d  by F r e n c h - s p e a k i n g  
p e r s o n n e l ,  were to r a dio  back to Allied c o m m a n d e r s  w h ere  
the G e r m a n s  wer e and were  not, and to help m a r s h a l l  the 
F r e n c h  M a q u i s  to fight the r e t r e a t i n g  Ge rma n forces. N O RSO  
d i s t i n g u i s h e d  itself in France, and re turned  to Great 
B r i t a i n  in June, 1944, to begin ski e n d ura nc e t r a in in g and 
to p r e pare for a c t i o n  in Norway.
O p e r a t i o n  RYPE was able to drop only sixteen of the
4r e m a i n i n g  e i g h t y - f o u r  O.S.S. N O R S O  Group m e m b e r s  into 
N o r w a y  on M a r c h  25, 1945, due to bad weathe r, a i r c r a f t  
m a i n t e n a n c e  problems, and the inability  of a i r c r e w s  to 
l o c a t e  drop areas in the s w i r l i n g  mo u n t a i n  snows of 
n o r t h e r n  Norw ay.  In spite of the harsh wi nt e r  e n v i r o n m e n t  
and the p r o b l e m  of re supply, O p e r a t i o n  RYP E was a ble  to 
a c c o m p l i s h  its p r i n cipal m i s s i o n  of i n t e r d i c t i n g  the 
N o r d l a n d  Railway. This h i g h l y - s u c c e s s f u l  o p e r a t i o n ,  in
co n c e r t  wit h  other teams in n o r t h e r n  Norway, e f f e c t i v e l y
/
s l o w e d  down the m o v e m e n t  of c r a c k  German m o u n t a i n  t r o o p s  
s o u t h  t o w a r d s  Germany.
O p e r a t i o n  RYPE was unique  in having been the only 
N o r w e g i a n - A m e r i c a n  o p e r a t i o n  to "invade"  Norway. The 
O.S.S . N O R S O  G r o u p  was the only p a r a t r o o p e r - s k i  unit in the 
U.S. Army. The R YP E o p e r a t i o n  was h i g h l y - c l a s s i f i e d  until 
d e c l a s s i f i e d  by the F r e e d o m  of I n f o r m a t i o n  Act in 1975.
Some a r t ic le s, chapt ers, and m a n u s c r i p t s  have been w r i t t e n  
on O p e r a t i o n  RYPE, but not from a stan dpoint of the 
s t r a t e g i c  e n v i r o n m e n t  wi th i n  w h i c h  the RYP E m i s s i o n  
d e v e l o p e d  .
In the w o rl d of "Se cret I n t e l l i g e n c e , "  only the 
f a i l u r e s  of spec ial o p e r a t i o n s ,  such as I r a n ’s Des e r t  One 
( Pr e s i d e n t  Jimmy C a r t e r ’s ill - f a t e d  rescue effort of 
A m e r i c a n  h o s t a g e s  in April, 1980 make the h e a d l i n e s ,  and 
the s u c c e s s f u l  ones r e ma in  hidden. This is a sto ry of a 
h i gh ly s u c c e s s f u l  one, for a change.
5H i s t o r i c a l  B a c k g r o u n d
Du r i n g  1940-1945, No rway had a p o p u l a t i o n  of about 
3.3 m i l l i o n  peopl e and an area of 125,181 square  m i les of 
w h i c h  only three percent is a r a b l e  land, two perc ent 
pa stu re , and t w e n t y - t h r e e  percent pro d u c t i v e  forest.
Norway, a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  m o n a r c h y  since 1805, had not 
kn o w n  war since 1814 when, as a part of De nmark, it had 
p a r t i c i p a t e d  in the N a p o l e o n i c  Wars. The T r e a t y  of Kiel 
(1814) ob l i g e d  Norway to accept union with Sweden. In 
1905, N o r w a y  s u c c e s s f u l l y  ac h i e v e d  its i n d e p e n d e n c e  from 
Sweden. All three S c a n d i n a v i a n  c o u n t r i e s  m a n a g e d  to stay 
out of World  War I by c l os ely a d h e r i n g  to a po licy  of 
’’st rict n e u t r a l i t y . ” On the eve of W o r l d  War II, No rwa y  
t h o u g h t  this po li cy w o ul d again work. But, N o r w a y  was in 
the c o n t i n g e n c y  plans of both Nazi Ge rmany  and Great 
B r i t a i n  for m i l i t a r y  o cc upatio n,  as both were i n t e r e s t e d  in 
N o r w a y ’s h a r b o r s  and a i r f i e l d s  and each d e s i r e d  to deny the 
other use of N o r w a y  as a condu it for Sw edish exports.
The Ge rma n armed forces in vad ed  Norway on April 9, 
1940. Their s e c r e t i v e  and s i m u l t a n e o u s  s t r ikes on N o r w a y ’s 
ma j o r  ports caught the N o r w e g i a n s  c o m p l e t e l y  by surpri se  
and found them i l l - e q u i p p e d  m i l i t a r i l y  to defend 
t h e m s e l v e s .  N o n e t h e l e s s ,  N o r w e gian s,  aided by the British, 
took a heavy toll of Ge rm an  naval forces and i n f l icte d  
c a s u a l t i e s  on Ge rma n gr ound forces be fore s u c c u m b i n g  in 
June, 1940, to German occu p a t i o n .  D u r i n g  five bitter years
6t h e r e af ter, N o r w e g i a n s  s u c c e s s f u l l y  r e s is ted German 
a t t e m p t s  to n a z i f y  them. M I L O R G  (Mi litary O r g a n i z a t i o n ) ,  
the m i l i t a r y  r e s i s t a n c e  group w i thin Norway, was v i r t u a l l y  
shut down by the G e r mans in 1942: it had proved v u l n e r a b l e
to a s u c c e s s f u l  c a m p a i g n  of i n f i l t r a t i o n  by the Gestap o.
The h a rs h r e p r i s a l s  by the G e s t a p o  on M I L O R G  me m b e r s  
c o n v i n c e d  man y  N o r w e g i a n s  to b e c o m e  more passive. Al lie d 
s u s p i c i o n s  of w h e ther " N o r w e g i a n s  could keep a s e c r e t "  
re s u l t e d  in a pench an t for co vert o p e r a t i o n s  carrie d on in 
N o rway  by c o m m a n d o  teams  from withou t.
The A l lie d Plan Jupiter , a propos ed at tack on 
n o r t h e r n  Norway, was c h a n g e d  to a c a r e f u l l y - o r c h e s t r a t e d  
sc e n a r i o  of d e c e p t i o n  c a lled F o r t i t u d e  N o r t h  in August, 
1942, at the i n s i s t e n c e  of W i n s t o n  Churchil l. He w a n t e d  
H i t l e r  to r e m a i n  c o n v i n c e d  that the All ie s w o ul d la unch  a 
fl an k a t t a c k  on Norway at a n y t i m e ,  even up to the de mi se of 
the Third R e i c h  in May, 1945. This d e c e p t i o n  forced H i t l e r  
to t r a ns fer p r a c t i c a l l y  ail of his r e m a i n i n g  German naval 
u n its to No rw ay.  He also gave high priority  to the task of 
t u r n i n g  the N o r w e g i a n  c o ast int o an i m p r e g n a b l e  fortress.
In 1944 and 1945, the G e r m a n s  had the no tion that, should 
the F a t h e r l a n d  fall to the Allies, 35 0,000 German troops 
wo ul d make a last stand in " F e s t u n g  Nor w e g e n . "
After "D" Day, the Su p r e m e  H e a d q u a r t e r s  Allied 
E x p e d i t i o n a r y  Forces (SHAEF) wa nted  to s a b otage the 
r a i l r o a d s  in n o r t h e r n  No rway to prevent m a s s i v e  Ge rma n
7t r o o p  m o v e m e n t s  to the south. The German s were r e t r e a t i n g  
f r o m  the R u s s i a n  Army th ro ugh the no rth e r n  pr ovi n c e  of 
Fi nnmar k.  The A l l i e s  held back on this a c t i o n  b e c a u s e  the 
e x p e c t e d  c o l l a p s e  of Ge rm an  lines on the c o n t i n e n t  itself 
had not taken place. In Novem be r, 1944, Allied  policy  
changed. G e r m a n  r e i n f o r c e m e n t s  from n o r t h e r n  No rw ay  would 
only p r o l o n g  the war if they could reach the c o n t i n e n t a l  
fronts. In n o r t h e r n  Norway, M I L O R G  was v i r t u a l l y  n o n ­
ex i s t e n t .  O p e r a t i o n  RY PE' s primar y m i s s i o n  was to cut the 
N o r d l a n d  rail line at two points in the N o r t h  T r o n d e l a g  
area. Its s e c o n d a r y  ob je ctive, given the Allied  p o licy of 
" u n c o n d i t i o n a l  s u r r e n d e r , "  was to disar m o v e r w h e l m i n g l y  
s u p e r i o r  G e r m a n  forces  in an or derly m a n n e r , shou l d  such a 
s u r r e n d e r  occur.
S o u r c e s
The O f f i c e  of S t r a t e g i c  Se r v i c e s  Papers, N O R S O  
Se ction , are the pr im ary s o u rc es  of i n f o r m a t i o n  about 
O p e r a t i o n  RYPE. Ame ri ca n, British,  and N o r w e g i a n  b o o k s  and 
a r t i c l e s  were c o n s u l t e d  to pr es ent a ge ne ral a c coun t of the 
c o n d i t i o n s  in o c c u p i e d  Norway du ring  1940-1945.
The F r e e d o m  of I n f o r m a t i o n  Act and the first O.S.S. 
N O R S O  Group R e u n i o n  in M i n n e a p o l i s ,  M i n n e s o t a  in 1975, 
p r o v i d e d  p a r t i c i p a n t s  with their first o p p o r t u n i t y  to 
d o c u m e n t  the p r e v i o u s l y  h i g h l y - c l a s s i f i e d  h i s to ry  of the 
e x p l o i t s  of this unit. Ad olph Hogfoss, of New U l m , 
M i n n e s o t a ,  Leif Eide of Min ne a p o l i s ,  Karl H o f fm an  of
8Irvine, C a l i f or ni a, C l i f f o r d  Kyllo of La rim ore, Nor th  
Dakota, and M o r r i s  Sy r s t a d  of M i n n e a p o l i s ,  wo rked very hard 
to o r g a n i z e  the first reunio n. The ir first p r o blem was to 
l o c a t e  peopl e who had not been in contact with each other 
for over thirty  years. H o f f m a n  spent c o n s i d e r a b l e  time 
l o c a t i n g  th'ese v e t erans of the O.S.S. in both the U n i t e d  
S t a t e s  and Norw ay. The s e co nd pr o b l e m  was to co m p i l e  some 
sort of a unit hi stor y in time for the reunion. Ad ol p h  and 
Dee H o g f o s s  R e q u e s t e d  that unit me m b e r s  send them 
m e m o r a b i l i a  and cur rent news. The res p o n s e  was 
o v e r w h e l m i n g :  pi ct ures fro m then and now, with many
s t o r i e s  incl ud ed, came in the mail. The result was a 
m a n u s c r i p t  titled: "RYPE  N o r w e g i a n  Special O p e r a t i o n s
Gr oup, Oc t o b e r  10, 11, 12, 1975," that A d o l p h  and Dee 
H o g f o s s  c o m p i l e d  and had prin te d in Willmar , Min n e s o t a .
O ver one h u n d r e d  copies w e r e  d i s t r i b u t e d  to unit m e m b e r s  at 
the r e u n i o n .
M e a n w h i l e ,  Borge L a n g el an d, the rad io o p e r a t o r  for
O p e r a t i o n  RYPE, had d e c id ed  to wri te about the m i s s i o n
b a s e d  p r i m a r i l y  on i n f o r m a t i o n  to be found in the m e s s a g e s
he r e c eive d from and sent to London  during  the ope ra ti on.
On Oc tober 27, 1971, the O f f i c e  of the Di rec tor, S t r a t e g i c
S e r v i c e s  Unit, W a s h i n g t o n ,  D.C. denied L a n g e l a n d  ac ce ss  to
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hi s own m e s s a g e s .  On August  4, 1.975, the Cen tral
I n t e l l i g e n c e  Ag ency d e c l a s s i f i e d  the O p e r a t i o n  RYPE  
ma t e r i a l s .  L a n g e l a n d  had s u b m i t t e d  his m a n u s c r i p t  called:
9"RYPE: N o r w e g i a n  Spec ial O p e r a t i o n s  Group, O . S . S . "  to the
C.I.A. for c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  review. The C.I.A. d e t e r m i n e d
2
his m a n u s c r i p t  to be uncla s s i f i e d .  It was printed in
W i l l m a r ,  M i n n e s o t a  by Adolph  and Dee H o g f o s s  in time for
d i s t r i b u t i o n  to unit m e m b e r s  at the 1975 r e u ni on  in 
3
M i n n e a p o l i s .  Up to this point, the only public news of
R Y P E ’s e x p l o i t s  was in the November,  1945 issue of the
4
N a t i o n a l  G e o g r a p h i c  which  de s c r i b e d  the l i b e r a t i o n  in 
N o r w a y  in general; in the Dec ember, 1946 issue of
5
T r u e  C o mi cs and in Bernt B a l c h e n ’s Come N o rth With M e ,
6
p u b l i s h e d  in 1958. B a l c h e n ’s a c c o u n t  was from the
p e r s p e c t i v e  of one of many a v i a t o r s  who pr o v i d e d  air
s u p p o r t  to gr oups b e hi nd  enemy lines in Norway.
In the mid 1970s, W i l l i a m  E. Colby, upon r e t i r i n g
fr o m  the C.I.A., wrote  H o n o r a b l e  Men: My Life with  the
C . I . A . , in wh ic h he d i s c u s s e d  O p e r a t i o n  RYP E  and his work
as its leader. His was the first det ai led pu b l i s h e d
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a c c o u n t  of O p e r a t i o n  RYPE. In Norway in 1981, Gerd
N y q u i s t  wrot e B a t al jo n 9 9 , in wh ich she de vo ted four pages
to the R YP E missio n, r e l y i n g  he avily  on L a n g e l a n d ’s
m a n u s c r i p t .  Her book, not yet t r a n s l a t e d  into Eng lish,  is
an e x c e l l e n t  account of the 99th Infantry B a t t a l i o n
8
( S e p ar at e) out of whi ch Op e r a t i o n  RYPE evolved.
The O.S.S. NORSO  Group in El Paso, Texas is 
r e s p o n s i b l e  for the u n i t ’s p u b li city prior to its reuni ons, 
held  every two years at various l o c a t i o n s  t h r o u g h o u t  the
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U n i t e d  States and o v e r s e a s  in Scotland and Norway. The 
n e w s p a p e r  and m a g a z i n e  a r t i c l e s  present the O.S.S. N O R S O  
G r o u p  as a still m y s t e r i o u s  unit and i n c lu de a photo of 
W i l l i a m  Col by p r o m i n e n t l y .  The se ar t i c l e s  a t t ract 
r e p o r t e r s  who at N O R S O  r e u n i o n s  ask q u e s t i o n s  of r e l u c t a n t  
m e m b e r s  about what they did du ri ng  World War II. The 
a n s w e r s  of the v e t e r a n s  al wa ys fall short of what 
i n q u i s i t i v e  r e p o r t e r s  want to hear, and re i n f o r c e  the
m y s t e r y  of the O.S.S. N O R S O  Group.
/
The O.S.S. P a p e r s  are on m i c r o f i c h e  at the U n i v e r s i t y  
of N e b r a s k a  at Omaha. The o r i g i n a l s  are store d at the 
N a t i o n a l  A r c h i v e s  in W a s h i n g t o n ,  D.C. The or i g i n a l  O.S.S. 
m a p s  that O p e r a t i o n  RY P E  used are also in the N a t i o n a l  
A rc hives, but copi e s  are not at UNO. I could not locate 
p o ints  of i n t e r e s t  on m o d e r n  maps  of Norw a y  u s i n g  the 
O.S.S. grid c o o r d i n a t e  system, b e c au se c o n t e m p o r a r y  
m a p m a k e r s  and users  e m ploy the Uni v e r s a l  T r a n s v e r s e  
M e r c a t o r  Grid C o o r d i n a t e  System  ( U T M ) . Mr. Co lb y was made
a w a r e  of my dilemma: he took time from his busy law
p r a c t i c e  to xerox c o p i e s  of the O.S.S. maps for me at the
N a t i o n a l  A r c h i v e s  and then mail them to me so that I could
m a k e  t r a n s p o s i t i o n s  of the points of interes t to m o dern 
maps. It is not every day that a former Di re ctor of the 
C.I.A. he lp s a hu mb le  gr a d u a t e  student to ob ta in  primar y 
m a t e r i a l s  for re search.
O f f i c i a l  H i s t o r i e s  of the Brit ish and Am e r i c a n
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i n t e l l i g e n c e  c o m m u n i t i e s  help expl ain how o p e r a t i o n s  such
as RYPE  evolved. Of these, the most u s ef ul were F.H.
H i n s l e y ’s B r i t i s h  I n t e l l i g e n c e  in the S e c o n d  W o rld War:
Its Inf l u e n c e  as S t r a t e g y  and O p e r a t i o n s  in three 
9
v o l u m e s  and T h o m a s  F. T r o y ’s Do no va n and the Cent ral
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I n t e l l i g e n c e  A g e n c y .
The h i s t o r i o g r a p h y  of N o r w e g i a n  r e a c t i o n  to Ge rma n
o c c u p a t i o n  du rin g 194 0 - 1 9 4 5  is di f f i c u l t  to assess.
A c c o u n t s  w r i t t e n  either du ring or i m m e d i a t e l y  after W o r l d
W ar  II are today s u s p e c t e d  by a later g e n e r a t i o n  of
h i s t o r i a n s  of b e ing too c h a rge d with e m o t i o n a l i s m  or
p a r t i s a n s h i p .  C o n t e m p o r a r y  N o r w e g i a n  h i s t o r i a n s ,  Olaf
R ist e, Berit Nok leb y, Johs. An d e n a e s  and M. Skodvin have
r e c e n t l y  revie w e d  the war yea rs for Norway. Andenaes,
R i s t e  and S k o d v i n  in 1983 publis he d N o r w a y  and the Se co nd
W o r l d  War. Riste  and N o k leby in 1986 p u b l i s h e d  N o r w a y
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19 40 -1945: The R e s i s t a n c e  M o v e m e n t . Both boo ks are
s u r v e y s  that provide both the context and points of
d e p a r t u r e  for future re s e a r c h  on sp e c i f i c  topics  about the
G e r m a n  o c c u p a t i o n  in Norway.
N o r w a y ’s R e s i s t a n c e  M u s e u m  in Oslo was op ened to the
pu bl i c  by H.R.H. Crown P r in ce Haral d on May 8, 1970. It
als o  has a h i s t o r i c a l  r e s ea rch d e p a r t m e n t  that is still in
the pr ocess of g a t h e r i n g  pr imary so ur ces about the war
years. It i n s pi red Odd B e r gfal d to w r ite  Gestapo  i Norge 
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in 1978. The m u s e u m  h o uses a large am ount of Ge s t a p o
12
" m e m o r a b i 1 i a .” A li ttl e k n own  ca m p a i g n  in n o r t h e r n  Norway
in the p r o vi nce of Finnm ark , lib e r a t e d  by the Red Army, is
a l s o  featured at the museum. Its displa y p r o mpted Kjell
F j o r t o f t  to w r ite Vi Har Vaar F r i h e t : F i n n m a r k  H o s t e n  1944
14
in 1984.
British h i s t o r i a n  T.K. Derry in A H i s t o r y  of M o d e r n
N o r w a y  1 8 1 4 - 1 9 7 2 , p u b lishe d in 1973, p r e s e n t s  a brief but
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o b j e c t i v e  a s s e s s m e n t  of the o c c u p a t i o n  years. Richard
Pe tr ow , an A m e r i c a n  h i s t o r i a n  and jou rnali st , did e x t e n s i v e
/
r e s e a r c h  and i n t e r v i e w s  be fore p u b l i s h i n g  in 1974, his
The Bitter Years: The Inv as ion and O c c u p a t i o n  of D e n m a r k  and
N o r way, April 1940 - May 1 9 4 5 , and p r o v i d i n g  what is to
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d at e the best and most c o m pl et e E n g l i s h  l a n g u a g e  account.
A n thon y C a v e - B r o w n  di s c u s s e s  the B r i t i s h  and A m e ri ca n
i n t e l l i g e n c e  c o m m u n i t i e s  in Wor ld War II in B o d y g u a r d  of
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L i e s  (1975) and Secre t War Report of the O.S.S. (1976).
A r e a d i n g  of the latter wo r k  led this w r i t e r  to the
O.S.S. Papers, N O R S O  S e ct ion and the A m e r i c a n  covert
o p e r a t i o n  th e r e i n  desc ribed. The p e r c e p t i o n  that Al lied
c l a n d e s t i n e  a c t i v i t i e s  in No rway was c o m p l e t e l y  a B r i t i s h
s h o w  was not true. The A m e r i c a n s  p r o vi de d the p e r sonne l
t r a i n e d  by the O.S.S. in the Un ited St at e s  and later in
G r eat Britain, the supplies, and the l o n g - r a n g e
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  to de l i v e r  the RYPE mis sion. The B r i tish
p r o v i d e d  the explos iv es.
As noted before, in October, 1975, Borge Langelan d,
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the radio op era to r for O p e r a t i o n  RYPE, c o m p i l e d  a 
c h r o n o l o g y  of the a c t i o n s  of his group based p r i m a r i l y  on 
m e s s a g e s  sent and r e c e i v e d  b e twee n RYPE and Lond on. This 
w ri t e r  u n d e r s t a n d s  that L a n g e l a n d fs report was not 
p u b li shed and was w r i t t e n  only for d i s t r i b u t i o n  to m e m b e r s  
of the O.S^S. N O R S O  Group. L a n g e l a n d  was kind e n o u g h  to 
let this w r i t e r  have a c c e s s  to this report.
L a n g e l a n d  used a B r i t i s h  B- Mar k 2 radio t r a n s c e i v e r
po w e r e d  by a 6-volt w e t c e l l  battery  that could fit into a
/
small s u i t c a s e  and was easy to carry. It had five to six
c r y s t a l - c o n t r o l l e d  frequ e n c i e s ,  which were a l t e r e d  for each
19
s c h e d u l e d  t r a n s m i s s i o n .  " E u r e k a ” was the t r a n s m i t t e r  on
20
the ground and " R e b e c c a "  was the receiver in the plane.
The Rebe cca was a sma ll d i r e c t i o n - f i n d i n g  unit. The Eu re ka
o p e r a t o r  coul d press a key to transmit a lette r in M o r s e
Co de  over the air. This signal could be r e c e i v e d  by the
21
ai r c r a f t  w i t h i n  a f i f t y - m i l e  range of the RYPE group.
Duri n g  W o rl d War II, the B r i t i s h  B r o a d c a s t i n g
C o r p o r a t i o n  (B.B. C. ) br o a d c a s t  news to all of the oc c u p i e d
co un tr ies, both in E n g l i s h  and in the native lang uage.
After the new s was c omplet ed , certain  m e a n i n g l e s s  m e s s a g e s
w er e read, w h i c h  would have m e a n i n g  only to ag en ts
22
o p e r a t i n g  w i t h i n  that p a r t i c u l a r  country. For Bernt
B a l c h e n fs unit of B-24 L ib er ators, ce rtain m e s s a g e s  
i n s t r u c t e d  it to drop men and su pplies to c e r t a i n  
u n d e r g r o u n d  pa r t i e s  that night. For example, "the finch
14
has laid three e g g s ” mean t that the Finch r e c e p t i o n  par ty
was to expect three drops that night. The mes sa ge: "Two
s e a g u l l s  are f l y i n g ” meant that Pro jec t Sea Gull sho ul d
23
e x pe ct two pl an es  that night. To trigger a c t i o n s  for 
O p e r a t i o n  R Y P E  L a n g e l a n d  of fered the fol l o w i n g  m e s s a g e  and 
explanation-:
Four pl anes c o m i n g  tonight. NE corner of Lake " P ” 
for Peter.  L i s t e n  to B.B.C. Six of thirty.
’’L i s t e n  to B . B . C . ” me an t that if the planes were c o m i n g  that
night, the f a l l o w i n g  p r e a r r a n g e d  m e s s a g e  wo ul d be read
af te r the N o r w e g i a n  news over B.B.C.:
F o x t r o t t  1 M a s t e t o p p e n
( F o xtrot [dance] on top of the mast)
If the m e s s a g e  was not read, it meant that the fl igh t had
been c a n c e l l e d  at the last m i n u t e  due to w e a t h e r  
24
c o n d i t i o n s .
In a d d i t i o n  to t r a n s m i t t i n g  the letter "P" , the
E u r e k a  o p e r a t o r  had a visua l pro c e d u r e  that was m a n d a t o r y .
L a n g e l a n d  co ntinued:
Flash the letter ”P ” , one short, two long and one 
short flash by f l a s h l i g h t  as i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  to the 
plane and to i n d i c a t e  that the r e c e p t i o n  area was 
clear of Germans. W i t hout  the proper signal, no 
drop shou ld [be] made. 25
B o n f i r e s  also h e lped the ai r c r e w s  vi s u a l l y  loca t e  the
r e c e p t i o n  area. In the case of RYPE, four large st ac k s  of
i g n ited dry wood, three of which were laid out in a
st r aig ht  line with  the fourth placed to the left, like an
26
i n v e r t e d  ”L ” , would v i s u a l l y  aid the pilots.
15
In F e b r uary , 1945, the RYPE m i s s i o n  p r e pa red to 
p a r a c h u t e  into N o r w a y  from Scotland. M e a n w h i l e  in Ger ma ny ,  
only 300 m i l e s  s e p a r a t e d  R u s s i a n  and A n g l o - A m e r i c a n  fo rces  
c l o s i n g  in on the Reich. Yet SHAEF, w i t n e s s i n g  the 
c o l l a p s e  of Nazi Ge rma ny, still c o m m i t t e d  brave men to the 
h e r c u l e a n  task of k e e p i n g  Germa n forces on S c a n d i n a v i a n  
soils. The f o l l o w i n g  c h a p t e r s  d e s cr ibe how m i s s i o n s  such 
as R YP E e v olved  and e x p lai n the Allied strategic 
e n v i r o n m e n t  of w h ic h it was a part.
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CHAPTER 1
THE C A M P A I G N  IN NORWAY, A P R I L - J U N E  1940 
I N T R O D U C T I O N
To u n d e r s t a n d  R Y P E  and other N o r w e g i a n  and Al li ed 
o p e r a t i o n s  ag ain st  the G e r m a n s  in Norway, one is o b l i g e d  to
have some k n o w l e d g e  of the Ge rman o c c u p a t i o n  of No rw ay and
/
the N o r w e g i a n  r e s i s t a n c e  to it. This chapter br iefly 
s u r v e y s  that o c c u p a t i o n  and points out some of the many 
b o o k s  and a r t i c l e s  that di s c u s s  that subj ect in 
c o n s i d e r a b l e  detail. The third chapter will d e s c r i b e  the 
N o r w e g i a n  r e s i s t a n c e  at g r eater length be cause  very few 
E n g l i s h - l a n g u a g e  w o r k s  do so.
W h e r e a s  Sw eden a l o n e  a m o n g  the S c a n d i n a v i a n  c o u n t r i e s  
s u c c e e d e d  in s t aying out of W o r l d  War II, all S c a n d i n a v i a n  
c o u n t r i e s  had kept out of Wo rld  War I by m a i n t a i n i n g  
p o l i c i e s  of "strict n e u t r a l i t y . "  During the R u s s o - F i n n i s h  
War in the w i n t e r  of 1939-40, B r i tain and Fr an ce r e q u e s t e d  
of No rwa y and Swed en p e r m i s s i o n  to use their t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  
n e t w o r k s  to send aid to Finland. But Norway and Sw ed e n 
r e f us ed  to comply. Aft er def e a t i n g  Poland in 1939, Nazi 
Germany , a p p r e c i a t i n g  the str at eg ic i m p o r t a n c e  of Norw a y  
and Denmark, a t t acked  the m on April 9, 1940, as a first 
ste p to ward an a s s a u l t  on France thro ugh the low co u n t r i e s .
20
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N o r w a y ’s F o r e i g n  Po lic y 1 8 1 4 - 1 9 4 0
Until 1940, N o rway  had not kn ow n war since 1814, when
a f t e r  two w e eks of fi ght ing, she had to acc ept union with
S w e d e n  in the p o s t - N a p o l e o n i c  area. In 1905, No rway
p e a c e f u l l y  b e c a m e  i n d e p e n d e n t  of Sweden. In 1907, in the
T r e a t y  of Int egrit y,  France, Germany, Great B r i ta in  and
R u s s i a  agre ed to resp ect N o r w e g i a n  i n d e p e n d e n c e  and 
1
n e u t r a l i t y .
Su b s e q u e n t  a t t e m p t s  of Norway, Sweden, and D e n m a r k  to
c o o r d i n a t e  their f o r e i g n  po licies  did not meet with much
success. On the eve of World  War I, De n m a r k  had to be on
good terms with Germany; Sweden had to please Russia, and
N o r w a y  was on its best be h a v i o r  with Great Britain,
N o r w e g i a n s  r e m e m b e r i n g  how they had su ffered  under the
2
B r i t i s h  b l o c k a d e  d u r i n g  the N a p o l e o n i c  Wars.
All three S c a n d i n a v i a n  c o u n t r i e s  had ma n a g e d  to stay
out of W o r l d  War I, but the "strict n e u t r a l i t y "  polic y had
3
cost the N o r w e g i a n s  a n o ther  B r i t i s h  blockade. In 1919,
N o r w a y  joined the L e a g u e  of Nati ons, de spite  co n c e r n  that
such m e m b e r s h i p  might c o m p r o m i s e  her n e u t r a l i t y  in the
event of L e a g u e  s a n c t i o n s  ag a i n s t  a g g r e s s o r  nations.
N o r w a y  b e came an active Leag u e  member , and under the
l e a d e r s h i p  of Fr i d t j o f  Nansen, put con s i s t e n t  em p h a s i s  on
4
the L e a g u e ’s h u m a n i t a r i a n  ac ti v i t i e s .  In 1936, No rway 
joined her S c a n d i n a v i a n  nei g h b o r s  in d e c l a r i n g  that they 
w o u l d  no longer feel ob l i g a t e d  to imp lem en t economic
22
s a n c t i o n s  under the Leag u e  C o v e n a n t  be ca use of the fa i l u r e s
and the a m b i g u o u s  p o l icies  of the we st ern powers to w a r d s
5
a g g r e s s i v e  nati ons. Norway, on the eve of W o rld  War II,
6
m a i n t a i n e d  her policy of ’’strict n e u t r a l i t y . ”
N o r w e g i a n s  read wit h inter es t and an xiety  about
E u r o p e a n  e v en ts  b e g i n n i n g  with  the Mu nich  Pact of S e p t e m b e r
30, 1938, a f ter  which the Oslo A f t e n p o s t e n ’s h e a d l i n e  declared:
JEG TRO R  DET ER FRED  FOR H ELE VAAR L E V E T I D  (peace in our 
7
time). On Sept em ber 3, 1939, the Stavanger  A f t e n b l a d ’s 
h e a d l i n e  a n n o un ced: S T O R B R I T A N N I A  0G F R A N K R I K E  ER I KRIG
8
M E D  T Y S K L A N D  (Britain and Fr an ce declar e war on Ge rm any).
N o r w a y  c o n t i n u e d  to try to m a i n t a i n  its po licy of ’’strict
n e u t r a l i t y . ” The R u s s o - F i n n i s h  War of 1939 a l a r m e d  Norway,
as had R u s s i a n  s e i zing  of three Baltic states  after Ge r m a n y
9
and R u s s i a  p a r t i t i o n e d  Poland.
N or w a y  fig ured in G e rman war plans: A d m ir al  E r ich
R a e d e r  and Fi eld  Ma r s h a l l  He r m a n n  Go ering saw the
a d v a n t a g e s  to G e rm any s e i zing S c a n d i n a v i a n  naval and air
bases. The a d m i r a l  took the lead in c o n v i n c i n g  Adolf
H i t l e r  that force must be used to insure G e r m a n y ’s
c o n t i n u e d  a c c e s s  to S w e di sh  iron ore on whi ch  the Third
R e i c h  de p e n d e d  for 1 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0  tons of iron ore 
10
c o n s u m p t i o n .  He ar gue d that most of the iron ore was 
s h i p p e d  by rail via Kir una from Swed ish  mines to N a r v i k  and 
o t her N o r w e g i a n  w a r m - w a t e r  ports and thence t h r o u g h  
N o r w e g i a n  t e r r i t o r i a l  w a t e r s  to the Baltic. If Great
23
B r i t a i n  should first take thes e ports, wa rn e d  Raeder, she
co ul d not only stop the vit al flow of ore but also
11
b l o c k a d e  the Balti c and the North Sea. Hi tler put the
s u g g e s t i o n  asid e b e c ause his mind was focused on pla ns for
12
i n v a d i n g  Fr ance and the low countries.
On Dec e m b e r  10, 1939, a former N o r w e g i a n  M i n i s t e r  of 
Defense-, Vid ku n Q u i s ling , came to Berlin to warn Ad miral  
R a e d e r  that B r i t a i n  was about to invade Norway. Q u i s l i n g
was the leade r of the N a s j o n a l  Sa ml ing (Nation al• • /
U n i f i c a t i o n ) ,  a party s y m p a t h e t i c  to the Nazi cause.
R a e d e r  ar r a n g e d  a m e e t i n g  on D e c em be r 14, 1939, be tw ee n
Q u i s l i n g  and Hitler , in which Hitler was i m p ressed with
13
Q u i s l i n g  and pr o m i s e d  him "help." Q u i s l i n g  told Hitl e r
that he could deli ver  N o r w a y  to Ge rman h a nds  th rough a
coup. He also had in his c o n f i d e n c e  the m i l i t a r y  c o m m a n d e r
at Narvik, C o lo ne l Ko nrad  Sundlo, who w o ul d s u r rend er  his
f o r c e s  to Germany. The iron ore port of Na rvik was the
14
e x p e c t e d  target of any B r i t i s h  ' invasion of Norway. On
the same day, H i t l e r  o r d e r e d  the Germa n High Co m m a n d  to
15
s t udy how to invade N o rwa y and Denmark. He did not
tell Q u i s l i n g  about such planning, w i s h i n g  it to be done in
16
st ri c t  confi de nce.
When the R u s s o - F i n n i s h  War began in 3939, the French 
s u g g e s t e d  that an A n g l o - F r e n c h  e x p e d i t i o n a r y  force be sent 
t h r o u g h  Norway and S w eden to aid Finland, but Brit is h and 
F r e n c h  o v e r t u r e s  to this end were rej ected by the S w e d i s h
24
and N o r w e g i a n  G o v e r n m e n t s ,  who r e a f f i r m e d  ’’strict 
17
n e u t r a l i t y . ” As late as F e b r u a r y  5, 1940, the A l li ed Wa r
council in P a ri s c o n s i d e r e d  s e n d i n g  a joint e x p e d i t i o n a r y
18
force to S c a n d i n a v i a  anyway.
The A l t m a r k  Af fai r final ly con v i n c e d  Hi tl er that
N o r w a y  must be seized and that he could not wait for
Q u i s l i n g  to de liver her in a coup. On F e b ruary 16, 1940,
the Ge rma n t r o o p s h i p  A l t m a r k , with B r i t i s h  p r i s o n e r s  on
board, had .been c a p t u r e d  by a B r i t i s h  Naval force in
N o r w e g i a n  waters. H i t l e r  fumed when N o r w e g i a n  g u n b o a t s  did
not resist this v i o l a t i o n  of N o r w e g i a n  n e u t r a l i t y  by the 
19
B r i t i s h .
By M a r c h  1, 1940, H i t l e r  had com p l e t e d  his plans for
20
o c c u p y i n g  both D e n m a r k  and Norway. On M a rc h 9, 1940,
R a e d e r  told H i t l e r  that i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  of W e s e r u b u n g  (the
c o d e - n a m e  for the o p e r a t i o n )  was urgent be ca use he was
c o n v i n c e d  that an Al lie d inv a s i o n  of S c a n d i n a v i a  w o u l d  have
to occur w h i l e  F i n l a n d  was still in the war, or not at all.
T h r e e  days later, F i n l a n d  ac c e p t e d  the Ru ss ia n terms, and
was out of the war. Hi tl er gave the green light to
Li e u t e n a n t  G e n eral N i k o l a u s  von F a l k e nh or st, in c h a r g e  of
21
W e s e r u b u n g ,  to begin o p e r at ions.
On M a r c h  28, 1940, W i n s t o n  C h u r ch il l (who would
become P r i m e  M i n i s t e r  of Great Britai n r e p l acing N e v i l l e  
C h a m b e r l a i n  on May 11, 1940) proposed  that the B r i t i s h  Navy 
mine the p a s s a g e  th r o u g h  the N o r w e g i a n  Leads (c oastal
25
22
w a t e r s )  so as to deny their use to Germany. If G e r many
c o uld be cut off from all S w e d i s h  ore su p p l i e s  until the
end of 1940, a se vere blow wou ld be struck at her war-
23
m a k i n g  cap ac ity.
On April 8, 1940, the Alli e s  a n n o u n c e d  the m i n i n g  of
three N o r w e g i a n  har bo rs. The N o r w e g i a n  G o v e r n m e n t  sent a
ter se pr ot est to Great B r i t a i n  sa yi ng this a c t i o n  was a
fla g r a n t  v i o l a t i o n  of the n e u t r a l i t y  of Norway. N o r w e g i a n
24
a t t e n t i o n  was on Great B r i t a i n  and not on Ge rmany.  That
a f t e r n o o n ,  the P o li sh  sub O r z e 1 sank the G e r m a n  t r a n s p o r t
Rio de J a n ei ro  off the s o u t h e r n  coast of No rway. The few
s u r v i v o r s  were W e h r m a c h t  soldiers in combat dress. They
told their r e s cu er s that they were on their way to Be rge n
to aid N o r w a y  a g a in st  the British . The r e s c u e r s  did not
25
alert the N o r w e g i a n  Adm ira lt y.
On April 8, 1940, at 11:23 p.m., the Oslo forts came
under G e r m a n  fire, and at m i d n i g h t  the N o r w e g i a n s  so un de d 
26
an air alarm. L i e u t e n a n t  C o l on el  R. Ro sher N i e ls en ,
Chi ef  of the O p e r a t i o n s  Section, was a w a k e n e d  by the Army
Chi ef  of Staff  on the e v e ni ng of 8-9 April to be told that
G e r m a n s  had at t a c k e d  f o r t r e s s e s  at the m o ut h of Oslo Fjord.
Oslo beg an a b l a c k o u t  at 1:58 a.m. and a n t i c i p a t e d  air
27
raids. The Army was caught napping. At 1:30 a.m., on 
April 9, 1940, the c a b in et  learne d that the G e r m a n s  had 
seiz e d  Narvik, T r o n dh eim, Bergen, Stav anger , and
28
K r i s t i a n s a n d  , i n c l u d i n g  all the im por tant ai r f i e l d s .  At
26
2: 30  a.m., the N o r w e g i a n  G o v e r n m e n t  still d e b ate d w h e t h e r
29
or not to m o b i l i z e  four r e se rv e divisio ns.
At 9:3 0 a.m., on April 9, 1940, a specia l train left
for Hamar with Kin g H a a k o n  VII and his famil y and m e m b e r s
of the g o v e r n m e n t  and S t o r t i n g  (the N o r w e g i a n  P a r l i a m e n t ) .
At the same time, tw en ty  tru cks t r a n s p o r t e d  the gold of the
Ba n k  of No rway  and the se cret  papers of the F o r e i g n  O f fi ce 
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to Hamar. Dr. Kurt B r a u e r , the Germa n m i n i s t e r  to
No r way , d e l i v e r e d  an u l t i m a t u m  to the N o r w e g i a n  G o v e r n m e n t
in H a m a r  d e m a n d i n g  i m m e d i a t e  surrender; the N o r w e g i a n s
r e j e c t e d  it, even t h o u g h  Br a u e r ' s  me ssage  su g g e s t e d  that
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the G e r m a n s  came as friends. A hand ful of N o r w e g i a n  army
and navy p e r s o n n e l  kept the German fleet out of Oslo for
most of the day and made  the K i n g ’s escape possible.
N o r w e g i a n  t o r p e d o e s  sank the crui ser Bl uc her that ca r r i e d
G e s t a p o  and c i v i l i a n  p e r s o n n e l  des i g n a t e d  to take over the
N o r w e g i a n  G o v e r n m e n t .  G e rm an  troops were not able to enter
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Os l o  until 2:00 p.m. The first Ge rman tr oop s entered
N o r w e g i a n  citi e s  with w h i t e  flags tied to their b a y o n e t s  to
a n n o u n c e  they had come as friends. When Ge rman
p a r a c h u t i s t s  jumped into F o rn eb u Airport ou tside of Oslo,
N o r w e g i a n  u n a r m e d  p o l i c e m e n  on h o r s e b a c k  e s c orted them into
33
N o r w a y ’s ca p i t a l  of Oslo.
The s o u t h e r n  half of Norwa y quickly fell under G e rm an  
34
o c c u p a t i o n .  A c o n t i n g e n t  of British, French, and P o li sh
f o r c e s  ru shed to Na rvik and began to retake it on April 14,
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1940. Two c o m p a n i e s  of the B r i t i s h  Scots G u ar ds la nded
at Har st ad , n o rt h of Narv ik, and joined fo rces w i t h  the
N o r w e g i a n  Army. G e r m a n y  r e i n f o r c e d  N a r v i k  by air. Ten
J u n k e r s  52s landed on a froz e n  lake nearby; and a ba t t e r y
of m o u n t a i n  a r t i l l e r y  cr o s s e d  the Swe dish border, ten m i l e s
ea st  of Nar-vik aft er h a v i n g  passed th rough Sw eden wit h
36
S w e d i s h  p e r m i s s i o n .  On April 24, 1940, the B r i t i s h  fle et
b o m b a r d e d  G e r m a n  p o s i t i o n s  ar ou nd Narvik. Four N o r w e g i a n
b a t t a l i o n s  were north of Narvik: one-h alf had bee n k i l l e d/
in action. B r i t i s h  tr oops under the command of Major
G e n e r a l  P.J. M a c K e s y  landed, but were sta lle d by four feet
of snow. In late April, three b a t t a l i o n s  of F r e n c h
C h a s s e u r s  A l p i n s  ar r i v e d .  In early May, two b a t t a l i o n s  of
F r e n c h  F o r e i g n  L e g i o n n a i r e s  and four b a t t a l i o n s  of P o l i s h
37
t r o o p s  arrived.
The final A l l i e d  a t ta ck was May 28, 1940. The
e x h a u s t e d  G e r m a n  t r o o p s  w i t h d r e w  ea stward on the r a i l w a y  
38
in t o  Sweden. The r e s i d e n t s  of N a rvik  made c o f f i n s  for
the Allied dead. A c o l o n e l  bade farewell to the fa ll e n
w i t h  a s a lute  of res pect. A pastor followed w ith a bu cket
of earth and a spade, u t t e r i n g  a prayer wit h  a s p r i n k l e  of 
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dirt.
Al lied ef f o r t s  had not been in vain: G e r m a n y  lost
o n e - f o u r t h  to o n e - t h i r d  of its surface navy in the i n v a s i o n
40
of Norway. B e c a u s e  the w e s t e r n  front was in a c r i s i s  
a f t e r  the G e r m a n s  had o v e r r u n  the low c o u n t r i e s  and i n v a d e d
28
Fr a n c e ,  all Al li ed forces w i t h d r e w  from Norway on June 11,
1940, to go to France. King H a a k o n  sailed from T r o m s o  to
41
L o n do n, to carry on N o r w a y ’s fight from there.
The N o r w e g i a n s  had been at peace for 126 years and
42
w e r e  u n p r e p a r e d  for war. They had skimped on arms and
had an arm y of only 9,000 men, a navy of only 57 small
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ships,  and an air force of 100 planes. The ma i n  re a s o n s  
why G e r m a n y  won a s t u n n i n g  v i c tor y in Norway were: (1) its
i m m e n s e  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  s u p e r iorit y;  (2) the total N o r w e g i a n  
u n r e a d i n e s s ,  and (3) the i n a b i l i t y  of the F r en ch  and
44
B r i t i s h  to ren der s u f f i c i e n t  and timely m i l i t a r y  aid.
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P i e r r e  Oliver Lapie, Wi t h  the Foreign L e g i o n  at 
N a r v i k  (London: John Murray , 1941), p. 121. H e r e a f t e r
r e f e r r e d  to as: Lapie, N a r v i k .
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VII bo ar ded  HMS D e v o n s h i r e .
42
Shirer, C h a l 1 e n g e , p. 28.
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I b i d , p. 34. See also Petrow, The Bitte r Y e a r s , 
pp. 38-39. The N o r w e g i a n  High Co mm an d had a s s i g n e d  full 
d i v i s i o n s  for the d e fe ns e of the c o u n t r y ’s six most 
i m p o r t a n t  m i l i t a r y  and ci v i l i a n  centers: Oslo;
K r i s t i a n s a n d ; Bergen; Tro ndhe im ; Stav anger; and Nar vik .
All d i v i s i o n s  wer e u n d e r s t r e n g t h , poorly equipped, i n a c t i v e  
and n e g l e c t e d  .
CHAPTER II
B R I T I S H  AN D A M E R I C A N  I N T E L L I G E N C E  R E O R G A N I Z E
I N T R O D U C T I O N
This c h a p t e r  su r v e y s  some of the e x t e n s i v e  
b i b l i o g r a p h y  on i n t e l l i g e n c e  in Worl d War II. If the 
r e a d e r  is w e 1 1 - s c h o o l e d  in the inner w o r k i n g s  of the 
B r i t i s h  and A m e r i c a n  i n t e l l i g e n c e  c o m m u n i t i e s  at that time, 
the au th or w o u l d  not be of f e n d e d  if this ch a p t e r  were 
by passe d.  The m a i n  aim of this chap ter is to d e s c r i b e  the 
l a r g e r  c o n te xt  of Al li ed i n t e l l i g e n c e  o p e r a t i o n s  out of 
w h i c h  Al lied  s a b o t e u r  m i s s i o n s  like RYPE d e v e loped.
B efo re W o r l d  War II, there were no B r i t i s h  or 
A m e r i c a n  c e n t r a l  c l e a r i n g  h o u s e s  to i n t e rpret i n t e l l i g e n c e  
g a t h e r e d  on a g g r e s s o r  natio ns . The at te mpt  by v i s i o n a r i e s  
to e s t a b l i s h  them  were met wit h  c o n s i d e r a b l e  r e s i s t a n c e  by 
s e l f - s e r v i n g  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  who were r e l u c t a n t  to share 
t h eir i n f o r m a t i o n  with a c o o r d i n a t i n g  unit d e s i g n e d  to 
i n t e r p r e t  it. The re sul t was that Allied n a t i o n s  were 
s u r p r i s e d  whe n Ge rmany invaded Poland in 1939 and D e n m a r k  
and Norway in 1940, even though f r a g mente d Allied a g e n c i e s  
had re ce ived i n d i c a t i o n s  that Germany wou ld do so. The 
B r i t i s h  r e o r g a n i z e d  their i n t e l l i g e n c e  c o m m u n i t y  in 1940 
and it p r o m p t l y  began covert ope r a t i o n s  behind ene my lines.
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The A m e r i c a n s  took longer to r e o r g a n i z e ,  c h i efly be cause of
the r e s i s t a n c e  by the F.B.I., and of the p o p u l a r i t y  of the
n o t i o n  that covert a c t i v i t i e s  were not the A m e r i c a n  way to
do business. The B r i t i s h  had a t w o -y ea r head start on the
A m e r i c a n  i n t e l l i g e n c e  c o m m u n i t y  and by 1941 u s ually  knew
what w o u l d . w o r k  and what would not work. As a result,
A m e r i c a n  i n t e l l i g e n c e  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  p a t t e r n e d  t h e m s e l v e s
aft er  their B r i t i s h  c o u n t e r p a r t s  for a joint effort  to
outwit Ge r m a n y  d u r i n g  W o rl d War II.
A. B R I T I S H  I N T E L L I G E N C E  S E R V I C E S  R E O R G A N I Z E
F.H. Kin sley, au thor of B r i t i s h  I n t e l l i g e n c e  in the
Se co nd  W o r l d  W a r , d e f ined i n t e l l i g e n c e  as follows:
I n t e l l i g e n c e  is an a c t i v i t y  w h ich co nsists , 
e s s e n t i a l l y  of three fun ctions. I n f o r m a t i o n  has 
to be acq uired ; it has to be a n a l y z e d  and 
interpr et ed; and it has to be put into the hands 
of those who can use it.
Once this ci rcle of a c t i v i t y  is inter r u p t e d ,  i n t e l l i g e n c e
is dead. That was the case with Br i t i s h  i n t e l l i g e n c e  after
W o r l d  War I as the U n i t e d  K i n g d o m  r e t r e a t e d  into " s p le nd id
i s o l a t i o n , "  s e p a r a t e d  from the i n t r i g u e s  of C o n t i n e n t a l  
1
E u r o p e .
B e t w e e n  the two W o r l d  V/ars, there was no lack of 
a n x i e t y  by the F o r e i g n  Of fi ce and the G o v e r n m e n t  Code and 
Cypher School for more and better i n t e l l i g e n c e .  The 
F o r e i g n  Offi c e  had an o v e r r i d i n g  int er est in the conduct of 
d i p l o m a c y  and was r e l u c t a n t  to p a r t i c i p a t e  in the Joint 
I n t e l l i g e n c e  S u b c o m m i t t e e  ( J . I . C . ). of the Ch ie fs  of
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Sta ff (C.O.S.). C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  the Joint I n t e l l i g e n c e  
S u b c o m m i t t e e  was i n e f f ec tive.
B r i t i s h  e m b a s s i e s  a b r o a d  had mi l i t a r y  a t t ac hes 
a t t a c h e d  to them. W h a t e v e r  i n t e l l i g e n c e  a t t a c h e s  gathe r e d  
was sent to the m i l i t a r y  a g e n c i e s  in Lo nd o n  by d i p l o m a t i c  
courie r. The e m b a s s i e s  simply acted as a "postal drop" for 
the att aches, f o r w a r d i n g  both " i n f o r m a t i o n "  and 
" i n t e l l i g e n c e "  to the a p p r o p r i a t e  mi l i t a r y  ag en cy for
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  (For example, the n u m b e r s  of ships in a
/
f o r e i g n  port were simply " i n f o r m a t i o n . "  Why they were
th er e was " i n t e l l i g e n c e . " )  H i g h - t e c h  " i n f o r m a t i o n "  was
p i g e o n h o l e d  into " s o m e o n e ’s m i l i t a r y  b a i l i w i c k "  in London.
O c e a n s  of data wer e h o u s e d  in London. I n t e l l i g e n c e  bu dgets
w er e so low that too few people were ar ound to even
c a t e g o r i z e  the data they had; a n a l y s i s  and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
2
wer e  s e l d o m  possible.
P e r h a p s  the gr eate st  Al lied i n t e l l i g e n c e  a c h i e v e m e n t
was the b r e a k i n g  of e n c i p h e r e d  G e rman "E nigma " messages .
The Eni gm a was an e l e c t r o - m e c h a n i c a l  e n c i p h e r i n g  m a c h i n e  of
3
great c omplex it y.
The G e r m a n  Navy ad op ted en igma for use in 1926 and 
the German Army and the Ge rma n Air Force followe d suit in 
1929 and 1934. The m i l i t a r y  b r a n c h e s  then made 
m o d i f i c a t i o n s  to E N IGM A that would so c o m p l i c a t e  the task 
of d e c i p h e r i n g  by u n w e l c o m e  c r y p t a n a l y s t s  that the G e r ma ns  
th oug ht they had a t o t al ly  secure s y stem of c o m m u n i c a t i o n .
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The F r e n c h  I n t e l l i g e n c e  Serv ice  got wind  of En igma
fro m a G e rm an  call e d  "Asc he" in 1932 and began w o r k  to wards
its p e n e t r a t i o n .  The B r i t i s h  Go v e r n m e n t  Code and Cy pher
S c hool  did not show mu c h  i n t ere st  in Genera l Gu s t a v e
B e r t r a n d ’s coup, as B r i t i s h  po lic y towards Fr ance was to
s h are e v e r y t h i n g  with her ex cept crypt ology. But that
ch a n g e d  when M a r i a n  Re jewski, a m a t h e m a t i c i a n  from P o s n a n
U n i v e r s i t y  in Poland, d e v e l o p e d  several m o d e l s  of E n i g m a  to
find a total s o l u t i o n  to d e c i p h e r i n g  i n t e r c e p t s  of G e r m a n
c o m m u n i c a t i o n s .  In 1937 he and c r y p t a n a l y s t s  Jerz y R o z ychi
and Henry Z y g a l s k y  p r o d u c e d  the " c r y p t o g r a p h i c  B o m b e , "  a
m a c h i n e  d e v i s e d  for "f i n d i n g "  enigma keys (s ettin gs). By
1939, Pol ish c r y p t a n a l y s t s  cou ld break E n igma m e s s a g e s  in 
4
110 m i n u t e s .
B e r t r a n d  called  a F r a n c o - B r i t i s h - P o l i s h  c o n f e r e n c e  of
c r y p t o l o g i s t s  to d i s c u s s  E n i g m a  in Paris on J a n u a r y  7-9, 1939
and again in W a r s a w  on July 24-25, 1939, wh ere the A l l i e s
a g r e e d  to c o l l a b o r a t e  fully to exploit what they k n e w  about
Enigma. In the me a n t i m e ,  the Ge rmans added more "new w h e e l s "
5
to E n igma  to c o m p l i c a t e  it even more. The A l lied  p e n e t r a t i o n
6
of the G e r m a n  E n ig ma came as "manna in a de s e r t . "
W h i t e h a l l  was s u r p r i s e d  whe n Italy inva ded Al bania on 
Apr il 7, 1939, even th ough  it had Secret I n t e l l i g e n c e  
S e r v i c e  r e p o r t s  st a t i n g  this was a pos sib il ity. The
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F o r e i g n  Offi ce  picked up on this, and gave the green light
to the Ch iefs  of Staff (C.O.S.) to create the S i t u a t i o n
R e p o r t  Center. The F o r e i g n  O f f i c e  w e l c o m e d  its
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in W h i t e h a l l ’s Joint I n t e l l i g e n c e
S u b c o m m i t t e e  and as s u m e d  its d i r e c t o r s h i p  in July, 1939.
T h u s  was born the n a t i o n a l  m e c h a n i s m  to i n t e r p r e t  and
7
a n a l y z e  all i n t e l l i g e n c e  ’’under one r o o f ” .
W h i t e h a l l  still had to learn how to t r a n s l a t e  po lic y
into practice. The joint v e n t u r e  into i n t e l l i g e n c e
a s s e s s m e n t s  had not had much of a chance to ’’w r i n g  itself
o u t ” as an e f f i c i e n t  m a c h i n e  from July to S e p t e m b e r  1,
1939, when  Ado lf Hi tle r began his ’’B l i t z k r i e g ” i n v a s i o n  of
Poland. Br i t i s h  h i e r a r c h i e s  did not k no w wha t i n t e l l i g e n c e
to ask for and s u b o r d i n a t e  en t i t i e s  were slow to re s p o n d
even whe n told what to provide.
The War Cabinet  n e eded  i n f o r m a t i o n  on which to base
its fo rec a s t  of H i t l e r ’s next move in the s p r i n g  of 1940.
It re c e i v e d  n u m e r o u s  su mm aries , i n c l u d i n g  i n t e l l i g e n c e
su m m a r i e s .  The M i n i s t r y  of Econ o m i c  W a r f a r e  (M.E.W.)
r e p o r t e d  a s s e s s m e n t s  of the G e r m a n  economy. The P o l i t i c a l
W a r f a r e  E x e c u t i v e  (P.W.E.) re p o r t e d  trends in German
p r o p a g a n d a .  The F o r e i g n  Off ice r e p orted p o l i t i c a l
i n t e l l i g e n c e .  The Joint I n t e l l i g e n c e  S u b c o m m i t t e e  made
8
daily and we ek l y  s i t u a t i o n  reports.
M.I. (M ilitar y I n t e l l i g e n c e ,  a b r a n c h  of the War 
Of fic e ) ,  was r e s p o n s i b l e  for c o l l e c t i n g  and c l a s s i f y i n g  all
40
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m i l i t a r y  i n f o r m a t i o n  on fo r e i g n  armies. M . I . 1 ( b )  was
r e s p o n s i b l e  for the s e c u r i t y  of Br i t i s h  cod es  and 
10
cyphers. M.I . 1 ( c ) ,  r e s p o n s i b l e  for s c r e e n i n g  sp ie s in
its Home O f f i c e  and for c o u n t e r e s p i o n a g e  on foreign soil,
had been split in 1921 into the Secret Se rvice B u r e a u  and
11
the S e c r e t ' I n t e l l i g e n c e  Service. The former b e c a m e  the
Se c u r i t y  S e r vic e (M.I.5) and the latter after 1940 was also
k n o w n  as M.I.6.  M.I.8. b e c a m e  r e s p o n s i b l e  for i n t e r c e p t i n g
12
Ge r m a n  w i r e l e s s  t r a n s m i s s i o n s .  M.I.9, also kno wn as the
C o m b i n e d  S e r v i c e s  D e t a i l e d  I n t e r r o g a t i o n  Center, was
13
r e s p o n s i b l e  for i n t e r r o g a t i n g  pris o n e r s - o f - w a r .
After the fall of F r a n c e  in June, 1940, Prime
M i n i s t e r  W i n s t o n  C h u r c h i l l  de cided to c o n s o l i d a t e  all
B r i t i s h  s a b o t a g e  a c t i v i t i e s  a g a i n s t  German y into one
o r g a n i z a t i o n  with " d i c t a t o r i a l  powers." On July 16, 1940,
C h u r c h i l l  i n s t r u c t e d  the S p e cial O p e r a t i o n s  E x e c u t i v e
(S.O.E.) to "set E u r o p e  a b l a z e "  by tr ai n i n g  in B r i t a i n
f o r e i g n  n a t i o n a l s  of G e r m a n - o c c u p i e d  c o u n t r i e s  in
s u b v e r s i o n  and s a b o t a g e  and then r e t u r n i n g  them to the
c o n t i n e n t  to rouse their fe llow  coun t r y m e n  ag ai nst G e r m a n  
14
o c c u p a t i o n .
W h i t e h a l l  r e c e i v e d  w a r n i n g s  of the i m p e n d i n g  
o c c u p a t i o n  of No rwa y by G e r m a n  forces. By March 26, 1940,
all i n t e l l i g e n c e  h e r e t o f o r e  gather ed c o n f irmed  that No rw a y  
and D e n m a r k  were next on H i t l e r ’s "B li t z k r i e g "  agenda. But 
the B r i t i s h  did not a n t i c i p a t e  how soon t h e r e a f t e r  the
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G e r m a n s  w o ul d invade Norway. Be c a u s e  the va r i o u s
i n t e l l i g e n c e  b r a n c h e s  were as yet u n a c c u s t o m e d  to c o l l a t i n g
i n f o r m a t i o n  from d i f ferent  sources, the Allie d i n t e l l i g e n c e
d e b a c l e  was c o n f i r m e d  on April 9, 1940, wh e n  Ge r m a n y
15
i n v a d e d  N o r w a y  and Denmark.
B. A M E R I C A N  I N T E L L I G E N C E  R E O R G A N I Z E S
K n o w i n g  that the U n i t e d  St ates would i n e v i t a b l y
en te r W o r l d  War II, W i l l i a m  J. "Wild Bill " D o n o v a n
s u c c e s s f u l l y  c h a m p i o n e d  his idea of an i n t e l l i g e n c e  central
c l e a r i n g  h o use  for Am erica w hen Pr e s i d e n t  F r a n k l i n  D.
R o o s e v e l t  a p p o i n t e d  him the C o o r d i n a t o r  of I n f o r m a t i o n
16
(C.O.I.) on July 11, 1941. W a s h i n g t o n ,  D.C. had
b u r g e o n e d  w i t h  " a l phabet  soup" agencies, all t r y i n g  to
solv e p r o b l e m s  w h i c h  the D e p r e s s i o n  p r e s e n t e d  and to r e s pond
to the t h r e a t s  from abroad. More often than  not, a g e n c y
f r a n c h i s e s  o v e r l a p p e d ,  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  be came "empir e
b u i l d e r s "  and se l f - s e r v i n g .  R o o s e v e l t ' s  tack was that, if
one ag enc y could not do its job, anot her one could take its
place, a "s u r v i v a l  of the fittest " in the " p o l i t i c a l
f i r e s t o r m "  in A m e r i c a  to solve the proble ms  at home and
abroad. What trou b l e d  R o o s e v e l t  were thos e a g e n c i e s  that
had i n t e l l i g e n c e  arms. The Ru m r i c h  Case, an e s p i o n a g e
episode, a n g e r e d  R o o sevelt  and he saw the need for
c o o r d i n a t i o n  of i n t e l l i g e n c e  m a t t e r s  and the d e f i n i t i o n  of
17
o p e r a t i n g  b ounda ri es.
Other g o v e rn me nt a g e n c i e s  perc ei ved D o n o v a n ' s  small
42
o r g a n i z a t i o n  to be one that i n t e r p r e t e d  the c o n f u s i n g  
r e p o r t s  by these a g e n c i e s  to Roosevelt.  Do nova n had other 
plans; by July 30, 1941, C o o r d i n a t o r  of I n f o r m a t i o n  moved 
i n t o  t h i r t y - t w o  rooms in the Apex Building. D o n o v a n ’s 
b u d g e t  came out of the P r e s i d e n t ’s ’’Eme r g e n c y  F u n d ” of 
$ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 .  In two m o nths, D o n ovan had al ready r e q u e s t e d  
$ 1 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 .  He s h u tt led b e twee n his law o f f ices in New 
Y o r k  and his home in G e o r g e t o w n .  He drew no pay.
Do n o v a n  had no time to build his o r g a n i z a t i o n  w ith
r e l i a b l e  pe opl e in the no rmal way, and he went to fr i e n d s
and c o l l e a g u e s  for r e c r u i t m e n t  of the i m m e d i a t e l y - n e e d e d
t al ent . A r c h i b a l d  ( ’’A r c h i e ” ) Mac Leish , who head e d  the
L i b r a r y  of Cong ress, h e l p e d  Do n o v a n  org an ize the s c h o l a r s
for the new A m e r i c a n  w o r l d w i d e  i n t e l l i g e n c e  service.
H i s t o r i a n s ,  p o l i t i c a l  s c i e n ti st s, eco nomists, and oth er
s oc i a l  s c i e n t i s t s  were h i re d for res earch  in the L i b r a r y  of 
18
C o n g r e s s .
D o nova n thought that the best way to beat the 
G e r m a n s  was at their own game. He wanted as much 
i n f o r m a t i o n  as p o s si ble on the German war ma chine. His new
o r g a n i z a t i o n  was to h o us e a strate gi c st udies center  filled 
w i t h  r e p or ts  and a n a l y s e s  of political, eco nomic, 
p s y c h o l o g i c a l ,  and f i n an cial data. The world faced the
most m o d e r n  c o n v e n t i o n a l  army to date, the Germa n 
W e h r m a c h t .  Unt il the U n i t e d  States could m a tch the Germ a n  
s tr e n g t h ,  u n c o n v e n t i o n a l  m e t h o d s  had to be d e v e l o p e d  and
43
i m p l e m e n t e d  to combat the a w e s o m e  Ge rman forces. C o m m a n d o s
w o u l d  have  to be trained and high t e c h n o l o g y  in e x p l o s i v e s
and u n c o n v e n t i o n a l  w e a p o n r y  wo uld have to be devised.
A g e n t s  w o u l d  have to p a r a c h u t e  deep behind enemy  lines, and
n a t i o n a l s  from the oc c u p i e d  c o u n t r i e s  wo ul d have to be
t r aine d in "the u n g e n t l e m a n l y  arts of spying, k i l l i n g  and
sa botag e.  All stops had to be pulled, as the w o r l d  was on
19
the b r i n k  of disaster.  By D e c em be r 15, 1941, eight days
af te r the U n i t e d  States had e n t e r e d  World War II,
C o o r d i n a t o r  of I n f o r m a t i o n  had 596 persons on its 
20
p a y r o l l .
D o n o v a n  re c e i v e d  B r i t i s h  adv ice and a s s i s t a n c e  in
21
b u i l d i n g  up the C o o r d i n a t o r  of I n t e l l i g e n c e . The n o tion
to place D o n o v a n ’s C o o r d i n a t o r  of I n f o r m a t i o n  und er the
Joint C h i e f s  of Staff st em med from ARCADIA, the W a s h i n g t o n
W ar C o n f e r e n c e ,  or the U . S . - B r i t i s h  Staff C o n f e r e n c e ,  held
in the n a t i o n ’s cap ital from De c e m b e r  22, 1941, to J a n u a r y
14, 1942. The B r i t i s h  cal le d for the A m e r i c a n  High C o m m a n d
to join an i n t e g r a t e d  Allied Joint High C o mm an d that wo ul d
be able to f u n c t i o n  well. The se  ideas had been tak en up
a g a i n  at the A R G E N T I A  C o n f e r e n c e  in August, w h ic h pr o d u c e d
the A t l a n t i c  Charter, and also produced a B r i t i s h - A m e r i c a n
22
Grand S t r a t e g y .
On June 13, 1942, F r a n k l i n  D. R o o s e v e l t  signed the 
M i l i t a r y  Order c r e a t i n g  the O f fi ce of Str a t e g i c  S e r v i c e s  
(O .S.S.). D o n o v a n  cease d b e i n g  C o o r d i n a t o r  of I n f o r m a t i o n
44
and be came Dir e c t o r  of the O.S.S., r e p o r t i n g  di r e c t l y  to
the Joint Chie f s  of Staff. On June 16, 1942, Do no van
b r i e f e d  the B r i t i s h  War C a b inet on the O f f i c e  of S t r a t e g i c
S e r v i c e s  org an i z a t i o n ,  p a r a l l e l  at all leve l s  to the
23
B r i t i s h  Secret I n t e l l i g e n c e  Service.
The U.S. Army and Navy wanted  to kno w how the O.S.S. 
spent its a p p r o p r i a t i o n s .  B r i ga dier G e n e r a l  Th omas T.
H a n d y  of the Joint P s y c h o l o g i c a l  W a r f a r e  C o m m i t t e e  po inted
out in a m e m o r a n d u m  to the C h a i r m a n  of the Joint C h i e f s  of
/
Staff, Ge nera l G e o r g e  C. Ma r s h a l l ,  that over fifty m i l l i o n
d o l l a r s  in the O.S.S. budget was u n e x p l a i n e d  a n d . D o n o v a n
m i g h t  be p l a n n i n g  large g u e r r i l l a  groups. The "li ttl e
m e m o r a n d u m "  was sent to M a r s h a l l  on July 11, 1942. On
A u g u s t  17, 1942, D o n o v a n  did the a c c o u n t i n g .  Over 2,0 00
Gr ee ks , Poles, Y u g o sla vs , and other fo re ig n n a t i o n a l s  were
b e i n g  trained into g u e r r i l l a  groups at two camps:
Q u a n t i c o ,  Vi r g i n i a  and H a g e r s t o w n ,  M a r y la nd . Two h u n d r e d
t h i r t y - s i x  Army, Nav y and M a r i n e  p e r s o n n e l  were i n s t r u c t i n g  
24
t h e m .
Stanley Lovell, a ch em ist and i n v e n t o r  was busy at
the O.S.S. R e s e a r c h  and D e v e l o p m e n t  B r a n c h  i n v e n t i n g
25
p l a s t i c  ex pl o s i v e s .  One new devise was the "Casey Jones"
e x p l o s i v e  box of e x p l o s i v e s  a t t ach ed  by p e r m a n e n t  ma gne t to
the frames of ra i l r o a d  cars, a silent and f l a s h l e s s  pistol
—  and also a m a c h i n e  gun. An ot her e x p l o s i v e  devise was to
26
be af f i x e d  to the sides of ships by O.S.S. Frogmen.
45
Ev er y m e m b e r  of an O.S.S. o p e r a t i o n  carried some "L"
t a b l e t s  to be taken sh ould he be captured  by the enemy. He
thu s  could kill h i m s e l f  in s e c o n d s  to avoid the brutal
t o r t u r e  by Naz i i n t e r r o g a t o r s  and po i n t e d l y  " s p i l l i n g  the
27
b e a n s "  on O.S.S. o p e r a t i o n s .  In March, 1942, "Area B"
was e s t a b l i s h e d  by O.S.S. in the Cat oc tin M o u n t a i n s  of
M a r y l a n d ,  s i x t y - f i v e  m i l e s  n o r t h w e s t  of W a s h i n g t o n ,  D.C. to
t r a i n  recru its. By July, 1943, an O.S.S. p s y c h o l o g i c a l
t e s t i n g  p r o g r a m  b e ca me more  so phis t i c a t e d ,  to b e tter
i d e n t i f y  r e c r u i t s  who could h a n d l e  the stress  of g u e r r i l l a  
28
w a r f a r e  .
O.S.S. had the jobs of "secret i n t e l l i g e n c e , "  the
c o n t a c t  of u n d e r g r o u n d  m o v e me nt s, and o r g a n i z i n g  rev ol ts.
O.S.S. also  had a p a r a m i l i t a r y  role in which it was to
repo r t  d i r e c t l y  to the Joint Ch ie fs  of Staff. In the field
it wo ul d be under the d i r e c t i o n  of theatre c o m m a n d e r s .
O.S.S. w o uld use co ver t c o m m u n i c a t i o n s ,  ciphers, se cret
inks, small arms, and h a n d - t o - h a n d  combat to a c h i e v e  its
o b j e c t i v e s .  On O c to ber 26, 1943, the Joint C h i e f s  of
S t aff D i r e c t i v e  1 5 5 / 1 1 / D  was ap p r o v e d  and published,
29
a f f i r m i n g  the a b ove  role of the O.S.S. The D i r e c t i v e  
b r o a d e n e d  the g e o g r a p h i c a l  area in which the O.S.S. co uld  
c o n d u c t  se cr et  i n t e l l i g e n c e  (S.I.), secret o p e r a t i o n s
30
(S.O.) and r e s e a r c h  and d e v e l o p m e n t  (R & A) a c t i v ities.
The Fie ld M a n u a l  for O.S.S. o p e r a t i o n s  was p u b l i s h e d  on
31
D e c e m b e r  1, 1943.
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q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  for a p a r t i c u l a r  o p e r a t i o n ,  basic m i l i t a r y  
tr aining, and high me nt al  and phy si ca l st an dards. Some 
w o uld be m e m b e r s  of o l d - l i n e  Am e r i c a n  families;  others 
wou ld be recen t i m m i g r a n t s  to Am er ic a from Europe.
31
Troy, Do n o v a n  and the C . I . A . , p. 206. See also
(S) O.S.S., " P r o v i s i o n a l  Basic Field Manual:  S t r a teg ic
S e r v i c e s , "  Dec. 1, 1943, O.S.S. Records, W a s h - D i r - 0 p 2 6 6 , 
Fold er 359. Co pie s by the Na tional  A r c h i v e s  and Record  
Service for the author.
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CHAPTER III
E V O L U T I O N  OF TH E  N O R W E G I A N  R E S I S T A N C E  M O V E M E N T
IN T R O D U C T I O N
L i t t l e  is kn own  in the Un it ed States  about the 
G e r m a n - o c c u p a t i o n  yea rs in Norway, April, 1940 - May, 1945. 
T h i s  ch a p t e r  g e n e r a l i z e s  about those years and offers
s
r e a d e r s  u n f a m i l i a r  w it h h ow a r e s i s t a n c e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  
e v o l v e s  a g a i n s t  f o r ei gn o p p r e s s i o n  the o p p o r t u n i t y  to study 
the d e v e l o p m e n t  of one of the most e f f e c t i v e  ones c r e ated  
d u r i n g  W o r l d  War II. It was a b s o l u t e l y  e s s e n t i a l  for the 
N o r w e g i a n  r e s i s t a n c e  to k ee p the RYPE m i s s i o n  there 
u n d e t e c t e d  by G e r m a n  forces. In short, it h e l p e d  in sure 
the s u c cess of O p e r a t i o n  RYPE.
A l t h o u g h  less than t w o - p e r c e n t  of the p o p u l a t i o n  in 
the U n i t e d  S t at es  c l a i m e d  N o r w e g i a n  h e r i tages , P r e s i d e n t  
F r a n k l i n  D. R o o s e v e l t  c h a m p i o n e d  their small c o u n t r y  of 
o r i g i n  af te r G e r m a n - o c c u p y i n g  force s a r ri ve d in No rway on 
April 9, 1940. He also i n s pir ed  the people  in No rw ay  to 
fight on, w i t h  the pr omis e that one day, Al li ed  forces 
would l i b e r a t e  No rw a y  from its foreign op pressor.
R o o s e v e l t  then told the world: ’’look to N o r w a y . ”
Am e r i c a n  R e a c t i o n  to Ger m a n  O c c u p a t i o n  of No rway
Sonner av N o rge  (Sons of Norway), a pr o m i n e n t
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g r oup of N o r w e g i a n - A m e r i c a n s , i m m e d i a t e l y  de c l a r e d  that
there was no l e g i t i m a t e  r e a s o n  for H i t l e r ’s i n v as ion of the
na ti on  of the ir a n c e stors . N o r w a y  was a " v i cti m of big
powers i m p e r i a l i s m . "  France, Great Britain, and Ge r m a n y
sh oul d have r e s p e c t e d  N o r w a y ’s policy of "strict 
1
n e u t r a l i t y ^ ’’ In an open letter to the Sons of Norway, the 
G e r m a n - A m e r i c a n  So ciety sta ted that, in no way did it 
a p p r o v e  of Adolf H i t l e r ’s Naz i Germany, nor of its a c t i o n
in Norway. The G e r m a n - A m e r i c a n  Soci ety wa nt ed  to m a i n t a i n
/
its c l o s e  ties to the Sons of No rway and to c o n t i n u e  to be
2
good f r i e n d s  with it, saying  "we are all A m e r i c a n s . "
A N o r w e g i a n  R e li ef Fund began; however, no m o n i e s
3
or s u p p l i e s  wou ld  go to V i d k u n  Q u i s l i n g ’s regime. The
Sons of N o r w a y  wo ul d sponsor a visit to A m e rica  by Dr.
H a l v d a n  Koht , Fo r e i g n  M i n i s t e r  of the N o r w e g i a n  G o v e r n m e n t -
i n - E x i l e  in London. His m e s s a g e  was to be that N o rw ay  was
4
fully c o m m i t t e d  to fight on.
On A p ril 14, 1940, five days after German y o c c upied
No rway, P r e s i d e n t  F r a n k l i n  D. R o o s e v e l t  issue d the
f o l l o w i n g  stat eme nt:
Fo rce  and m i l i t a r y  a g g r e s s i o n  are once more on 
the m a rc h a g ainst small nations, in this 
i n s t a n c e  t h r o u g h  the i n v a s i o n  of D e n m a r k  and 
No rway. . . .  If c i v i l i z a t i o n  is to survive, 
the r i g h t s  of the smalle r nations to 
i n d e p e n d e n c e ,  to their t e r r i t o r i a l  int egr ity, 
and to the u n i m p e d e d  o p p o r t u n i t y  for self- 
g o v e r n m e n t  must be r e s p e c t e d  by their more 
p o w er ful ne i g h b o r s .  5
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The P r e s i d e n t  a r r a n g e d  wit h the Bri ti sh and G e r m a n
g o v e r n m e n t s  to send A m e r i c a n  tra ns port to P e t sa mo  in
F i n l a n d  to pick up str an ded A m e r i c a n s  in the area and in
n o r t h e r n  Norway. Included on the list to sail to A m e r i c a
w as the C r ow n P r i n c e s s  of N o r w a y  and her family. The y were
to be gu es ts of the P r e s i d e n t  at Hyde Park, New York, w h ere
his estate  was located. German  d i p lo ma ts c l e arly k n e w  that
R o o s e v e l t  had sent a stro ng s t a t ement  to them about w h e r e
6
his s y m p a t h i e s  lay.
N o b o d y  to N e g o t i a t e
On A p ri l 9, 1940, Dr. Kurt Brauer, the German
M i n i s t e r  to No rway, was the only Third R e ic h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e
in Oslo. A d o l f  H i t l e r  a s s umed that Norway wou ld c a p i t u l a t e
qu i c k l y  to German y:  Brauer had no i n s t r u c t i o n s  t e l l i n g  him
what  to do if the N o r w e g i a n  G o v e r n m e n t  refused to 
7
c o o p e r a t e .  Brau e r  a p p r o a c h e d  the M i n i s t r y  of F o r e i g n
A f f a i r s  to a r r a n g e  for N o r w a y ' s  surrender. He was
rebu ffed.  On the ev en ing of April 9, 1940, V i dkun
Qu i s l i n g ,  l e a d e r  of the Na s j o n a l  Saml ing (NS), a
N a z i - l i k e  party in Norway, made a bro a d c a s t  on Ra dio Oslo
at 7:32 p.m. He a n n o u n c e d  that he had taken over the reins
of g o v e r n m e n t  and d e c lared res i s t a n c e  to German t r o o p s  to 
8
be a crime. The broa dcast backfired: this was treason.
The bro a d c a s t  became a ra l l y i n g  point to begin the
9
N o r w e g i a n  r e s i s t a n c e .  Brauer had no i n s t r u c t i o n s  on 
Qu i sli ng , and G e r m a n s  and N o r w e g i a n s  alike were con fu se d.
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B r a u e r  c o n s u l t e d  with Berlin: Hi tl er  i n s t r u c t e d  him to
10
su p por t Qu isling.
At 3:00 p.m. on April 10, 1940, Dr. Brauer  de m a n d e d
that King H a ak on  VII ap p o i n t  a Qui s l i n g  Gove r n m e n t .  The
11
King refused: the Nazi d i p loma t was stunned. Br au er
was going to run afoul of H i tler over Qu is ling. Vi dku n
Q u i s l i n g  was rebu ff ed by i n t e l l e c t u a l s  and la bo r le ad ers
alike. His NS party had no pos ts in the N o r w e g i a n
G o v e r n m e n t .  Q u i s l i n g  had no s y m p a t h e t i c  press in the
N o r w e g i a n  n ew spaper s.  W ith the King going into exi le in
G r eat Br i t a i n  , Brauer had no N o r w e g i a n  G o v e r n m e n t  with
wh i c h  to n eg otiate.  On April 14, 1940, an a n g e r e d  Hi tl er
d e m a n d e d  Q u i s l i n g  chair a ’’n o t h i n g "  p o l itica l position.
Q u i s l i n g ' s  s e l f - a p p o i n t e d  si x- day  reign as Pri me  M i n i s t e r  
12
was o v e r .
D e s p a i r  and the Th reat of Rep r i s a l s
T h r o u g h  the sp rin g of 1940, N o r w e g i a n s  wer e in deep
despair. Th eir  armed fo rce s were crushed in six ty days
and G e r m a n  m i l i t a r y  c o m m a n d e r s  gained control of their
country. No rway e x p e r i e n c e d  invasion, treason, war, and
defeat. N o r w e g i a n s  were b e w i l d e r e d  by the Ge rm a n  invasion,
and they be l i e v e d  that their lead ers had been rem i s s  in not
k e e p i n g  N o r w a y  out of war. N o r w e g i a n s  felt so a l one when
the King and Gov e r n m e n t  fled to London, p e r h a p s  nev er to 
13
r e t u r n .
On April 13, 1940, the Lysa ker Br id ge from Oslo to
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F o r n e b u  Airport  was s a b o ta ged. It was the first act by any
r e s i s t a n c e  group a g a inst  Nazi o c c u p a t i o n . G e r m a n s  were
qu i c k  to t h r e a t e n  r eprisa ls : p r o mi ne nt c i t i z e n s  told their
people not to do more d e s t r u c t i o n .  The lines began to be
14
dr aw n b e t w e e n  r e s i s t a n c e  and col l a b o r a t i o n .
German i n t e n t i o n s  were to conquer N o r w e g i a n  
g o v e r n m e n t a l  h i e r a r c h i e s  fro m within, r e p l a c i n g  the le a d e r s  
wit h c o l l a b o r a t o r s ,  and to k ee p Norway quiet. F a i l i n g
15
this, they t h r e a t e n e d  N o r w a y  with a harsh m i l i t a r y  regime.
The G a u l e i t e r  from Esse n
On April 24, 1940, H i t l e r  a p p o i n t e d  Josef T e r b o v e n  as
R e i c h s k o m m i s s a r  for Norwa y.  He was a y o u thful thug: with
p a r t n e r s h i p  of the Gestapo, he wou ld c o o r d i n a t e  the
16
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  of Norway. A few days before, Dr. Kurt
Br au er  had sold H i t l e r  on a " governm en t c o u n c i l "  to keep
the g o v e r n m e n t a l  m a c h i n e r y  going. Hi tl er  saw th r o u g h
B r a u e r ' s  dece pt ion: the re was  no gov e r n m e n t  at all.
Br au er  was re c a l l e d  by H i t l e r  and was di s m i s s e d  from the
17
F o r e i g n  Se rvi ce  of Germany.
T e r b o v e n  was d e t e r m i n e d  that King Ha ak o n  a b d i ca te ,
the C a b in et  should resign, the Supreme Court f o ll ow  his
orders, and N o r w e g i a n  p o l i t i c a l  leaders form a n a t i o n a l  and
more p e r m an en t for in of gove rnment,  a "Council of the
R e a l m . "  He was to be f r u s t r a t e d  at every turn.
On June 27, 1940, he forced P a r l iame nt  to ask the
19
K in g  in L o nd on  to a b d i cate.  The King declined: in a
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b r o a d c a s t  over B.B.C., he c l a r i f i e d  the political  issue for
N o r w e g i a n s .  H a a k o n ’s w o r d s  sprea d quickly through N o r w a y
by word of mouth. His m e s s a g e  be came a r a l l y i n g  point for
20
those who di s p a r e d  at c o l l a b o r a t i o n  with the Germans. In
Se p t ember,  1940, T e r b o v e n  made the same " r e q u e s t . "  On
S e p t e m b e r  25, 1940, T e r b o v e n  de ci ded to rule his c o n q u e r e d
pr o v i n c e  w ith an iron hand. He di ssolved  all of the
p o l i t i c a l  pa r t i e s  except Q u i s l i n g ’s NS, and ruled that the
21
N o r w e g i a n  Royal Family  had fo r f e i t e d  its right to return.
Birth of the R e s i s t a n c e
In the chu rches, c h a i n l e t t e r s  began with the ten
p o l i t i c a l  c o m m a n d m e n t s  . . . obey Haakon . , . hate H i t l e r
. . do not c o l l a b o r a t e .  T e r b o v e n  told the L u t h e r a n  C h u r c h
that he w a n t e d  r e p o r t s  on c o n f e s s i o n s  and he wa nt ed s e r m o n s
22
s y m p a t h e t i c  to Nazism. In No vember, 1940, T e r b o v e n
at t a c k e d  the N o r w e g i a n  legal system: all m e m b e r s  of the
23
Su p rem e C o urt  res i g n e d  in protest. T w e n t y - t w o
p r o f e s s i o n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  banded tog ether in a n t i - N a z i
so li d a r i t y .  T e r b o v e n  d i r e c t e d  the Gest apo to m a rch  the
le a der s of all major n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  to Oslo. The
m e s s a g e  was clear: eit h e r  c o o p e r a t e  or be re placed by pro-
Germans. The N o r w e g i a n s  did not and they were replaced,
but the o r g a n i z a t i o n s  simply  went und erg round . They b e c a m e
24
known as "B," or i l l egal  groups. Norway had no recent
t r a d i t i o n  of ille gal  p o l i t i c a l  ac t i v i t y  on wh ic h to base  a
25
r e s i s t a n c e  movement, but one was evolving.
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V i d k u n  Q u i s l i n g
Vid kun Q u i s l i n g  becam e ’’M i n i s t e r p r e s i d e n t ” on 
F e b r u a r y  1, 1942. He did not re ceive any ne w r e ­
d i s t r i b u t i o n  of power. The G e r m a n  R e i c h s - k o m m i s a r i a t  still 
had full control, l e a v i n g  to the NS only such f u n c t i o n s  as
s e e m e d  expedien t. Th ere was no room  for Q u i s l i n g  in Josef
26
T e r b o v e n ' s  plan.
Q u i s l i n g ’s p r o b l e m  was that his NS Party  did not have
m u c h  of a f o l lo wing and was v i r t u a l l y  n o n e x i s t e n t  on the
eve of war. T e r b o v e n  made it clear to Q u i s l i n g  that the NS
m e m b e r s h i p  rolls w o ul d have to swell b e f o r e  it could be a
27
p o t e n t  p o l it ic al force.
Q u i s l i n g ’s a t t e m p t  to place NS l e a d e r s h i p  into all
the a s s o c i a t i o n s  was t h w a r t e d  at every turn. The N o r w e g i a n
r e s i s t a n c e  went u n d e r gr ou nd, but without  the a s s o c i a t i o n s
c h a n g i n g  their basic s tru ct ures. The m e d i c a l  a s s o c i a t i o n
w r o t e  ho wls of pr otest over NS pos itions; sp orts
a s s o c i a t i o n s  refused to compete  under NS banners; t e a c h e r s
r e f u s e d  to sign lo y a l t y  oaths to "nazify" c l a s s r o o m
i n s t r u c t i o n .  Q u i s l i n g  was, s o c i o l o g i c a l l y ,  not a
28
N o r w e g i a n :  he was in his own dream world.
Q u i s l i n g  in duced some y o u n g  N o r w e g i a n s  to serve on 
the e a s t e r n  front to fight with Germany a g a i n s t  the 
R u s s i a n s .  In Berlin, H e i n r i c h  Himml er  picked up on 
Q u i s l i n g ’s P a n - G e r m a n i c  idea for N o r w e g i a n s  to v o l u n t e e r  in 
a c o m m o n  fight a g a inst Imp er ial Great B r i t a i n  and the
59
B o l s h e v i k s  in Russia. The call for v o l u n t e e r s  came on
29
J a n u a r y  12, 1941. As a purely m i l itary  c o n t r i b u t i o n ,
the se units did not carry much weight. Only 2,000
N o r w e g i a n s  v o l u n t e e r e d  to be led by German o f f i c e r s  into
the m a e l s t r o m  of the B a ttle  of Leningrad; 1,000 were k i l l e d
in action. . Very few people  in Ame rica were awar e of such
a c t i v i t i e s ,  but N o r w e g i a n s  knew. The units were d i s b a n d e d
in 1943, when the a t t r i t i o n  rat es  became kno wn and the
30
lack of v o l u n t e e r s  b e c a m e  evident.
/
S i l e n t  R e s i s t a n c e
A c c o r d i n g  to Tor Myk e b o s t ,  the Germa n s o l d i e r s
c o n d u c t e d  t h e m s e l v e s  c o r r ec tl y, but the pe ople looked upon
t h e m  w it h icy disdain.  Any N o r w e g i a n  women  who had gone to
bed wit h G e r m a n  s o l d i e r s  s u d d e n l y  found t h e m s e l v e s  w ith all
31
of their hair cut off -- a v i s i b l e  sign of c o l l a b o r a t i o n .
The re was no free press in Norway. N e w s p a p e r s  were 
to p u b l i s h  only p o s i t i v e  r e p o r t s  about Nazism. The pro- 
Naz i n e w s paper,  Fritt F o l k , was the party organ. The 
p e o p l e  looked fo rw ard  to the N o r w e g i a n  B.B.C. b roadcas ts , 
as the G e r m a n - c o n t r o l l e d  Radio Oslo was of no accoun t.  
N o r w e g i a n  p a t r o n s  w o u l d  bo yc ot t a s h o p k e e p e r  if he sold too 
m u c h  to the Germans. To wear wire  p a p e r c l i p s  on la pe ls  
m e a n t  ’’stick t o g e t h e r . ” L a bl es stating ” 100% N o r w e g i a n "  
w e r e  cut from milk c a r t o n s  and worn. A m a t c h  placed in a 
b u t t o n h o l e  mea nt  " f l a m i n g  h a te ."  No r w e g i a n  flags f l u t t e r e d  
e v e r y  day: be for e the o ccup at ion, they wer e  only d i s p l a y e d
60
on S u n d a y s  and hol iday s.  A St a v a n g e r  e d i toria l boldly
st ated that "no N o r w e g i a n  was for sale, " and those
32
r e s p o n s i b l e  for it were a r r e s t e d  by the Gestapo.
The Home F r on t and M I L O R G
D u r i n g  the w i n t e r  m o n t h s  of 1940 the Home Front
r e s i s t a n c e  "was org anize d. It was a c e l l u l a r  s t r u cture :
nob ody k n e w  more than a few co lleagues . In order to test
the e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of Home Front c o m m u n i c a t i o n s ,  all
N o r w e g i a n s  R e m a i n e d  off the s t r ee ts to re m e m b e r  April 9th,
for a d e s i g n a t e d  t w o - h o u r  period. The Home Front
o b j e c t i v e s  were to halt NS e f f o r t s  to gain c o n t r o l  of the
so ci al  m a c h i n e r y  and to re ta rd Germa n war a c t i v i t y  as much 
33
as pos sible .
The Home Front was o r g a n i z e d  with many l i nk s to a
c e n t r a l  comman d.  The M I L O R G  was the m i l i t a r y  o r g a n i z a t i o n :
it was a i ded  by Special O p e r a t i o n s  E x e cu ti ve
(S O E )/ N o r w e g i a n  S e c t i o n  in London, w h ic h sm u g g l e d  in
i n s t r u c t o r s  and w e a p o n s  for sa bo tage and to p r e p a r e  for the
day of A l lied  i n v a s i o n  or to take German s u r r e n d e r  should
34
G e r m a n y  lose the war. At the beginning, the link with
Br i tai n was weak: not until F e b ru ary 1942, did the
N o r w e g i a n  S e c t i o n  of the B r it is h SOE s u c c e s s f u l l y  link up
35
w i t h  the N o r w e g i a n  High C o m m a n d  and MILORG.
T o w a r d s  C l o s e r  C o o r d i n a t i o n
On June 10, 1941, M I L O R G  wrote a lette r to King 
H a a k o n  VII in Lo nd o n  that was courier ed  t h r o u g h  Stockh olm.
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In it were plans to pr ep are c a dres for a secre t army in
N o r w a y  that w o uld be a c t i v a t e d  when  the ex p e c t e d  A l li ed
i n v a s i o n  came. The B r i ti sh i n t e r c e p t e d  it: they were not
in c l o s e  c o o r d i n a t i o n  with N o r w e g i a n  a u t h o r i t i e s  in 
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L o ndon . The ex ch ange of l e t te rs b e t ween SOE and M I L O R G  
a g g r a v a t e d  .the di strus t of each other. The N o r w e g i a n  
G o v e r n m e n t - i n - E x i l e  in L o nd on was s u s p i c i o u s  of both 
gr oups.  In October , 1941, two M I L O R G  l e a d e r s  re ached
L o n d o n  to di s c u s s  the m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s .  The r e su lt  was
/
that M I L O R G  was  r e c o g n i z e d  as an e x t e n s i o n  of the N o r w e g i a n
A r m e d  Fo rc es.  The N o r w e g i a n  G o v e r n m e n t  dem a n d e d  a " m e et in g
of the m i n d s "  with SOE. The res ult was a joint memo calle d
"The A n g l o - N o r w e g i a n  C o l l a b o r a t i o n  R e g a r d i n g  the M i l i t a r y
O r g a n i z a t i o n  in N o r w a y , ” and pl ed ge d to w o r k  toward s
h a r m o n y .  The year ended on a sad note whe n  the N o r w e g i a n
G o v e r n m e n t  w as  not told of an o t h e r  S O E - t r a i n e d  N o r w e g i a n
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" C o m p a n y  L i n g e "  raid on the L o f o t e n  Islands. How ever,
the N o r w e g i a n  G o v e r n m e n t  had its way when a s p e ci al
N o r w e g i a n  S e c t i o n  of SOE was e s t a b l i s h e d  in early 1942.
L t . Col. J.S. Wils on, its chief, wou ld wo r k  c l o sely with
the N o r w e g i a n  High Command. M I L O R G  would report di r e c t l y
to F . O . I V  ( F o r s v a r e t s  O v e r k o m m a n d o ) (The D e f e n s e  High
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C o m m a n d )  of the N o r w e g i a n  High Comm and in London.
Th e " S h e t l a n d  Bus"
A c l a n d e s t i n e  tra ffic b e t ween Norway  and the S h e t l a n d  
I s l a n d s  was c o n d u c t e d  by seamen, d e s c e n d a n t s  of Vikings,
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w ho  were then, o n e - t h o u s a n d  years later, s a i l i n g  the same
seas wit h the same size boats. This time their m i s s i o n s
w e r e  to r e s c u e  r e f u g e e s  and to land men and cargo in N o rw ay
w i t h o u t  the k n o w l e d g e  of the German s. The jo ur ne ys were
m a d e  m o s t l y  in the w i nt er  b e c a u s e  there was too m u c h  light
in the s u m m ert im e. The ’’S h e t l a n d  B u s ’’ wou ld r e g u l a r l y
t r a n s p o r t  B r i t i s h  and N o r w e g i a n - t r a i n e d  radio o p e r a t o r s  and
s a b o t e u r s  and w e a p o n s  to Norway. It was 180 m i le s to
B e r g e n  from Lunna in the S hetla nd s. Th er e were forty
N o r w e g i a n  c i v i l i a n  seamen who wer e pr o v i d e d  free room and
bo ar d and paid four B r i t i s h  P o u n d s  w e e k l y  and a ten P o un d
bo n u s  if they made a trip to Norway. G e r m a n  ai r c r a f t  were
a c o n s t a n t  threat and Ge rm a n  p a t r o l s  he a v i l y  gu arded  the
s h o r e s  of Norw a y  out to a f i f t y - m i l e  limit. That- is why
the ’’S h e t l a n d  B u s ’’ had to sail at the w o rs t time of the
year and in the worst we ather. Lunna  was remot e from
c i v i l i z a t i o n  and ideal o p e r a t i o n a l l y :  the main o f f i c e  was
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in L e r w i c k  w h i c h  had c o m m u n i c a t i o n s .
Leif L a rsen was a ma gnet of e n t h u s i a s m  for the 
s u c c e s s e s  of the ’’B u s . ” He was a w a rd ed Great B r i t a i n ’s 
C o n s p i c u o u s  G a l l a n t r y  Medal, D i s t i n g u i s h e d  Se rv ice Med al 
and Bar, D i s t i n g u i s h e d  Service Cross, D i s t i n g u i s h e d  S e r vi ce 
Order,  and also N o r w e g i a n  dec or a t i o n s .  No other man, 
n e i t h e r  B r i t i s h  nor foreign, had ever re ceive d all of 
these. The " B u s ” was mo ve d to Scalloway, near Lerwick, 
w h e n  its a c t i v i t y  increased.  It ca rr ied  on ma king r e g ul ar
63
c r o s s i n g s  until the end of the war, h a u ling over 400 tons
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of arms to Norway.
A W eek of Terror
T e r b o v e n  d i s m i s s e d  the le ader of the F a r m e r ’s
A s s o c i a t i o n  and r e p l a c e d  him w i t h  a N o r w e g i a n  Nazi
s y m p a t h i z e r .  All m e m b e r s  of the F a r m e r s  A s s o c i a t i o n
res i g n e d  in d i sgust  and the o r g a n i z a t i o n  ceased to exist
(it simpl y went u n d e r g r o u n d ) .  In turn, the N a t i o n a l  Labor
F e d e r a t i o n  fo llowe d suit. This was the last straw for
Te r b o v e n :  on Au gust 1, 1941, he i n s t i t u t e d  a st at e of
civil eme rg en cy. All r a d i o s  w e r e  to be turned in by 4:00
p.m. on Au gust 7th. At the same time, Re i n h a r d  H e y dr ic h,
chief of G e r m a n y ’s SS I n t e l l i g e n c e  Services, arrived in
Oslo from Berlin. Two t h o u s a n d  people, r e p r e s e n t i n g  all
c l a s s e s  and all groups, were a r r e s t e d  in a week of terror.
The G e s t a p o  not only a r r e s t e d  people; it t o r tu red and shot
some of them. The p r i s o n s  and cam ps were filled  by those
w ho e s c ap ed death. P h y s i c a l  p u n i s h m e n t  was the nor m  and
the firing squad came to stay. Now the G e s t a p o  was in
charge: it would  decid e w h ich  N o r w e g i a n s  were di r e c t l y
i n t e r f e r i n g  wit h the Ge rman war effort. H e y d r i c h  boarded
the plane back to Ber lin. His trip had ended the
u n s u c c e s s f u l  Nazi p r o g r a m  to win over the N or wegians :
the ir i n v i t a t i o n  to p a r t i c i p a t e  in the ’’New O r d e r ” as
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’’Ary an " co usins  was w i t h dra wn .
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The P r o b l e m  of Food
M os t pe ople r e a l i z e  that Norway came very close to
m a s s  s t a r va ti on. Hel en A s t r u p  had to feed her daug ht er,
Ki rs ti  , on the bla ck mar ket . She re cei ve d Ger man r a t io ns
fro m the r e s i s t a n c e  for d i s t r i b u t i n g  its n e w s l e t t e r s  and
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the B.B.C. - s u m m a r i e s . The G e rman  war m a c h i n e  gorged
it se lf  on N o r w e g i a n  food. N o r w e g i a n s  o b t a i n e d  no m e a t s  nor
eggs; even p o t a t o e s  and fish were taken in mass
c o n f i s c a t i o n s .  The G e r m a n s  c l o s e d  the very best
r e s t a u r a n t s  to N o r w e g i a n s .  I n side  they ate as many as ten
egg s at one sitting. After the Germ an as s a u l t  on R u s s i a  in
June, 1941, no v e g e ta bles, milk, berries, or fruit r e a c h e d
N o r w e g i a n  h o mes and even fish was rationed. The G e r m a n s
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w o u l d  even take t u r n i p s  if they found them.
G e r m a n  D i s r u p t i o n  of N o r w e g i a n  R e s i s t a n c e
The S c h u t z s t a f f e l  (SS) G e s t a p o  was an u n h o l y  a l l i a n c e
of bullie s,  sadists, m u r d e r e r s ,  and spies. They were
u n i f o r m e d  and subject to d i s c ipli ne . The G e s ta po was
c o m p l e t e l y  i n d e p e n d e n t  of the German  We h r m a c h t .  In Norway,
a "Nacht und N e b e l "  order w o u l d  mean a b d u c t i n g  a w a y w a r d
c i t i z e n  in the m i d d l e  of a foggy night, and the ci tizen
w o u l d  be slain and burie d in an u n m arke d grave. In
a d d it io n,  there was Q u i s l i n g ' s  Nat io nal State Po lic e 
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(S t a p o ).
Many  people  were brave and were not br oken by the 
ph y s i c a l  i n t e r r o g a t i o n s  of the Gestapo, but these brave
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pe o p l e  were mor e  the e x c e ption, not the rule. As a
re s u l t  , t r a i t o r s  ofte n wo rm ed their way into r e s i s t a n c e
o r g a n i z a t i o n s .  These gr oups faced di s a s t e r s  from N o r w e g i a n
c o l l a b o r a t o r s ,  and the r e s i s t a n c e  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  were
u n d e r m i n d e d  from within. One such ind ivi du al was Henry
O l i v e r  Rinnan, the " D e v i l ’s A p p r e n t i c e "  in Tro n d h e i m ,
r e c r u i t e d  by Ernst Parow, a G e r m a n  a u t o m o b i l e  d e a l e r  there
in June, 1940. A p a t r i o t i c  group was i n f i l t r a t e d  by R i n n a n
in the Fall of 1941. It re s u l t e d  in fi ft y-six p e r s o n s
b e i n g  arre sted,  t h i r t y - s i x  of w h o m  were sent to
c o n c e n t r a t i o n  camps. R i n n a n ’s c o m p e n s a t i o n  was $100 per
m o n t h  for his work: at the time of G e r m a n y ’s col l a p s e ,
th e r e  were s e ve nt y male and fem ale agents on his pa yr ol l
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and R i n n a n  had an e x pe ns e bu dge t of $7 5, 00 0 per year.
R u m o r s ,  S e c u r i t y  Bre ec hes, and Disaster
B e c a u s e  of joint B r i t i s h - N o r w e g i a n  raids and rumors
of A l l i e d  invasion,  in D e c e mb er, 1941, Hi tl e r  tu rn ed  N o r w a y
i nt o a m i l i t a r y  for tr es s. Hitl e r  in c r e a s e d  G e rm an  troop
g a r r i s o n s  in Norwa y in 1942 from 100,000 to 250,000.
H o w e v e r ,  the All ies c h o s e  North Africa as the "second
f r o n t , "  not Norway. The d i v e r s i o n  of Ge rma n troops h e l p e d
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the A l l i e s  make a s u c c e s s f u l  in v a s i o n  of North Africa.
The lack of c o o r d i n a t i o n  be tween the Allied Hig h  
C o m m a n d  and M I L O R G  early in the o c c u pa ti on m a n i f e s t e d  
i t s e l f  wit h the di s a s t e r  on Sotra Island at T e l e v a a g  in 
April, 1942. Tele va ag, off the coast of Bergen, was the
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h a v e n  for two B r i t i s h - t r a i n e d  men. So meo ne  "gave their
s h o w  a w a y ; ” the SS came and de s t r o y e d  300 houses,
s l a u g h t e r e d  the cat tle, and d e p orted eighty of the adu lt
m a l e s  to Ger ma ny. T e l e v a a g  was a m o rale di s a s t e r  to the
N o r w e g i a n  pe op l e  b e c a u s e  the re prisal s were ha rs h b e y o n d
a n y o n e ' s  i m a g i n a t i o n .  Most  of the N o r w e g i a n s  w a n t e d  to
h e l p  in the r e s i s t a n c e ,  but after Te lev aag, the ri sk s to do
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t h i s  bec ame t r e m e n d o u s .  O p e r a t i o n  Anklet  also ended  on a
sad note: on the s e cond raid in the L o f oten Island s, Maj or
M a r t i n  Linge was killed. He was one of si xt een N o r w e g i a n s
in a 45 0-ma n B r i t i s h  C o m m a n d o  raid which was very
s u c c e s s f u l  and i n f l i c t e d  heavy c a s u alties on the G e r m a n s  on
M a a l o y .  One r e s i d e n t  thou ght  the unit was th ere to stay:
it was not and he e x p e c t e d  h a r sh er Nazi r e p r i s a l s  a f te r the
s e c o n d  raid. He b e gg ed  the unit to stay -- or n e v e r  to 
49
come back.
S a b o t a g i n g  the Nazi N u c l e a r  Bomb
There was an u r g e n c y  in the R o o s e v e l t - C h u r c h i  11 
m e e t i n g  on June 17, 1942: the German phy si cist, Otto Hahn,
had d i s c o v e r e d  that a t o m i c  fission could cause s u p e r ­
e x p l o s i o n s .  The M a n h a t t a n  Pr oject was w o r k i n g  on this 
a s p e c t  als o to p r o duce a nuc le ar bomb. The G e r ma ns w ere 
p r o c u r i n g  "heavy w a t e r ” -- ten times h e a v i e r  than normal  
wa t e r  -- n e c e s s a r y  to co nt rol the fission pro cess.  The 
i m p l i c a t i o n  if Ge r m a n y  built the bomb first was awesome: 
the Al lies had to have it first. There was only one heavy
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w a t e r  plant. It was in s o u t h c e n t r a l  Norway in the T e l e m a r k
D i s t r i c t ,  in Vemork, and it had to be s a b o t a g e d  at all 
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costs.
The time was Oc tober, 1942. The ta rg et was the
h e a v i l y  guarde d, v i r t u a l l y  i m p r e g n a b l e  str a t e g i c  m a t e r i a l
pl an t at Vemork, in N a z i - o c c u p i e d  Norway. The p u r p o s e  was
to dest roy the cr it ic al s u p p l i e s  and to c r i p p l e  the key
p r o d u c t i o n  facili ties. The a s s a u l t  force was four
N o r w e g i a n s  from Great B r i tain  and six other N o r w e g i a n s  in
p l a c e  who wer e v i g o r o u s l y  t r a ined by B r i t i s h  I n t e l l i g e n c e
in Sc ot la nd and landed by p a r a c h u t e  on desolate, f o r b i d d i n g
t err ain. C o l on el  Leif T r o n s t a d  of the Royal N o r w e g i a n  Army
sai d that if this m i s s i o n  were s uc cessful , it w o u l d  live in
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N o r w a y ’s m e m o r y  for a h u n d r e d  years.
The ta rg et  was the high c o n c e n t r a t i o n  roo m  in whi ch  
the heavy e x p l o s i v e  c h a r g e s  w o u l d  be secured a r o u n d  the 
c o n i c  cel ls of heavy wa ter pro duc ti on. The e x p l o s i o n  
so u n d e d  a s t o n i s h i n g l y  fe eb le  and innocent. When the 
r a i d i n g  part y was 300 feet away, the G e r m a n s  still did not 
k n o w  what was ta king place. The e x p lo sion was, in fact, 
s i g n i f i c a n t  and tremendous: the co ncrete  b u i l d i n g  was
st ro ng e n o u g h  to m u f f l e  the sounds. Bj arne Nilssen, 
D i r e c t o r  of Nor sk Hydro, called it perfect sabotage. The 
R e i c h  s c i e n t i s t s  had suffere d a delay of many months , a 
del ay they could not afford. General N i k l a u s  von
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F a l k e n h o r s t  called the s a b ot age ’’B r i t a i n ’s finest c o u p . ”
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R e b u i l d i n g  M I L Q R G
At the b e g i n n i n g  of 1943, M I L O R G  le ad er s were either
un der  arre st or in h i d i n g  to a v o i d  labor c o n s c r i p t i o n  by
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G e r m a n  a u t h o r i t i e s .  The d i s t r i c t s  and central l e a d e r s h i p
had to start afresh. The B r i t i s h  S O E , the N o r w e g i a n  High
C om ma nd, and M I L O R G  had to wo r k  together.  The long range
po li c y  was that Norway should not expect  an Allied i n v a s i o n
un ti l o t h e r s  took place e l s e where: lie low, go slow.
T h e r e  was to be no co ntact w it h the enemy until the time 
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was  r i p e .
M I L O R G  itsel f was split: the younger m e m b e r s  w a n t e d
a heroic, a c t i v e  resi st ance, w h i l e  the older m e m b e r s  wanted
to use cau tion.  Just ic e Paal Berg, the guide of the Home
F r o n t  w i t h i n  the "inner c a b i n e t ” (a.k.a. "the C i r c l e ” )
r e j e c t e d  M I L O R G  n o t i o n s  of sa b o t a g e  and violen t a c t i o n s
a g a i n s t  the Germans. That, and also Allied bombing, w o uld
d e s t r o y  N o r w a y ’s i n d u s t r i a l  base. M I L O R G  said the A l l i e s ’
pol icy was to bomb Ge rm any into su bmission,  and o c c u p i e d
c o u n t r i e s  were not exempt: N o rw ay  had to be pushed into
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s a b o t a g e .
Jens C h r i s t i a n  H a u g e , a young lawyer, r e o r g a n i z e d  
M I L O R G  to e s t a b l i s h  a m i l i t a r y  p r e p a r e d n e s s  at home which 
the N o r w e g i a n  High C o m mand  could use for p u r po se s in 
c o n n e c t i o n  with the r e c o n q u e s t  of Norway. Hauge b e l i e v e d  
that sa b o t a g e  done and not a u t h o r i z e d  by London was 
i r r e s p o n s i b l e  b e c au se  the N o r w e g i a n  people no longer could
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take the pr e s s u r e  of G e r m a n  terror and reprisals. On
N o v e m b e r  15, 1943, the M I L O R G  council, the c l a n d e s t i n e
P o l i c e  O r g a n i z a t i o n  and the C I V O R G  (Civ il ian O r g a n i z a t i o n ,
p u b l i s h e r s  and d i s t r i b u t o r s  of u n d e r g r o u n d  n e w s p a p e r s )
l e a d e r s h i p  r e i n f o r c e d  H a u g e 's n o tio n into a joint 
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m e m o r a n d u m ,
M I L O R G  m i l i t a r y  d i s t r i c t s  were formed and o p e r a t i n g  
p r o c e d u r e s  were  s t a n d a r d i z e d .  Each me mber was a s s i g n e d  a
number and a spe c i f i c  job to do. M e m bers  were given
/
"co n t a c t  c a r d s , 1' w h i c h  liste d other m e m b e r s  he knew: if
the member  was a r r e s t e d  by the Gestapo, he was to r e m a i n
si le nt  for t w e n t y - f o u r  hours until the others li sted on the
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card had a chance to e s c a p e  to Sweden.
Labor R e g i s t r a t i o n s  and M I L O R G  R e c r u i t m e n t
On F e b r u a r y  22, 1943, Vid kun Q u i s l i n g  said that all 
a b l e - b o d i e d  N o r w e g i a n s  were to re gister  to be a part of a 
labor reserve. In reality, it was to be a labor re serve to 
be used on Ge rm an  m i l i t a r y  in s t a l l a t i o n s .  By this time, 
the p r o g r a m  to "nazify " Norway had failed. Q u i s l i n g  w o u l d  
p r o v i d e  r a t i o n  cards to the labor force. N o r w e g i a n s  not 
r e g i s t e r i n g  w o ul d not eat. Q u i s l i n g  was foiled when the
Labor Card Of f i c e s  were blown up and the ration cards
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s c a t t e r e d .
In the Autumn of 1943, only 2,000 N o r w e g i a n s  had 
v o l u n t e e r e d  for se r v i c e  on the ea st ern front. In January, 
1944, Q u i s l i n g  calle d again for a "labor fo rce ." A wom an
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in the M i n i s t r y  of J u s t i c e  i n t e r c e p t e d  Q u i s l i n g ’s or de r and
sent a copy to the R e s i s t a n c e ,  who, in turn sent it to
London. The B.B.C. b r o a d c a s t  to Norway was: "No one to
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report for labor s e r v i c e . "  In May, 1944, Q u i s l i n g  tried
again. This time, the i n t e l l i g e n c e  ne t w o r k s  qui ckl y spread
the word t h r o u g h o u t  Norway. T h o usands  of N o r w e g i a n s  fled
to the h i ll s to join the " u n d e r g r o u n d . "  By the end of the
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war, M I L O R G  had 4 0 , 0 0 0  recruits.
T h r o u g h o u t  1944, the re were f r u s t r a t i o n s  wit h i n
MILORG. T h ere were d i r e c t i v e s  and not tasks; only papers,
not guns. Peter F u r ubotn,  the Co mm unist M I L O R G  leader in
Bergen, t h r e a t e n e d  a c t ivity. There was a da nger of a c t i v e
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e l e m e n t s  b r e a k i n g  away from MILORG.
Bernt B a l c h e n  G i ven C h a n c e  to Aid R e s i s t a n c e
On July 3, 1941, a m e e t i n g  of Ameri can, Bri ti sh, and 
N o r w e g i a n  Air For ce o f f i c e r s  was held at the of fic e of 
Henry "Hap" Arnold, the C o m m a n d i n g  General, U n i t e d  S t ates  
Army Air Corps. It was l o c ated in the M u n i t i o n s  B u i l d i n g  
on C o n s t i t u t i o n  A v enu e in Washingt on , D.C. In a t t e n d a n c e  
were  G e n er al Arnol d in the chair, Royal Air Force Gr oup  
C a p t a i n  D e b o u l a y  from the Br i t i s h  A t t a c h e ' s  Office, M a jo r 
Gene Beebe, G e n e r a l  "Hap" A r n o l d ’s aid, and Flight
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L i e u t e n a n t  Bernt Balche n,  Royal Norwe gi an Air Force.
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Balchen was a N o r w e g i a n - b o r n  arctic exp lorer. He had 
been w o r k i n g  wit h the B r i t i s h  and French since he was 
caught in W a s h i n g t o n ,  D.C. when he heard the news that
71
G e r m a n  forces oc c u p i e d  N o rway on April 9, 1940. B a l c h e n
k n e w  Arn old from the 1930s, as both had been a v i a t i o n  
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pi o nee rs .
Ge ne ra l Arn ol d came right to the point of the 
m e e t i n g :  he had an a s s i g n m e n t  for Balchen, should B a l c h e n
join the USAAF. Arnold said it was more ex c i t i n g  than 
b e i n g  a ferry pilot for the British. When Bernt Ba l c h e n  
a g r e e d  to do so, he was c o m m i s s i o n e d  on the spot as a 
C a p t a i n  in the Un ited  St at es Army Air Force. Ar nol d then 
d i r e c t e d  him to the offi c e  of the B r i g a d i e r  Ge neral Carl 
(T ooey)  Spaatz. Spaatz  p r o p o s e d  that B a l chen set up a 
s e c r e t  A m e r i c a n  air base on the west coast of Gr e e n l a n d .  
W h e n  B a l chen ob s e r v e d  that the U n i t e d  States was not at
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war, Sp aatz agreed, but s u g g e s t e d  that it soon w o u l d  be.
Fro m 1941 to 1943, Ber nt B a l c h e n ' s  Task Force Eight
set up s t a gi ng  bases on N e w f o u n d l a n d ,  Baffi n Island,
I c e l a n d  and N a r s a s u a k  and Sond re S t r o m f j o r d  in 
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G r e e n l a n d .
On S e p t ember 7, 1943, Be rn t B a l ch en met with General
A r n o l d  at K e f l a v i k  Air Base in Iceland. Ba lc hen said that
now  that his wo r k  was done, he w a nt ed  to help the N o r w e g i a n
R e s i s t a n c e  Mo vem ent. Arnol d said that the best way for him
do to so was to go see W i l l i a m  (Wild Bill) Donovan  of the
O. S.S . in W a s h i n g t o n ,  D.C. B a l c h e n  caught the next plane 
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to W a s h i n g t o n .
D o nova n told B a l c h e n  that the N o r w e g i a n  G o v e r n m e n t -
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i n - E x i l e  in L o n d o n  ne ed ed N o r w e g i a n s  in the war to fight
the Nazis. N o rway  had p u r c h a s e d  two L o c kheed Lodes ta rs,
but the t r i c k l e  of fl igh ts  be t w e e n  S t o c k h o l m  and L o n d o n
p r o v i d e d  very few N o r w e g i a n s .  In 1942, Sweden  was b e c o m i n g
m or e s y m p a t h e t i c  to the Al li e s  be cause of the e v i d e n c e  of
G e s t a p o  a t r o c i t i e s  in the o c c upied countrie s, and
e x p e c t a t i o n  that G e r m a n y  might lose the war. By early
1943, D o n o v a n  said that Sw ed e n  had de clare d itself w i l l i n g
to defy Berlin. D o n o v a n ’s orders  were to set up an
a d e q u a t e  air t r a n sp or t s e r v i c e  to bring 2,000 N o r w e g i a n s
f r o m  S t o c k h o l m  to London . The A m e rica n program, O p e r a t i o n
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SO NNIE, was born.
In January, 1944, d u r i n g  a w o r k i n g  dinne r at 
Wi d e w i n g ,  a Lond o n  s u b u r b  that hou sed the H e a d q u a r t e r s ,  
U n i t e d  St ates S t r a t e g i c  Air Force, General Spa a t z  asked 
M a j o r  G e n eral F r e d r i c k  Anderson , Air T r a n s p o r t a t i o n  
C o m m an de r, w h er e a i r c r a f t  for B a l c h e n  c o uld be found for 
O p e r a t i o n  SONNIE. A n d e r s o n  said it was di f f i c u l t  be c a u s e  
th er e w o ul d be a push on F r a n c e  soon. Major G e n eral Jam es 
(Jimmy) D o o l ittle, C o m m a n d e r  8th Air Force, said that 
Co l o n e l  C l i f f o r d  J. H e f l i n ’s 482 nd Bomb Grou p at 
N o r t h h a m p t o n  in England (unit nic kname: ’’C a r p e t b a g g e r s ” )
was al rea dy  under o r de rs of the O.S.S. to deliver p e r s o n n e l  
and s u p plies  be hind ene my lines. He told Ba lche n to o b ta in 
a i r c r e w s  and a i r c r a f t  from H e f l i n ’s resources.  B a l c h e n 
said, ’’sure, ve do i t . ” On Ja nuary 27, 1944, Ba l c h e n  as
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s p e c i a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of the C o m m a n d i n g  Ge ner al, U n i t e d
S t a t e s  S t r a t e g i c  Air Force, re q u e s t e d  from An der son, five
B - 2 4  L i b e r a t o r s  from Co lonel H e f l i n ’s group. The c r ews
w o u l d  have c i v i l i a n  cloth ing. The L i b e r a t o r s  were pa i n t e d
dar k  green and w i t hout  in signia . They came e q u i p p e d  with
”Gee B o x e s , ” an a c c u r a t e  radar n a v i g a t i o n a l  aid for flying
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in blind  weath er.
B a l c h e n  e n c o u n t e r e d  red tape with the B r i t i s h
m i l i t a r y  and c i v i l i a n  a u t h o r i t i e s  as they d e nied him
p e r m i s s i o n  to use L e u char s Air Base in S c o t l a n d  for his
S c a n d i n a v i a n  ope ratio n.  Their  excuse was that A m e r i c a n s
h ad  no b u s i n e s s  in that area. Their o p p o s i t i o n  was
o v e r c o m e  by mi d - M a r c h ,  1944 after Balchen e x p l a i n e d  the
p r o b l e m  to T r y g v e  Lie, N o r w e g i a n  Foreign M i n i s t e r ,  at the
K i n g s t o n  H o use wh er e the N o r w e g i a n  G o v e r n m e n t - i n - E x i l e  was
c o n d u c t i n g  its business. Lie told Ba lc he n that he w o u l d
a d d r e s s  the L e u c h a r s  issue at lunch the next day with  King
H a a k o n  VII, C r o w n  Prince Olaf , Anthony Eden, and W i n s t o n
C h u r c h i l l .  At this lunch, the King asked C h u r c h i l l  why the
B r i t i s h  had turne d down A m e r i c a n  re que sts to use L e u c h a r s
as a s t a g i n g  base to S t o c k h o l m  to fly men out of S w e d e n  to
h e l p  wit h the war effort. C h u r c h i l l  said he had no idea
why it was turned  down, but he would solve the problem.
Tw o days later, Ba l c h e n  de p l o y e d  five L i b e r a t o r s  to 
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L e u c h a r s .  O p e r a t i o n  S O N N I E  began on M a rch 27, 1944, with
a fl ig h t  from L e u c h a r s  to B r omma Airport near S to ckholm .
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F u t u r e  f l i g h t s  to p e n e t r a t e  enemy ai rsp a c e  w o u l d  vary from
T r o n d h e i m  in the north to K r i s t i a n s a n d  on the sou t h e r n
co ast  of N o r w a y  to av oid the flak from Germ an a i r c r a f t  
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ba t t e r i e s .
The S w e d i s h  C o n n e c t i o n  to the N o r w e g i a n  R e s i s t a n c e
N e u t r a l  S w e d e n  found itself su rrounde d by W o r l d  War
II. The  capit al , Stock holm, was  a fa vorit e " l i s t e n i n g
post" for A l l i e d  i n t e l l i g e n c e  and Axis a g e n t s  alike. In
March, 1942 v Br uc e H o p p e r  went to S t o c k h o l m  to e s t a b l i s h
the O.S.S . m i s s i o n  there. He i m m e d i a t e l y  met r e s i s t a n c e
fro m the A m e r i c a n  A mb as sador, H e r s h e l  Johnson, who th o u g h t
c l a n d e s t i n e  o p e r a t i o n s  were " s a t a n i c . "  J o h n s o n  r e f u s e d  to
p r o v i d e  cov er for the O.S.S. station. Even the P a s s p o r t
D i v i s i o n  r e q u i r e d  Hopper  and his team to have "O . S . S . "
c l e a r l y  e m b o s s e d  on their  p as sports . For p u r p o s e s  of
cover, the S p e c i a l  Fo rc e s  H e a d q u a r t e r s  had to be s e p a r a t e d
into B r i t i s h  and A m e rican entities, a l t h o u g h  the
c o o p e r a t i o n  of a joint c o m mand still ex is ted —  most of the 
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time .
H o p p e r  a r r i v e d  in S t o c k h o l m  in 1942 on an RAF twin-
e n g i n e  M o s q u i t o  from London. It was a very d e p e n d a b l e
s h u t t l e  b e t w e e n  Lo ndon and Stoc kholm, even tho u g h  it flew
ove r enemy t e r r itory. The N o r w e g i a n  R e s i s t a n c e  M o v e m e n t
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p r o v i d e d  L o n d o n  with daily Ger ma n Orders of Battle.
H o p p e r ’s own p e n chant  was spying on the Russ ian s.
Thi s c h a n g e d  in the autu m n  of 1943 when W i l h o  T o k ander , a
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C h i c a g o  law ye r of F i n n i s h  e x t r a cti on , took over from Hopper 
as O.S.S. St ati on  Ch ie f at Stoc kholm. As the f o r t u n e s  of 
w ar  began to r e v e r s e  for G e r m a n y  on the E a s t e r n  Front in 
1943, T o k a n d e r  c o n c e n t r a t e d  on Allied and Axis O r d e r s  of 
Ba ttle. The State D e p a r t m e n t  fina lly  came under tow, but 
the B r i t i s h  be ca me  s u s p i c i o u s  of American i n t e n t i o n s  in 
Nor way , as they th ou gh t it was en tir e l y  their show. Not 
un ti l J o s e p h  H a s k e l l  took over the O.S.S. desk at L o ndon
did Br i t i s h  and A m e r i c a n  fe a t h e r s  become unr uffle d.  • In/
mi d - 1 9 4 4 ,  it was o b v i o u s  to all Swedes that G e r m a n y  was
l o s i n g  the war; both A m e r i c a n  and Sw edi sh State
D e p a r t m e n t s  a r r a n g e d  for direct m e e t i n g  b e t we en  the O.S.S.
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and the S w e d i s h  State Police.
On M a r c h  31, 1944, Bernt  B a l che n flew the first B-24 
fro m  L e u c h a r s  Air Base  in Sc o t l a n d  to Br omma Ai rport near 
St o c kholm.  The p e n e t r a t i o n  of enemy ai r s p a c e  by O p e r a t i o n  
S O N N I E  was mad e over K r i s t i a n s a n d  , B a l c h e n ’s home town.
The night fog over the town p r e v e n t e d  Germ an flak from 
d i s r u p t i n g  the L i b e r a t o r ’s flight. T a i l w i n d s  he lp ed the 
c r e w  to an early m o r n i n g  l a n d i n g  at Bromma. The dark 
g r e e n - p a i n t e d  B-24, wi t h  no in s i g n i a  on it, was m a r s h a l l e d  
by a S w e d i s h  g r o u n d c r e w m a n  to a parking spot next to a 
c a m o u f l a g e - p a i n t e d  t w o - e n g i n e  DC-3. On cl oser i n s p ec tion, 
B a l c h e n  found a small s w a s t i k a  painted on the tail: the
G e r m a n  co ur ier from B e r l i n  also had arri ved early. The 
G e r m a n  cre w was w e a r i n g  c i v i l i a n  clothing, as was B a l c h e n ’s
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crew. The G e r m a n s  were quite cu rious  about the B-24. Both
cr ew s were t r a n s p o r t e d  to the Grand Hotel. B a l ch en  took a
hot bath, then went to a b r e a k f a s t  of steak and eggs -- a
real banquet! The d i ni ng room was full of foreign 
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agents.
After b r e a kf ast, B a l c h e n  and his cre w  were en r o u t e  to
the A m e r i c a n  E m b a s s y  when they di s c o v e r e d  they were bei ng
followed. It turned out to be Dr. G r e ssman of German
I n t e l l i g e n c e ,  who B a l c h e n  k ne w as a press a t t a c h e  in Oslo.
B a l c h e n  g r ee ted him plea s a n t l y :  Dr. G r e s s m a n  was st unn ed
whe n  B a l c h e n  saw right th r o u g h  his false wh iskers .
G r e s s m a n  said a n e r v o u s  go odbye and d i s a p p e a r e d  into a 
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store.
W h ile at the Em bassy,  M i n i s t e r  H e r shel J o h n s o n  was
br i efe d on the e v a c u a t i o n  of 2,000 N o r w e g i a n s  to Britain.
Dr. H a rr y Soe d e r m a n ,  Chief of the Cr imi n a l  I n s t i t u t e  in
Sw e d e n  -- and a great frien d of Norway -- re p o r t e d  that
1 2 ,500  N o r w e g i a n  yo ut hs wer e being tr ain ed as ’’police
s o l d i e r s . ” He also said that 40,00 0 young men had fled to
the m o u n t a i n s  in N o r w a y  to escape  German c o n s c r i p t i o n  and
asked if the U n i t e d  S t a t e s  could resupply them. Balche n
c o n t a c t e d  Ge n e r a l  Carl Spaaz in London, sa yin g ”Ve can do
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i t . ” Spaa t z  resp ond ed: ’’Y o u ’re the Ve Do I t s . ”
Ba l c h e n  was p r o v i d e d  office space at Br om ma  by 
Br i t i s h  O v e r s e a s  A i r w a y s  C o r p o r a t i o n  (B0AC) Chief Do u g l a s  
Grey. B a l c h e n  c o n t a c t e d  the O.S.S. in S t o c k h o l m  as well
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as the N o r w e g i a n  U n d e r g r o u n d  there. B a lc he n re c e i v e d
s e c r e t  radio codes, call le t t e r s  for direct c o n t a c t  with
u n d e r g r o u n d  statio ns  in Norway, as well as a c u r r e n t  air
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o r d e r  of ba ttl e for Norway.
On June 22, 1944, King H a akon VII and Cro wn Pr in ce
Ol af  a r r i v e d  at L e u c h a r s  Air Base in Sc otl and , as well as
A d m i r a l  R i i s e r - L a r s e n , head of the Royal N o r w e g i a n  Air
F o r c e  (RNAF), to give the K i n g ’s per so nal guido n to the
R N A F  unit there. They wer e also there to in sp ect the
A m e r i c a n  a i r c r a f t  and p e r s o n n e l  prior to their ta keo ff  and
d r o p  on H e r d l a  Island in Norway, c o d e - n a m e d  F e t l o c k  I.
O n e - h a l f  of the ten L i b e r a t o r s  were pa inte d dark green, the
o t h e r  on e - h a l f ,  recent a r r i v a l s ,  were pa inted  black. The
K i n g  i n s p e c t e d  the e x h a u s t  pipes with their d a m p e n e r s  to
c o n c e a l  the red glow of e n g in es at night. Also he
i n s p e c t e d  the flame a r r e s t o r s  on the ma c h i n e  gun muzzle s.
Th e King fou nd that the b o t t o m  turret had been re move d so
t ha t  p e r s o n n e l  and e q u i p m e n t  could be droppe d from there.
It was cal led the "Joe H o le ."  A p l e x i g l a s s  g r e e n h o u s e  had
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r e p l a c e d  the nose turret.
B a l c h e n  told the p a c k a g i n g  stations  in B i r m i n g h a m  to 
get busy p r o v i d i n g  c o n t a i n e r s  of ever yt hing. Some p a c ka ge s 
went  to L e u c h a r s  for air drops over Norway; others were 
fl ow n to Stockholm, w h e r e  they were tr ucked  to N o rw ay in 
h o l l o w e d - o u t  logs. C i g a r e t t e s ,  liquor, m a g a zines,  and 
c u r r e n t  n e w s p a p e r s  were added as persona l items. The
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n e w s p a p e r s  were on Oslo hotel ta ble s for the Na zis to see:
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they were ca l l i n g  card s of the Am eri ca n Air Force.
D u r i n g  the w i nt er of 194 4-1945, MVe Do It" flew 1,442 men
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and 2 , 4 5 6 , 0 0 0  tons of eq u i p m e n t  to the far north.
After a slow start, with  some early se t b a c k s  ca used 
by i n f i l t r a t i o n s  by Nazi s y m p a th izers, the N o r w e g i a n  
r e s i s t a n c e  m o v e m e n t  c o n s o l i d a t e d  into one of the most 
e f f e c t i v e  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  in all of G e r m a n - o c c u p i e d  Europe. 
F r o m  late 1942 to June, 1944, the N o r w e g i a n  r e s i s t a n c e  
m o v e m e n t  t h w a r t e d  the Na zi s at every turn.
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c a p i t u l a t i o n .  The reply was a r e s ol ut e "no" from bot h Kin g 
and G o v e r n m e n t  .
12
Pe trow, The Bitte r Y e a r s , pp. 99-100. Br au er must 
h av e k n o w n  that Q u i s l i n g  did not have much of a f o l l o w i n g  
in Nor way . Q u i s l i n g  had told Hi tl er  in 1939 that he could 
d e l i v e r  N o r w a y  in an NS "coup." Pe rhaps Hi tler b e l i e v e d  
t h i s  on April 9, 1940, but not six days later. King H a a k o n  
did not want a Q u i s l i n g  G o v e r n m e n t  b e c ause it w o uld  not 
r e p r e s e n t  the m a j o r i t y  of Norw eg ians. The King th ought it 
c o r r e c t  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y  to run a N o r w e g i a n  G o v e r n m e n t - i n -  
e x i l e  in L o ndon b e c a u s e  he still r e p r e s e n t e d  the m a j o r i t y  
of N o r w e g i a n s .  Hi tler had plans to "nazify " N o r w e g i a n s , 
and Q u i s l i n g  c o ul d be tt er  be used to " r e e d u c a t e "  them in 
the "new order . "
13
Petrow, The Bitter Y e a r s , pp. 97-100.
S c a n d i n a v i a n s  vote once per year, for two people, w h e r e a s  
A m e r i c a n s  can vote for many r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  in f r e q u e n t  
e l e c t i o n s .  Local and Di st rict r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  are e x p e c t e d  
to do their jobs well. N o r w e g i a n s  p e r c ei ve d that their 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  in Lo ndo n could not do their jobs w h i l e 
a w a y  from their desks in Norway. N o r w e g i a n s  p e r c e i v e d  
t h e i r  p r e i n v a s i o n  m i l i t a r y  of fic er s as ar r o g a n t  e l i t e s t s  
who were not doi ng  their jobs. ( S c a n d i n a v i a n s  p r e f e r r e d  
that most m o n i e s  go to social programs; thus d e fens e 
b u d g e t s  were very low. N o r w e g i a n  o f f i c e r s  had no combat 
e x p e r i e n c e .  )
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Riste, R e s i s t a n c e , pp. 1415.
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I b i d . , p . 11.
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Shirer, C h a l l e n g e , pp. 44-45.
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Petrow, The Bitter Y e a r s , p. 96. Te rbo ven , 41, was 
an o l d - l i n e  Nazi who had flown in World War I. He joined 
the Nazi party in 1920. In 1933, he be cam e G a u l e i t e r  of 
E s s e n  where he served until H i t l e r ’s Norway a p p o in tm ent.
Paal Berg, the Chief J u s t i c e  of N o r w a y ’s Suprem e Court, and 
B i s h o p  Eivind Ber ggrav, leader of the L u t h e r a n  Ch urch in 
N o r wa y, were part of the ’’g o v e r n m e n t  c o u n c i l ” to keep 
N o r w a y  r u n n i n g  on a daily basis, and pro vide practica l 
s o l u t i o n s  to d a y - t o - d a y  problems.
18
Josef Ter bo ven, N y o r d n i n g e n  & Norg e (Oslo:
J.M. Sten ersen, 1940). Also: Josef Ter boven,
B e k a n t m a c h u n g , Oslo, den 23 Marz 1 9 4 1 . (Oslo: 1941).
T e r b o v e n  wa nte d co m p l e t e  control  and o b e d i e n c e  from 
N o r w e g i a n s .  N e w s p a p e r s  were only to pu blis h German 
v i c t o r i e s  and B r i t i s h  losses. The re  was to be no c o v e r a g e  
of H a a k o n  nor his G o v e r n m e n t - i n  Exile. The re  wer e to be no 
p i c t u r e s  of the King. There was to be only a ’’Ge rm a n  s p i r i t . ”
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Shirer, C h a l l e n g e , pp. 44-45.
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Petrow, The Bitter Y e a r s , p. 104.
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Shirer, C h a l l e n g e , pp. 44-45.
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Petrow, The Bitter Y e a r s , p. 104. Also:
N o r w a y ’s F i g h t i n g  Ch ur ch (Was hi ngton: The Royal N o r w e g i a n
G o v e r n m e n t ’s Pre ss R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  in the U.S.A., 1941), pp. 
1-7. In Norway, the King  is not only the head of 
g o v e r n m e n t ,  he is also the head of the state church.
L u t h e r a n  pa s t o r s  are paid as civil servants. When T e r b o v e n  
put r e s t r i c t i o n s  on the church, pa stors simply r e s igned and 
c o n d u c t e d  u n d e r g r o u n d  services. V i s i b l e  church servic es  
w e r e  not at tended. The notion was that pastors simply 
c o u l d  not put the Ten C o m m a n d m e n t s  aside. In January,
1941, the chu rc h made detai le d pro te s t s  to Te r b o v e n  about
the a c t i v i t i e s  of the Gestapo, the Hird (a N o r w e g i a n
G e s t a p o  secret police agency), the NS and the i n j u s t i c e  of
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the o c c u p a t i o n .  Over 50,0 00  chain letters of pr otest were 
printed. 2 0 ,000 were co nfi s c a t e d ,  but 30,000  were  
c l a n d e s t i n e l y  d i s t r i b u t e d  to No rwegians .
23
I b i d . , p. 105. Svere Riisnaes, the new M i n i s t e r  
of Justice, de cla red that he al one could ap poin t or dismis s 
jury m e m b e r s  and court o f f i cia ls . He also could force 
judge s into early ret ir ement. The R e i c h s k o m m i s s a r  said 
that he was ’’the b o s s . ” All the judges resigned, w h i c h 
shoc ked  many Norw egi ans. T e r b o v e n  rep la ced them with 
c o l l a b o r a t o r s .  T e r b o v e n ’s tak eo v e r  of the judicial s y ste m 
was c o m p l e t e .
24
I b i d . , p. 106-108. N o r w e g i a n s  have a h i g h l y -  
s t r u c t u r e d  societ y and there are o r g a n i z a t i o n s  for 
everyone. tn May, 1940, many did begin to go u n d e r g r o u n d  
s t a r t i n g  the whole process. F o r t y - t h r e e  national 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  750,000 s t r o n g  ( o n e -f ourth of the N o r w e g i a n  
p o p u l a t i o n )  filed m a s s i v e  w r i t t e n  r e p o r t s  to T e r b o v e n  
p r o t e s t i n g  n a z i f i c a t i o n . T e r b o v e n  heard about the repo rts 
on B.B.C. before they ap p e a r e d  on his desk.
25
T.Derry, M o d e r n  N o r w a y , p. 391.
26
Andenaes, N o r w a y , WW  I I , pp. 6465. Q u i s l i n g  was 
m ad e  ’’M i n i s t e r p r e s i d e n t ” at an ela b o r a t e  ce r e m o n y  at 
A k e r s h u s  Castle, atten d e d  by many d i g n i t a r i e s  from Berli n 
in a ’’show of s u p p o r t . ” T e r b o v e n  had i m m e d i a t e l y  sized 
Q u i s l i n g  up as a vague and i n e f f i c i e n t  t h eo re tician.
27
I b i d . , p. 72. A r e c r u i t i n g  drive in the latter 
half of 1941 netted only 3.5 5%  of N o r w a y ’s popu latio n.  The 
NS could not rally its m e m b e r s  aroun d the idea of a 
’’N o r w e g i a n  n a t i o n a l - s o c i a l i s m . ”
28
I b i d . , p. 69-73. The N o r w e g i a n  people, like 
T e r bo ve n,  c o n s i d e r e d  Q u i s l i n g  as a ’’c l o w n . ”
29
Fxi tt F o l k , Oslo, January 13, 19 /il. This n e w s p a p e r  
was the NS Party organ. Q u i s l i n g  calle d for v o l u n t e e r s  
over R a dio Oslo the day before.
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Andenaes,  N o r w a y  , W W I I , pp. 73-76. Q u i s l i n g 
r e q u i r e d  the State Po lice, M e m b e r s  of the Hird (N o r w e g i a n  
e q u i v a l e n t  of the Germ an SS), and labor vol u n t e e r s  to swear 
a l l e g i a n c e  to Ad olp h Hitler.
31
Tor Myk l e b o s t ,  They Came as F r i e n d s , t r a n s l a t e d  
by Tr ygve M. Ager (Garde n City: Doubleday, Doran and
Company, 1943), pp. 26-27. H e r e a f t e r  referred to as: 
M y k l e b o s t ,  F r i e n d s . C o p i e s  of Fri tt Folk are on d i s play at 
the N o r w e g i a n  R e s i s t a n c e  M u s e u m  in Oslo. So are many 
u n d e r g r o u n d  n e w s p ap er s, w h i c h  provid ed  the truth to 
N o r w e g i a n s  as to what wa s going on in the world and in 
Norway. As many as sixty u n d e r g r o u n d  n e w s pa pe rs ex isted in 
N o r w a y  by the end of W o r l d  War II. Also: see b i b l i o g r a p h y
for the Royal N o r w e g i a n  G o v e r n m e n t  Inform at ion S e r v i c e  in 
W a s h i n g t o n ,  D.C. Thes e p a r t i c u l a r  p u b l i c a t i o n s  are h o use d  
in the a r c h i v e s  of R o l v a a g  M e m o r i a l  Library, at St. Olaf 
C o l l e g e  in N or thfield , M i n n e s o t a .  The N o r w e g i a n - A m e r i c a n  
c o m m u n i t i e s  in No rt h A m e r i c a  were  given timely i n f o r m a t i o n  
as to e x a c t l y  what was g o i n g  on in G e r m a n - o c c u p i e d  Norway.
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M y k l e b o s t ,  F r i e n d s , pp. 130-140. Also: Riste,
R e s i s t a n c e  , p. 19. T h e r e  were not enough loyal s u p p o r t e r s  
of NS to serve the i n t e r e s t s  of Qu i s l i n g  and the Third 
Reich. In early 1942, t h ere  were only 20,000 NS m e m b e r s  
for the N o r w e g i a n  p o p u l a t i o n  of 3.3 million, less than one- 
pe r cen t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .  NS p e n e t r a t i o n  of local 
g o v e r n m e n t s  was not s u c c e s s f u l .  Open d e m o n s t r a t i o n s  by the 
pe op le were met by " Q u i s l i n g ’s bu l l i e s , "  but their h e a v y -  
h a nded  r e a c t i o n s  only s t i f f e n e d  the resistance. In the 
Sp r i n g  of 1942, a c o n c e r t e d  ef for t by the NS to co n t r o l  the 
c l a s s r o o m s  was made. M any  t e a c h e r s  were placed into Grini , 
a c o n c e n t r a t i o n  camp near Oslo. They then were taken by 
ship to hard labor in K i r k e n e s  in north er n Norway.
Q u i s l i n g  f i na lly gave up the idea of "cl ass room 
n a z i f i c a t i o n ," but not unt il  many teachers suffered. For 
news of events, see N o r w a y ’s T e a c h e r s  Stand Firm 
(Washin gt on: The Royal N o r w e g i a n  G o v e r n m e n t ' s  Press
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  1942). A m e r i c a  was informed rapidly of 
the plight of the teacher s.
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Hans C h r i s t i a n  A d a m s o n  and Per Klem, Blood on 
the M i d n i g h t  Sun (New York: W.W. Norton and Company,
Inc.), pp. 185-186. X-U was the military i n f o r m a t i o n  service. 
It co n d u c t e d  c l a n d e s t i n e  radio t r a n s m i s s i o n s  to the B r i tish 
SIS of G e r m a n  land, air and sea movements . C I V 0 R G  was the
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ci vi l o r g a n i z a t i o n :  it would print ill egal n e w s p a p e r s  to
fo st er  o p p o s i t i o n  to the Q u i s l i n g ’s and the Nazi p h i l o s o p h i e s .  
Also: Riste, Re si s t a n c e , p. 39. The c e ntral  c i v i l i a n
r e s i s t a n c e  l e a d e r s h i p  e v o l v e d  by the end of 1942. The 
K r e t s e n  (the Ci rc le,) the focal point of the Home Front, was 
c o m p o s e d  of former m e m b e r s  of the Sup reme Court, the 
A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  C o u n c i l s  and Labor le aders who c o o r d i n a t e d  
po l i c y  wit h the N o r w e g i a n  G o v e r n m e n t - i n - E x i l e  in London.
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Derry, M o d e r n  N o r w a y , p. 398. Also: Gu nnar
F r i d t j o f  T h u r m a n n  Son steby, Report from No: 2 4 , t r a n s l a t e d  
by M a u r i c e  M i c h a e l  Stuart (New York: Lyle Stuart (New:
Lyle Stuart, Inc., 1965), pp. 42-43. Since it was a cri me 
a f te r Se ptember, 1941 for N o r w e g i a n s  to own ra di os and 
w i r e l e s s  sets, radio o p e r a t o r s  had to p a r ac hute into N o rway 
w h e r e  r e s i s t a n c e  m e m b e r s  would arr ange for radio d i s p e r s a l  
and to re por t on troop mov e m e n t s .  One of the first r a dio 
t r a n s m i t t e r s  was in use as early as the summe r of 1940. 
A u t h o r ’s comme nt : It is on di sp lay at the R e s i s t a n c e
M u s e u m  in O s l o .
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Riste, R e s i s t a n c e , pp. 30-32.
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Petrow, The Bitter Y e a r s , pp. 124-128. The B r i t i s h  
w a n t e d  it both ways. The "Co mpany  Linge " raids (March 4, 
D e c e m b e r  26, 1941) were hi ghly s u c c es sful in d e s t r o y i n g  
fish oil f a c t o r i e s  and in r e c r u i t m e n t  of patriots. This 
p r o m p t e d  H i t l e r  to i n c r e a s e  his m i l itar y ga rrison in N o r w a y  
from 15 0 , 0 0 0  to 350,00 0, for he thought that "s eco nd front" 
of the Al li es was to be an in va sion of n o r t h e r n  Norway.
G e r m a n s  and N o r w e g i a n s  ali ke fell for the "F o r t i t u d e  N o r t h "  
de c e ption,  later in 1942 called "Jupiter" when the A l lies 
n o m i n a t e d  Fr ench North Afric a instead as the "second 
f r o nt." The Br i t i s h  did not tell Haakon VII of the raids  
b e c a u s e  " N o r w e g i a n s  coul d not keep a s e c ret." The L o f o t e n s  
were bombed by the L u f t w a f f e  on Dec em ber 28, 1941.
A f t e r w a r d s ,  the SS began re p r i s a l s  on the people, man y  
goi ng  to c o n c e n t r a t i o n  camps. M I LO RG was angry b e c a u s e  the 
r a i d s  a p p e a r e d  to do more harm than good. Major H a n e b o r g  
Hansen, an early leade r of M I L O R G  did not want a ma jo r arms 
buildup; instead, he w a nted ma ss ive drops of w e a p o n s  only 
upon invasion. D i s c o v e r i e s  by Germ ans  of w e a p o n s  c a che s 
only brough t more r e p r i s a l s .  The Br it ish S0E wanted full 
c o n t r o l  to direct s e l e c t i v e  sabotages, c o o r d i n a t e d  with  
o v e r a l l  Allied raids. " I n vasio n rumors" persisted, M I L O R G  
was ca r e l e s s  in r e c r uit me nt, and was vi rt ually shut down in 
1942.
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D a vid Ar mine Howarth, Across to No rway (New 
York: W i l l i a m  Sloan A ssoci at es, 1952) pp. 1-16.
H e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to as: Howarth, Across to N o r w a y .
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I b i d ., pp. 101, 156-277. The B r i t i s h  were bent 
on s i n ki ng  the Ge rma n b a t t l e s h i p  T i r p i t z . They did not 
s u c c e e d  unti l 1944. One of L a r s e n ’s a s s i g n m e n t s  was to 
c a r r y  a B r i t i s h  Chario t, a t w o -m an  B r i t i s h  s u b m a r i n e  into 
the fjord at T rond he im, where the Ti rpi tz  hid from the 
B r i t i s h  Fleet. La rsen close d to a five mile range in heavy 
w a t e r s  to the T i r p i t z , where the char iot d i s l o d g e d  and 
sank. In 1943, the "Sh e t l a n d  Bus" lost over half of its 
" f i s h i n g "  boats. The O.S.S. gave the ope r a t i o n  three 
s u b c h a s e r s  w h ic h made 105 trips ac ro ss  the Nor th Sea 
w i t h o u t  a loss.
41
M y k l e b o s t ,  F r i e n d s , pp. 196-200. Also see:
Od d  Be rg fald, G e s t a p o  i Norge (Oslo: Hj e m m e s  Forlag,
1978). T his is a v a i l a b l e  in the a r c h i v e s  of St. Olaf 
C o l l e g e  in N o r t h f i e l d ,  M innes ot a. Also: Finn Dyn gvol d,
K r i g e n  og Aus t e v o l l ,  1 9 4 0 -1 94 5 (Bergen: Bladet
S u n n h o r d l a n d , 1980), p. 109. "Den 27 juni, Olaf D r o n e n  
var a r r e s t e r t  av G e s ta po  og sett i fe n g s e l . "  (On June 27th, 
O l a f  Dr one n was a r r e s t e d  by the Gest apo and thrown in 
jail). ( A u t h o r ' s  holding). Dronen was tr ai ned in B r i t i s h  
"d ir ty tr i c k s "  and wor k e d  with Leif L a r s e n ’s " S h e t l a n d  
B u s . "  The G e s t a p o  re all y did not have proof of his 
a c t i v i t i e s  and he was r e l e a s e d  after five days of 
" i n t e r r o g a t i o n . "  Also: Di splay at the R e s i s t a n c e  Mus eum:
A c o ffee k e t t l e  wit h a hole in the bo tto m i l l u s t r a t e s  the 
" C h i n e s e "  t o r t u r e  method. A clamp, ap pl ied  to arms and 
legs, is als o  shown.
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He l e n  Astrup, Oslo Intrigue: A W o m a n ' s  M e m o i r
of the N o r w e g i a n  R e s i s t a n c e  (New York: M c G r a w - H i l l  Book
Co m pan y,  Inc., 1954), pp. 7, 28-33. H e r e a f t e r  r e f e r e n c e d
to as: Astrup, Oslo I n t r i g u e .
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M y k l e b o s t ,  F r i e n d s , pp. 209-215. Also: Alan
S. M i l w a r d , The Fascis t Economy in Norway (Oxford:
C l a r e n d o n  Press, ]972). Nazi Germany did not p o s s e s s  
c e r t a i n  s t r a t e g i c  economic r e s o u r c e s  and f i n a n c i a l l y  could 
not trade wit h other c o u n t r i e s  for them. In order to keep 
the Third R e i c h ' s  "l iving st a n d a r d s "  high, H i tl er in v a d e d  
n e i g h b o r i n g  c o u n t r i e s  to exploit them ec o n o m i c a l l y .
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G e r m a n y  in va ded Russia in 1941 for oil and wheat fields.
N o r w a y  was o b l i g e d  to p r o v i d e  fish oil, sulfur, and food to 
fuel the v e n t u r e  into Russia. N o r w e g i a n  cod and sa lmo n 
w er e f a v o r i t e s  in Germa n field rations. Also: Riste,
Re si s t a n c e , pp. 33-34. T e r b o v e n  had not d i s t u r b e d  the 
N o r w e g i a n  trade unions until G e r m a n y  in vaded Russia. Now 
t i g h t  co ntrol was n e c e s s a r y  w i t h  a rule by fear. On 
S e p t e m b e r  9, 1941, Oslo w o r k e r s  e n g ag ed  in a s p o n t a n e o u s
s t r i k e  be c a u s e  of the c e s s a t i o n  of spec ial milk r a t i o n s  to 
the w o r k e r s  in the fac to ries. On Se p t e m b e r  10th, the 
G e s t a p o  s t e p p e d  in and e x e c u t e d  two trade u n i o n i s t s  d u ring 
six days of terror.
44
Hans C h r i s t i a n  A d a m s o n  and Per Klem, Blood on 
the M i d n i g h t  Sun (New York: W.W. No rto n and Com pany, Inc.),
pp. 187-189. H e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to as: Adamson, Blood.
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Sonsteby,  N o . 2 4 , p. 51.
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Ad am so n, B l o o d , pp. 221-230.
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Riste, R e s i s t a n c e , pp. 47-48. By 1942, there were 
s i x t e e n  Secre t I n t e l l i g e n c e  S e r v i c e  radio stati ons , m a n n e d  
by B r i t i s h - t r a i n e d  N o r w e g i a n s  in Norway, r e p o r t i n g  G e r m a n  
na v a l  and t r oop m o v e m e n t s  back to London. In 1942,
’’C o m p a n y  L i n g e "  c o n d u c t e d  t w e n t y - o n e  s a b o t a g e s  and 
r e c r u i t e d  a "secret a r m y . "  They were sent in by the 
" S h e t l a n d  B u s."
48
I b i d ., p. 52. A N o r w e g i a n  "too hones t to lie" 
p o i n t e d  the NS Sheriff t o w a r d s  the Linge arms dump de s t i n e d  
for MILORG. The two L i nge men were tortured, then shot.
For a full accou nt, co nsult: K o n r a d  Birkhaug, Televa ag :
F i s k e v a e r e t  som T y s ke ne S l e ttet  Ut 1942 (Oslo: Gy ld e n d a l ,
1946). The Ge s t a p o  did its h o m e w o r k  and a r r e s t e d  ot he r s  in 
w e s t e r n  Norway. I n f i l t r a t i o n  and N o r w e g i a n  c a r e l e s s n e s s  
led to a vi rtual  s h u t d o w n  of M I L O R G  in 1942. (This book is
h o u s e d  in the a r c h i v e s  at St. Olaf Colleg e. )
49
Petrow, The Bi tt er Y e a r s , pp. 123-128. Major 
M a r t i n  Linge, a N o r w e g i a n  actor, and his co mp any of N o r w e g i a n s  
u n d e r w e n t  sp eci al  fo rces t r a i n i n g  by SOE in Great Britain.
A New York T i m e s  h e a d l i n e  b a n n e r e d  that King Ha akon VII was
r u m o r e d  to be a p a r t i c i p a n t  of the two raids on the
L o f o t e n s .  He was not, but he was fumin g b e c au se the B r i ti sh  
did not tell him in a d v a n c e  a b out the raids.
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T h o m a s  Mi ch ael Gal la gher, As sa ul t in Norway: 
S a b o t a g i n g  the Nazi N u c l e a r  Bomb (New York: H a r c o u r t  Brace
J o v a n o v i c h ,  Inc., 1975), pp. 3-14. H e r e a f t e r  referre d to 
as: G a l l a g h e r ,  B o m b .
51
G a l l a g h e r ,  B o m b , pp. 15-83.
52
I b i d . , pp. 136-163. The s a b ot age team left 
b e h i n d  B r i t i s h  unit s h o ul der patches. Also: Riste,
R e s i s t a n c e , pp. 59-60. Also: Petrow, The Bitter Y e a r s ,
pp. 138-150. The conic al  cells are on di splay  at the 
R e s i s t a n c e  Mu se um. All a u t h o r s  c o n c l u d e  that the raid was 
the most s u c c e s s f u l  of all the o p e r a t i o n s  u n d e r t a k e n  in 
Norway. The a u t hors have gone into c o n s i d e r a b l e  detail on 
the p l a n n i n g  and e x e c u t i o n  of the raid. They also tell of 
p a r a c h u t i n g  on the h o s t i l e  H a r d a n g e r v i d d a , survival, the 
p h y s i c a l  dem an ds , d i f f i c u l t y  in r e n d e z v o u s  with those in 
place, and also the h a r d s h i p s  of desc ent and as cent  of the 
only route p o s s i b l e  to the target, and the es cape to fight 
again. It d e f i n i t e l y  d e t e r m i n e d  the value of sabot ag e 
i n s t e a d  of Al li e d  bombing, whic h would take nee d l e s s  
c i v i l i a n  c a s u a l t i e s .  U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  the plant was bombed 
by the E i g h t h  Air F o rc e in 1943, be cause the Allies  
u n d e r e s t i m a t e d  the p l a n t ’s heavy  water prod uction.  The 
b o m b i n g  raid was a disaste r: very littl e pr o d u c t i o n  was
s t o pped and there were c i v i l i a n  c a s u alt ie s. N o r w e g i a n s  
ho w l e d  to the Allies: ’’Stop the b o m b i n g . ”
53
Petrow, The Bi tter Years , P- 230.
54
Riste, Res ist an ce, p. 58.
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Petrow, The Bitter Years , P • 230.
56
Riste, R e s i st ance, pp. 67-69. The 
M I L O R G  w a n t e d  a very ac tive r e s i s tance.
C o m m u n i s t s
57
Petrow, The Bitter Years , P • 232 . P e r m a n e n t
M I L O R G  grou p s  were set up in the woods and mou nt ains. At 
the d r o p p i n g  zones, the ’’boys in the f o r e s t ’’ re ceived 
i n s t r u c t o r s ,  w e a p o n s  and food from Britain. At the 
R e s i s t a n c e  Museum, two maps from  the High Co mmand define 
and id e n t i f y  the m i l i t a r y  d i s t r i c t s  and the "safe a r e as." 
All t w e n t y - t h r e e  s e l f - c o n t a i n e d  d i s t r i c t s  had radio co nt act 
wi t h  England. In north Norway groups were able to op er ate
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fro m base s wit h  radio s t a t i o n s  esta b l i s h e d  on the Sw e d i s h  
side of the border, t h anks to Swedish spec ial d i s p e n s a t i o n  
( S E P A L S ) .
58
Kiste, R e s i s t a n c e , p. 72. Also: Sonsteby, N o . 2 4 ,
pp. 107-116. S o n s t e b y  place d char ges in the buil dings,  then 
w a l k e d  into the o f f i c e s  and calmly told the w o r k e r s  to 
e v a c u a t e  i m m e d i a t e l y - - t h e  place was going to blow up. They 
did and the e x p l o s i o n s  s c a t t e r e d  every thi ng. It was a real 
m o r a l e  boost for N o r w e g i a n s .
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Riste, R e s i s t a n c e , p. 73.
60
I b i d . , pp. 74-75.
61
Petrow, The Bitte r Y e a r s , p. 233. F u r u b o t n  
r e a s o n e d  since Russ i a  was e n t e r i n g  N o r w e g i a n  soil, this was 
to be the t u r n i n g  point to lead a general i n s u r r e c t i o n .
The B r i t i s h  re f u s e d  to arm  the Co mmunist e l e m e n t s  b e c a u s e  
of this. A June, 1944 d i r e c t i v e  from Ge ner al  Dwight D. 
E i s e n h o w e r ,  S H AE F C o m m a n d e r  (Riste, R e s i s t a n c e , pp.
75-76): "No Al li ed m i l i t a r y  o f f ens es  were pl an ne d for 
Norw ay.  Don't e n c o u r a g e  the R e s i s t a n c e  to make overt 
m o v e s . "  The SHA EF po licy was to use the R e s i s t a n c e  to 
p r e ve nt the G e r m a n s  from u s ing "scorch ed earth " tacti cs on 
N o r w a y ' s  p o we r stat io ns, c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  and public 
u t i l i t i e s .
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Balch en , Come N o r t h  , p. 212.
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C a v e - B r o w n ,  Secre t W a r s , p. 312.
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Balchen, Come N o r t h , p. 213
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I b i d . , p. 214.
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Ibid., p. 216.
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I b i d . , p. 256.
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I b i d . , pp. 260-261.
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Ibid . , p . 262.
70
I b i d . , p . 263
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I b i d . , pp. 263-264.
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C a v e - B r o w n ,  Secret W a r s , pp. 302-3U4.
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I b i d .
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I b i d .
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Balchen, Come N o r t h , pp. 264-265. Also see the 
c o m i c  o p era wi t h  Germ ans in S t o c k h o l m  on page 267. On a 
s u b s e q u e n t  flight, B a l c h e n ' s  B-24  crac ked  a cyl i n d e r  head on 
one of its eng in es. It had to be re pl a c e d  befor e it could 
r e t u r n  to Scotland . Ba lchen  c h e cked with his friend, Carl 
F l o r m a n  of the S w edis h Air Line, to see if he c o uld get a 
c y l i n d e r  head or a new engine. F l o rman said that n o t h i n g  
was a v a i l a b l e ,  but he wou ld  check  with the Germa n L u f t h a n s a  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  to see if he had stock on hand at Bromma. 
L u f t h a n s a  said n o t h i n g  was on hand, but an engine w o u l d  be 
on board the DC-3 courier  from Be rlin the next day. The 
e n g i n e  from a s h o t - d o w n  B-24 a r r ive d the next day from 
B e r lin. The L u f t h a n s a  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  gave it to Florman , 
who in turn, gave it to Balchen. After its i n s t a l l a t i o n  by 
m e c h a n i c s ,  the B-24 ret ur ned to Scotland, co urtesy  of Nazi 
G e r m a n y .
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I b i d .
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I b i d . , pp. 267-269.
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I b i d .
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Ibid . , pp. 269 270.
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Ibid . , p . 27 3.
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I b i d ., p . 287.
C H A P T E R  IV 
T H E  F O R M A T I O N  AND O P E R A T I O N S  OF NORSO
T h i s c h a p t e r  d i s c u s s e s  the evo l u t i o n  of the
O.S.S. N o r s o  Gro up and d e s c r i b e s  its tr a i n i n g  in
g u e r r i l l a  w a r f a r e  in both the Uni ted States and Great
B r i t a i n  in p r e p a r a t i o n  for its eventual role in Norway.
The S t r u g g l e  to V o l u ntee r
Leif O i s t a d  found h i m s e l f  on a N o r w e g i a n  tanker in
the m i d d l e  of the A t l ant ic  when Ge rma n troops oc c u p i e d
N o r w a y  on Apr il 9, 1940, and he could not re turn to his
b e l o v e d  c o u n t r y  to check up on his parents. He left his
ship in Ne w  York City in Sep tembe r,  1940, and s t r u g g l e d  to
e n l i s t  in the U.S. Army. Since Amer ica was not yet in the
war, he was c l a s s i f i e d  as an alie n and could not enlist.
W h a t  p r o m p t e d  his desi re to enlis t was not only a sense of
1
a d v e n t u r e ,  but a de sire to help liber at e his ho meland.
Not un ti l Se ptember, 1942, could Leif Oi stad enlis t
in the Army. He took his basic training at Fort Lee,
V i r g i n i a ;  on Christ ma s, 1942, he was t r a n s f e r r e d  to Camp
Hale, C o l o r a d o .  The 99th Infa nt ry Brigade was u n d e r g o i n g
2
v i g o r o u s  m o u n t a i n  t r a in in g there. Tom Sather was 
s t r a n d e d  on a N o r w e g i a n  vessel on April 9, 1940, in the
h a r b o r  of Lon g Beach, C a l i forni a,  with the same a m b i t i o n  to
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enlist. The I m m i g r a t i o n  a u t h o r i t i e s  were r e l u c t a n t  to give
hi m a "green ca rd" so he could not even find work in the
3
U n i t e d  States, let alone gain p e r m ission to enlist. In
lat e 1942, the Army p e r m i t t e d  Sather to enlist, 
c o m m i s s i o n i n g  him as a secon d l i e u te nant in early 1943.
A n o t h e r  s t r a n d e d  N o r w e g i a n  me r c h a n t  m a r ine r,  H a r o l d  
Nipe, f i n a l l y  was given the op tion to enlist at Fort
4
S n e l l i n g ,  M i n n e s o t a ,  then went to the 99th at Camp Hale.
Lei f Eide  of M i n n e a p o l i s ,  M i n n e s o t a ,  a U.S. cit iz en,
c o r r e s p o n d e d  w ith his brother, Olav, who was in the 99th,
to find out that the 99th had good food. Eide i m m e d i a t e l y
r e q u e s t e d  a t r a n s f e r  from his Jac ks onvill e,  F l o rid a
I n f a n t r y  R e g i m e n t  to the 99th, and it was a p p r o v e d — no
3
p r o b l e m  for this U.S. citizen! Karl Ho ffman  (a.k.a. Ma tti
R a i v i o )  fled F i n l a n d  at age si xteen  to escape the d e b acle
of the R u s s o - F i n n i s h  War in 1939. He spoke many l a n g u a g e s
and he was an e x p e r i e n c e d  skier: H o ff man e n l is ted into the
6
U.S. Army and then was sent di rectly to the O.S.S.
F o r m a t i o n  of the 99th In fantr y Bat talion (Se parate)
On July 10, 1942, the War Depa rt ment a c t i v a t e d  the
99th I n f a n t r y  B a t t a l i o n  (Separate) at Camp Ripley,
M i n n e s o t a .  It was i n t en de d by the War D e p a r t m e n t  that
this unit e v e n t u a l l y  would co ns is t only of N o r w e g i a n
7
n a t i o n a l s  (a liens or aliens wit h  first papers).
The a u t h o r i z e d  stre ng th was to be 931 e n l i s t e d  men. 
The i n f a n t r y  b a t t a l i o n  would consist of 884 e n l i s t e d  men;
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the me di ca l de tachment,  36; the t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  platoon, 11.
O f f i c e r s  of N o r w e g i a n  e x t r a c t i o n  wh o could speak N o r w e g i a n
w o u l d  be c h o s e n  from S e c o n d  Army perso nnel. They wou ld be
e v e n t u a l l y  re pla ce d by N o r w e g i a n  n a t i o n a l s  g r a d u a t e d  from
8
o f f i c e r  c a n d i d a t e  schools.
The C o m m a n d i n g  G e n e r a l s  of the First, Third and,
F o u r t h  A r mies and the VI, VII, and IX Army C o rps woul d
c o l lect all r e q u e s t s  for t r a n s f e r  to the 99th Inf antry
B a t t a l i o n  from N o r w e g i a n  n a t i o n a l s  se rvi ng  in the Army in
this co untry. If s u f f i c i e n t  al iens were not pr o c u r e d  to
f or m a c o m plete  bat ta li on, N o r w e g i a n - s p e a k i n g  so l d i e r s  who
w e r e  U.S. c i t i z e n s  wo ul d be v o l u n t a r i l y  t r a n s f e r r e d  to the 
9
unit .
Lif e at Camp Hale
Almost 1,000 No rw e g i a n s ,  mo stly exiles and me r c h a n t
s e a m e n  and A m e r i c a n s  of S c a n d i n a v i a n  descent, gat he re d at
C a m p  Hale, Color ado , to train in m o u n t a i n  wa rf are. Their
unit, the 99th In f a n t r y  B a t t a l i o n  (Sepa rate), was e a r mar ke d
10
for N o r w a y ' s  l i b e r a t i o n  from Ge rm an  occu patio n.  They
11
w e r e  to become e x pe rts in skiing. The A m e r i c a n
G o v e r n m e n t  as s u m e d  that e v e r y o n e  of S c a n d i n a v i a n  des cent
was an e x c e llent skier, but that was not al wa y s  the case.
Leif Oistad, an e x c e l l e n t  skier, taught man y  o f f i c e r s  how
to ski well: "If you can't out-ski the Germans, you will
12
not r e t u r n . ” In late 1942, tr ainin g began in ear nest in 
m o u n t a i n  climbing, forging rivers and c a n y o n s — and the
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13
a r d u o u s  task of h a u l i n g  s u p p l i e s  and weapons.
The 99th had its own n e w s p a p e r  from which its m e m b e r s
c o uld read news from Norway, c o u r t e s y  of the N o r w e g i a n
u n d e r g r o u n d  in Oslo. They were also i n f ormed that the
N a t i o n a l  S e r vi ce  Life I n s u r a n c e  (NSLI) provi de d b e n e f i t s  of
14
$ 1 0 , 0 0 0  and were e n c o u r a g e d  to sign up for this package.
On May 23, 1943, the V i k i n g  r e p o r t e d  on Pr e s i d e n t  F r a n k l i n
D. R o o s e v e l t ’s secret i n s p e c t i o n  of the unit: the Chief
E x e c u t i v e  was very war m  in his praise  of the husky
15
N o r w e g i a n s  who pa rad ed b e f o r e  him.
R e c r u i t m e n t  into the O.S.S.
In the su mmer of 1943, two h i g h - r a n k i n g  N o r w e g i a n
o f f i c e r s ,  Ober st lo’ytnant M u n t h e - K a s s  and Oberst loy tnant
A.H. Dahl, v i s ited Camp Hale, Colorado.  So did
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of the A m e r i c a n  Of fice  of Strat eg ic
S e r v i c e s  (O.S.S.). They were the re to recruit select
c a n d i d a t e s  for thei r o r g a n i z a t i o n  out of the ranks of the
16
99th I n f a n t r y  Bat ta li on. R u m o r s  had it that the O.S.S.
p l a n n e d  to pa r a c h u t e  s a b ota ge  teams into oc cu pi ed E u rop e
17
and "r ai se  he ll " with the Nazis. Since the 99th was
m o s t l y  N o r w e g i a n  (with a few F i nns and Swed es  throw n in),
18
the O.S.S. must have had plans for Norway.
The i n t e r v i e w s  began, w ith  the i n t e r v i e w i n g  team
s t a t e m e n t  that the O.S.S. "was lo ok ing for men to v o l u n t e e r
19
for extra h a z a r d o u s  duty b e hi nd enemy lines in N o r w a y . "
20
The men were i n t e r v i e w e d  in N orw eg ian. The i n t e r v i e w s
95
w er e  als o the first to assess the p s y c h olo gi cal p r o f i l e s  of
21
the c a n d i d a t e s  to go on "su ic id e mi s s i o n s . "  Leif Eide
was told that he woul d have to take par ac hute t r a i n i n g  if
22
he v o l u n t e e r e d :  he said yes.
Finn Hoff was the first soldier to v o l u n t e e r  for the 
23
O.S.S..
S e l e c t i o n s  made, the O.S.S. sent the f o l l o w i n g  men to 
W a s h i n g t o n ,  D.C. from Camp Hale in July, 1943, for 
O p e r a t i o n a l  Gro up training:
Ra n k Name Serial N
C a p t a i n H a r o l d  Larson 0- 4 0 8 8 0 0
1st L t . W i l l i a m  F. Larsen 01292011
1st L t . H a rr y L. So lberg 01 29403 2
2nd L t . Er ik  J. An dersen 0 1 2 95 64 9
2nd L t . Bi rg er  Berg 0 1 3 1 7 2 6 0
2nd L t . R a l p h  N. Elsmo 01 552 4 8 3
2nd L t . Re id er  J. Gr unseth 01 30863 5
2nd L t . M e l v i n  J. Hj e l t n e s s 01291641
2nd L t . Ado lf Lieum 0 1 3 10 73 2
2nd L t . Tom Sather 0 1 3 05 65 5
S / S g t . E i na r A. El i a s s e n 6871 912
S / S g t . Al vi n Toso 37 08137 8
S g t . Alf G. Am ese n 20 28 55 70
Sgt . K e n n e t h  R. John son 37 271 917
S g t . E d wa rd E. Kj el ness 392 30 883
T/ 4th Si gur d T. G i l b e r t s o n 32109847
T / 4 t h Ein ar K r i s t i a n s e n 13143 869
T/4 th C u r t i s  Olson 17011137
Cp 1 . Si gu rd  M. Baro 324 24 096
Cpl . T r y g v e  Berge 390 31 393
Cp 1 . John  I. H a l v o r s e n 321 721 54
Cpl . Kai O.C. Joh an se n 32 62483 3
Cpl. Karl Larsen 311571 47
Cpl . Lars Motland 3231270 7
Cpl. E r l i n g  Olsen 32597 12 8
Cpl . Olav S. R e i n h o l d t s e n 32423 629
C p l . John Sunde 324974 97
T / 5th M a r i n u s  D. My rland 327 084 77
T / 5 t h J o h a n n e s  S. Rorvick 3 7 3 11 880
T / 51 h M o r r i s  A. Syrstad 17017008
T / 5 t h Otto  Tw ingley 372 72 189
T / 5 t h Ar thur J. We s t g a r d 37 16851 3
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Pf c Olaf H. A a n on sen 3244967 7
Pf c Sverre Aa n o n s e n 3 2 5 02 869
Pfc Siewert Dymbe 3 6 2 61 072
Pf c Leif Eide 37096441
Pfc Olaf J . Eide 36 6 2 8 9 4 3
Pfc Knut J. Fal ck 3 2 4 2 1 3 3 5
Pfc Hans H. Flater 3 2 4 2 9 0 6 5
Pfc Asmund Gravdal 32498841
Pfc Olaf Hall 3 2 2 60389
Pfc Harry A. H a nsen 3 2 8 04609
Pfc Arne I . H e r stad 39193561
Pfc Berger I. H j e l v i k 375 4 3 0 1 9
Pfc Arne M. Hoff 3 6 7 1 1 1 8 9
Pfc Finn E. Hoff 324 0 8 5 0 8
Pfc Adolf I . Ho g f o s s 393 7 8 5 5 9
Pfc Nels Huus 3 9 3 8 9 7 0 0
Pfc K n u t e J o a 3982616 7
Pfc Rudolf J o h a n n e s e n 3 2 6 1 6 0 8 6
Pfc T o rlei f B. Jo h a n s e n 321 0 8 8 5 6
Pfc Lars S. Larsen 3 2 2 5 9 4 7 9
Pfc Arne N. Li st ei d 32 4 2 3 6 7 7
Pfc Ha ro ld  E . Ness 3 6 3 8 1 2 4 3
Pfc Ha lv or  H. Nipe 3 2 4 2 3 6 2 3
Pfc Gj eru lf O t t e r s l a n d 32 6 2 4 1 4 2
Pfc Lars N. R o t t i n g e r 3 2 4 9 7 6 3 2
Pfc To st e n  Rusdal 3 9 6 1 4 5 2 9
Pfc Hakon A. S k g o l s v i k 3 2 4 2 8 4 4 3
Pfc Eddie 0. S o n den o 39 6 1 4 9 0 7
Pfc O d d b e r g  S t i anse n 3 2 7 2 1 7 1 9
Pfc Be r n h a r d  W. T a l l a k s e n 3 2 2 4 8 8 9 5
Pfc C h r i s t o p h e r  To rp er 3 2 5 4 1 5 8 2
Pfc H a r t w i c k  E. W e b e r g 3662693 1
Pvt H a r o l d  A n d er so n 32880 5 2 7
Pvt Mike B a a r s v i k 3 2 6 2 4 2 8 9
Pvt Ra n d o l p h  K r i s t i a n s e n 3 3 7 3 7 5 6 6
Pvt Borge La n g e l a n d 32876 2 8 7
Pvt Rolf Lilleby 32 7 2 1 6 3 5
Pvt Leif E. M e la nd 3 2 8 6 9 4 9 4
Pvt Leif Oistad 3 2 5 0 2 6 4 6
Pvt Sverre B. Rogne 3 2 4 9 7 5 0 6
Pvt E r li ng K. Sa lv e s e n 3 2 7 9 7 3 9 3
Pvt Paul P. Th om le 36 802 7 2 7
The ir new station was known as "Area F," the ground of the
C o n g r e s s i o n a l  Country Club, w h er e Major W .E . Fa ir bairn ,
Maj or Joe A l d e r d y c e  and C a p t a i n  A1 Cox taught the
25
c a n d i d a t e s  h a n d - t o - h a n d  combat.
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The C o n g r e s s i o n a l  "Country C l u b M
Alf Paulsen, a farmer from Crosby, N o r t h  Dakota, was
a l s o  i n t e r v i e w e d  by the O.S.S. (He was s t a t i o n e d  in
L o u i s i a n a ,  and was never a m e mber  of the 99th Infan tr y
B a t t a l i o n . )  He was pr of icient in Norwegi an . P a u l s e n  was
a s k e d  by his i n t e r v i e w e r s  if he was a vo l u n t e e r  for
h a z a r d o u s  duty. P a u lsen said that the w h o l e  U.S. Army was
h a z a r d o u s  duty. He was put down as a v o l u n t e e r  and sent
d i r e c t l y  to the C o n g r e s s i o n a l  Co un try Club for c o m m a n d o
t r a i n i n g  by the O.S.S.. P a u l s e n  had never seen a c o u n t r y
c l u b  and he was cur iou s about how the elite lived. ’’Some 
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c o u n t r y  c l u b ! ”
T e n t s  were pitched arou n d  the c l u b ho use. The
f a i r w a y s  of the golf course pr ovided  an e x c e l l e n t  c o m m a n d o
t r a i n i n g  course. The t h i ck ets on the sides were more  dense
th a n  m a n y  jungles. It was d i f f i c u l t  to sneak up on
o p p o n e n t s  w i t h o u t  being detec ted: booby traps were
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e v e r y w h e r e .  Major F a i r b a i r n  trained the men in the art
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of the u n d e r w o r l d  Oriental warfare.
C a d r e s  of young of f i c e r s  were r e c r u i t e d  from Fort 
B e n n i n g ,  Georgia, with the aid of General Don ovan, head of 
the O . S.S.. P a r a c h u t i n g  was a key to the s u cce ss  of O.S.S. 
o p e r a t i o n s :  the officers, in turn, were to train others.
W h e n  the N o r w e g i a n  deta chmen t arrived, V/.E. F a i r bairn,  Joe 
A l d e r d i c e ,  A1 Cox, and Major Serge O b o l en sk y took them smar tly 
in hand. They took them out at seven in the m o r n i n g  and
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they did not r e tu rn  u n til mi d n i g h t .  A smal l M a ri ne raider
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unit acted as the Germans. The N o r w e g i a n  O p e r a t i o n a l
G r o u p  (O.S.S. N O R S O  Group) then trai ned at Area MB M (now
C a m p  David), and then went to M a r t h a ' s  V i n e y a r d  to make an
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a m p h i b i o u s  as sault  on a " s e cret" radar i n s t a l l a t i o n .
E s p r i t  de C o rps  Too Hig h
D e t a c h m e n t s  of Greeks, French, and I t a l i a n s  als o
a r r i v e d  in late 1943 to u n d e r g o  co m m a n d o  tr ai ning.  All
w e r e  quite good, but the groups became too h o m o g e n e o u s .
J o int o p e r a t i o n s  began: the I t a l i a n - N o r w e g i a n  e f fo rt  was
h i g h l y - s u c c e s s f u l  b e c a u s e  it was w e l l - c o o r d i n a t e d .  Fr ench
o f f i ce rs , olde r than the men, r e l e n t l e s s l y  led the field
o p e r a t i o n s .  This  w o u l d  provide rich d i v i d e n d s  for the
O. S.S. in F r a n c e  in 1944, as there was no i m m i n e n t  m i s s i o n
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to jump into Norway.
The esprit de co rps be came too high for these ethnic
d e t a c h m e n t s :  by then they were honed in the ir s k i l l s  and
they knew  it. The men wo rked hard and pl ayed hard. On
lib ert y, they woul d get into fights wit h the M i l i t a r y
P o l i c e  (M.P.s). At least half of the men ended their
l i b e r t i e s  in the sto ckade. The o f f i c e r s  had to "sign for
t h e m  on a hand r e c e i p t . "  Then the men were th rown into
e a r l y - m o r n i n g  field ex ercises, as if n o t h i n g  had h a p p e n e d
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the night, before.
One time the M . P. s c o n d u c t e d  tank o p e r a t i o n s  near the 
O.S.S. t r a i n i n g  area and that was a s e r io us m i s t a k e  made by
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the M.P.s, for the men of the O.S.S. had no love for them.
H i d d e n  and und et ected, the men su d d e n l y  p o u n c e d  upon the
M . P . s  and gave them the b u s iness until S e rg e O b o l e n s k y  
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int e r v e n e d .
M a r t h a ' s  V i n eyard
In late 1943, the O.S.S. N O R S O  Group " i n v a d e d "
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M a r t h a 's V i n e y a r d  for an e x e r c i s e  in a m p h i b i o u s  training. 
T he  ob je ct  was to p e n e t r a t e  a h i g h l y - s e c u r e d  radar sta tio n,
" c h a l k "  targets , then d i s a p p e a r  into the night, u nd etected .
/
T h a t  st atio n was guarde d by M a r i n e s  who k n e w  the " a s s a u l t "
w a s  coming, but did not know when. The e x e r c i s e  pr ovi d e d
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e v e r y b o d y  w i t h  an e x c e l l e n t  field problem.
The men were t r a n s p o r t e d  by sub m a r i n e  and came asho r e
in r u b b e r  raf ts to Gay Head on the we s t e r n  side of M a r t h a ' s
V i n e y a r d .  Once beached, the men pr o c e e d e d  to the radar
s t a t i o n .  They found that the i n s t a l l a t i o n  had a high
e l e c t r i c a l  fence s u r r o u n d i n g  it; s o m e t h i n g  the O.S.S. did
not brief the ass aul t group  about. The men b e ga n to 
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p o n d e r .
The i n s t a l l a t i o n  had only one ent r a n c e  t h r o u g h  which,
as the men observed, truck  t r a ffic moved in and cut, using
s p e c i a l  h e a d l i g h t  s i g n a l s  to gain entrance. Tom Sather
t h o u g h t  that by this means, the N O RS O Gr oup could  also get
i n s i d e .  This  wou ld i n v ol ve  h i j a c k i n g  the t r u c k s  farther up
the main road, out of v i s i o n  of the i n s t a l l a t i o n ,  and then
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d r i v i n g  in like e v e r y b o d y  else did.
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Soon a tr uck came along. The NORSO  Group a t t a c k e d
the d r iver  and p a s s e n g e r s  and u n c e r e m o n i o u s l y  tied them  up,
l e a v i n g  them b e hi nd  in the th ic kets. They c o n v o y e d  to the
gate of the radar i n s t a l l a t i o n ,  were given p e r m i s s i o n  to
enter, they qu ietly " c h a lked " their targets, and drove out.
M i s s i o n  co mp l e t e d :  the N O R S O  Gro up "passed the c o u r s e , "
then left for Fort H a m i l t o n  in Bro oklyn, New York.
Mor e T r a i n i n g — More R o w d y — in Great Britain
E i g h t y - f o u r  men and twelve officers sailed to W a l e s
in Dec e m b e r ,  1943 w h ere  the O.S.S. NOR SO Group was to
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c o n t i n u e  its tra ining. They landed at S w a nsea  and they
took the t r ain to a place named after Lord Lovat for
f u rthe r c o m m a n d o  training, this time con d u c t e d  by the 
40
Br iti sh . After N o r t h l a n d  L o dge near In ve rness , Sco tland,
the group left for S t o n e l a i r i g  Castle near Loch Ness in
S c o t l a n d  for six mo nths  of ski and d e m o l i t i o n s  tr aining;
then  to W e e d e n , Engl and in Brock Hall, then to R i n g w a y  near
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N o r t h h a m p t o n  for p a r a ch ute tra ining.
The t r a i n i n g  was hard and mon otonou s.  That, however,
did not d i s t r a c t  the N o r w e g i a n s  from partying:
. those N o r w e g i a n s  are different  from 
e v e r y b o d y  else, e s p e c i a l l y  those me r c h a n t 
m a r i n e s .  In the e v e n i n g  they went out to have 
fun, they got arres ted, bo y - - t h e y  got them 
w o r k e d  so tired, you w o u l d n ’t think they'd have 
e n o u g h  pep to go on, but that d i d n ’t stop them 
. . the fights with other o u t fits . . .
t h a t ’s the Vi king blood in them. 42
Karl H o f f m a n  said half the boys were in the s t o ckade 
ev ery  Mo nday : "P ap py" B o y i n g t o n ’s outfit "could not even
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serve an a p p r e n t i c e s h i p  in o u r s . ” C l i fford Ky llo  observe d
"We d i d n ’t salute Ge ne ral Don ov an, so why sh ou ld we salute
a g o ddam second l i e u t e n a n t ? "  Kyl lo said the O.S.S. N O R S O
G r o u p  had a "secret te l e p h o n e  number" to call in order to
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get out of t r o uble and avoid court martials.
The " P r a ct ice" Jumps into  Fr ance
The N O R S O  Grou p dr op ped into occ up ied Franc e after
"D" Day, b e hin d German lines, r e n d e z v o u s e d  with the French
u n d e r g r o u n d  "and then wa it e d  for General G e o r g e  S. Patto n
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to cat ch  up w i t h  them."
One such a c tion was O p e r a t i o n  LINDSE Y. James C. 
L a r s o n ’s c i t a t i o n  to a c c o m p a n y  his Bronze Star read as 
f o l l o w s :
C a p t a i n  James C. Larson pe r f o r m e d  m e r i t o r i o u s  
s e r v i c e  in France from Au gus t 17 t h r ough 
S e p t e m b e r  1944. He p a r a c h u t e d  behind enemy 
lines with a small g r oup of men and o r g a n i z e d  with 
the Ma qu is . This group took and held a h y d r o ­
e l e c t r i c  plant and c a p t u r e d  many Ge rman 
prisoners . S e t ti ng up a defense abo ut the 
im p o r t a n t  in s t a l l a t i o n ,  he then led his small 
band, sti ll b e h i n d  enemy lines, to h a r a s s  German  
tr oop  c o n c e n t r a t i o n s ,  m o v i n g  columns, and other 
enemy f ormatio ns . O p e r a t i n g  behind the lines 
for t h i r t y - f o u r  days, h i d i n g  in p a t r i o t s ’ homes 
and w o o d e d  areas, C a p t a i n  Lar son d e m o n s t r a t e d  
l e a d e r s h i p  and a f i g htin g spirit that reflect 
great cred i t  upon h i m self and the m i l it ary 
s e r v i c e .45
O p e r a t i o n  L I N D S E Y  in v o l v e d  a night p a r a c h u t e  jump by 
t h i r t e e n  men into the Re uy r e  River basin off sou thern  
France. Five c a s u a l t i e s  o c c u r r e d  on landing. Se v e n t e e n  
e n g a g e m e n t s  with the enemy were  made and the op e r a t i o n  was 
one of c o n s t a n t  fighting. Other O.S.S. N O R S O  Gro up m e m b e r s
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hav e s i m ilar  stories.
" B ones  and Gut s"
A Fort B e n ni ng  gradu ate, M a j o r  W i l l i a m  E. Col by  took
ov e r  c o m m a n d  of the O.S.S. N O R S O  Gro up  in late 1944. The
N o r w e g i a n s  had bee n led by L t . Col. Serge O b o l e n s k y  in
thei r drop s behind ene my line s in France. He had lea rn ed
his m i l i t a r y  craft in St. P e t e r s b u r g ' s  Imp er ial Gu ards and
had met "Wild Bil l" D o n o v a n  in New York soc iety c i r c l e s  and
was r e c r u i t e d  by Do n o v a n  into the O.S.S.. Col by was Irish
and C a t h o l i c  and he was du b i o u s  about his new command.
C o l b y ' s  only link wit h this h o m o g e n e o u s  group was that he
was born and raised in M i n n e s o t a ,  s u r r o u n d e d  by 
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S c a n d i n a v i a n s .
C o l b y  was on the ski tea m dur ing his high school
y e a r s  at Bu rl i n g t o n ,  Vermont, b e f o r e  c h a i r l i f t s  were built
in the s u r r o u n d i n g  hills, so he was w e l l - a c q u a i n t e d  wit h
the s i t u a t i o n  he and the N O R S O  Group w o uld face in the
m o u n t a i n s  in n o r t h e r n  Norway. They were to drop in six
foot sno ws to di sr up t G e r m a n  t r o o p  m o v e m e n t s  along  the
N o r d l a n d  Railway, r e t r e a t i n g  from Fi nlan d to fight a g ai n in 
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G e r m a n y  .
C o lby vis ited L t . Glen F a r n s worth,  in a h o s p i t a l  in 
E n g l a n d  in October, 1944, to c o n v i n c e  him to join the N O R S O  
Group, b e ca use of his e x p e r i e n c e  in dem olit ions.
F a r n s w o r t h  do ubt ed  his sk iing abilitie s, but agreed to join 
the N O R S O  Grou p to give it a try. Colby moved the NO RSO
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Gro up to the G r a m p i a n  M o u n t a i n s  in S c o tl an d in Dec ember,
1944, with the main object of b u i l d i n g  the unit's e n d u r a n c e  
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in skiing.
F a r n s w o r t h  was not able to join the group until 
January, 1945, at B l a i r g o w r i e ,  P erthshi re . He was met by 
L t . W i l l i a m  Lee C o u l e h a n  and his GM6x6 ba gg age d e t a i l . 
W e l c o m i n g  t o a s t s  to each other at the Angus Hotel was first 
on the agenda. (The Scots were amaze d at the huge
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c o n s u m p t i o n  of a l co hol by the "Yanks" in their mi ds t.)
F a r n s w o r t h  was a m az ed at Co lby's st amina while
skiing: C o lb y was f i v e -foot, eight inches, and was 130
po und s of " s c r e a m i n g  d y n a m i t e . "  "How can that little . . .
take it?" (Colby was then  du bbe d with the n i c k n a m e  "Bones 
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and Guts ").  John W.C. Ma nners,  who stood five feet five
and o n e - h a l f  inches  tall, was issue d ski poles mean t for a
si x-foot, two i n c h - t a l l  person. This slowed hi m down and
he had to c a t c h  up w i t h  the ot he r s  when they took breaks.
Once he did catch up wit h  the others, the break was over
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and they skied away. The snow was wet and it was
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d if f i c u l t  to m a i n t a i n  balance. The men pre pa r e d  hard, 
for they k n e w  they w o u l d  join othe r o p e r a t i n g  groups to 
c on duc t s a b o t a g e  c a r e f u l l y  o r c h e s t r a t e d  by the Allied  High 
C o m m a n d .
The Staff from Lond o n
In early Fe bruary , 1945, the O.S.S. Staff from London 
paid a visit to the O.S.S. N O R S O  Group in Scotland. They
104
told Colby  and his men that the drop into N o rt h T r o n d e l a g
wa s on, and to pr epare for it. The new moon was
a p p r o a c h i n g  and made a night drop possible. This  m e a n t
r o s t e r s  had to be made up and loads of e q u i pment , weapons,
and s u p p l i e s  i d e n t i f i e d .  The men were given l i b e r t y  in
D u n d e e  a n d P e r t h ,  w h e r e  they had their last c h a n c e  to
i m b i b e  a quart or two of sp irits for what was to b e come
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q u i t e  a w h i l e  befo r e  they could do so again.
Not e v e r y o n e  was going to Norway this time: only the
best skiers. The o t h e r s  wou ld fo llow when sp ri n g  in N o r w a y
w o u l d  not r e q u i r e  skii n g  to get around. F a r n s w o r t h  still
w as  an i n e x p e r i e n c e d  skier, and he kne w it: he w a n t e d  his
n am e s c r a t c h e d  from the roster. The other s p l e a d e d  for him
to go, b e c a u s e  his d e m o l i t i o n  ex p e r t i c e  was nee ded. He
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f i n ally a g reed to be placed on the roster again.
O t h e r  N o r w e g i a n  O p e r a t i n g  Grou p s  in Norway
The "bang and b o o m ” sabot ag e raids on N o r w e g i a n
r a i l r o a d s  were not new to Norway. Between 1941 and 1942,
s a b o te ur s, r e f u g e e s  from No rway trained in Great Britain,
q u i e t l y  e n t e r e d  N o r w a y  to be gi n their o p e r a t i o n s .  The
groups were  s t a t i o n e d  b e t w e e n  Grong and Mo i Rana and had
code na mes of A R C H E R  and HERON. FA LCON arrived  in Ja nu ary
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and Fe br uary,  1944.
B e t w e e n  O c t o b e r  1, 1943 and March, 1944, Speci al  
Fo rc es H e a d q u a r t e r s  (SFHQ) sent more gr oup s to N o rwa y to 
w r e a k  m o r e  havoc on the railways, this time, on the lin es
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b e t w e e n  T r o n d h e i m  and Oslo. T h ei r code names were GREBE,
L A P W I N G ,  and W O O D P E C K E R .  These groups co n s i s t e d  of from
t h r e e  to six men each and were c l o sel y c o n t r o l l e d  by F.O.
IV of the N o r w e g i a n  High  C o m m a n d - i n - e x i l e  in Lond o n  t h r o u g h
its s t a t i o n  in S t o c k h o l m  in ne utral  Sweden. C o m m u n i c a t i o n s
by radio, d i re ct to London, or by rela y s  to or from  other
grou ps,  were made; ho wever * the me s s a g e s  had to be brief
for fear that Ge rma n d i r e c t i o n  find ing (DF) e q u i p m e n t  might
p i n p o i n t  the l o c a t i o n s  of these o p e r a t i n g  groups. The
q u a l i t y  of r e c e p t i o n  v a ri ed with the a t m o s p h e r i c  c o n d i t i o n s
of the day or night. For d e t ai led reports, the gr oups
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d e p e n d e d  on co u r i e r s  from  Stockholm.
S u p r e m e  H e a d q u a r t e r s ,  Allied E x p e d i t i o n a r y  For ces
( SH AEF ) in L o n d o n  c l o sel y c o o r d i n a t e d  these groups, to the
c h a g r i n  of MILORG, who wa nt ed more ’’coup de m a i n ”
s a b o t a g e s ,  w h i l e  SHA EF wa nt ed  only s e l e c t i v e  o p e r a t i o n s  and
to p r e s e r v e  a s s e t s  n e c e s s a r y  to r e e s t a b l i s h  the N o r w e g i a n
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e c o n o m y  a f t e r  its lib er ation.
B e t w e e n  Decemb er  9, 1944 and April 29, 1945, other 
N o r w e g i a n  o p e r a t i n g  groups  were  placed in N o r w a y  by SHAEF. 
They were: W O O D P E C K E R ,  LAPWING, GREBE, F I E L DF AR E, and
W O O D L A R K ,  FR EETHORP , LARK, C R A M L I N G T O N , WA XW ING, and COTON. 
T h e i r  m i s s i o n s  were to slow the retreat of 15 0,000 of 
G e r m a n y ' s  best troops to the bele a g u e r e d  fatherla nd. 
O p e r a t i o n  C O N C R E T E  MIXER, run by MILORG, c o n c e n t r a t e d  on 
bot h s i des of the Oslo harbor, to disrupt German
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t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  there. C O N C R E T E  MIX ER  had 1500 
59
parti c i p a n t s .
The h i g h l y - t r a i n e d  O.S.S. N O RSO Gr oup  jumped into 
Fr a n c e  after "D" Day when  there was no i m m in en t m i s s i o n  for 
Norway. A u g m e n t e d  by F r e n c h - s p e a k i n g  p er sonnel , N O RSO  
c a d r e s  ra ll ied  the Free Fr ench of the In te rior (F.F.I.) to 
d i s r u p t  r e t r e a t i n g  G e rma n troop m o v e m e n t s  there. Its 
m i s s i o n  done, the O.S.S. N O RS O Gr oup re turn ed  to Sco tl an d
to u n d erg o v i g o r o u s  ski tr a i n i n g  for the p e n ding N o r w e g i a n
/
operati on . In early Feb ruary, 1945, the O.S.S. Staff from 
L o n d o n  told the O.S.S. N O RSO Gr oup that the drop into North 
T r o n d e l a g  in N o r w a y  was on, and to prepare for it.
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P L A N N I N G  O P E R A T I O N  RYPE 
I N T R O D U C T I O N
D e c l a s s i f y i n g  the O.S.S. Pa per s in 1975, p r o m p t e d  by 
the F r e e d o m  of I n f o r m a t i o n  Act, was the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of 
K e r m i t  R o o s e v e l t  of the O.S.S.. Five percent of the 
i n f o r m a t i o n  e s c a p e d  d e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n :  most i n s t a n c e s
i n v o l v e d  the d e l e t i o n  of names.
This c h a p t e r  d e s c r i b e s  the pl annin g of the RYP E 
m i s s i o n  in a shroud of secrecy. The reader is f o r e w a r n e d  
that N o r w e g i a n s  used " d e k k e n a v n "  (a code name) for fear 
that if the ir true n a m e s  were made known to G e r m a n  agents, 
G e s t a p o  r e p r i s a l s  on r e l a t i v e s  in Norway followed. Allied 
i n t e l l i g e n c e  s t a f f s  used ’’of fi ce s y m b o l s ” (e.g. ”C ” in 
truth, S t e wa rt  M e n z i e s )  (the symbol s t h e m s e l v e s  c l a s s i f i e d  
to some de gree) to i d e n t i f y  people and their roles. The 
n o t i o n  was that if the enemy i n t e rcepte d c o r r e s p o n d e n c e ,  
the subject wa s  c o m p r o m i s e d ,  but its p a r t i c i p a n t s  were not.
The a u t h o r  a p o l o g i z e s  to readers if the' ’’c l ut te r of 
a l p h a b e t  s o u p ” d i s t r a c t s  them from the topic of this 
chapter . It is the only u n c l a s s i f i e d  i n f o r m a t i o n  a v a i l a b l e  
on p l a nn in g the RYPE mission.
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S H A E F ' s  D i r e c t i v e  to SFHQ in July, 1944 for No rway
The S u p re me H e a d q u a r t e r s  Allied E x p e d i t i o n a r y  Forces
(SHAEF) sent a d i r e c t i v e  to Spec ial Forces H e a d q u a r t e r s
(SFHQ) in July, 1944 to d e v e l o p  plans for s e l e c t i v e
1
s a b o t a g e  in Norway. The R u s s i a n  Army was a t t a c k i n g  uni ts
of the Ge rm an Army G r ou p and was d r i vi ng the m back west
a c r o s s  the no r t h e r n  Dvi na River.  The l i b e r a t i o n  of
2
n o r t h e r n  Norw a y  was near. SFHQ was to pr e p a r e  for a
c o u n t e r - s c o r c h  effor t to pr e s e r v e  N o r w e g i a n  i n s t a l l a t i o n s .
/
S F H Q  was als o told to plan to sa bo tage N o r w e g i a n
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  n e t w o r k s  to del ay Germa n tr oo p m o v e m e n t  
3
s o u t h w a r d .
SFHQ pl an ned the r e q u e s t e d  sa botage  o p e r a t i o n s ,  but
had no a u t h o r i z a t i o n  to i m p l e m e n t  them until Octobe r,
4
1944. The F i n n i s h  G o v e r n m e n t  c o n c l u d e d  an a r m i s t i c e  with 
R u s s i a  in S e p t emb er , 1944, by w h i c h  time the Ge rm an  
W e h r m a c h t  was e v e r y w h e r e  in retreat. The Germ a n  High 
C o m m a n d  b r o u g h t  back 2 0 0 , 0 0 0  Ge rm a n  troops  to the 
n o r t h e r n m o s t  part of F i n l a n d  to prot ect the F i n n i s h  nickel 
m i n e s  G e r m a n y  so d e s p e r a t e l y  ne ed ed  to co n t i n u e  its 
w a r m a k i n g  efforts. Fr es h R u s s i a n  troops a r r i v e d  in the 
K ola P e n i n s u l a  from Siberia. General Lo thar Re ndulic, 
C o m m a n d e r  in Chief of the G e rm an  20th M o u n t a i n  Army had his 
u n i t s  retreat to K i r k e n e s  in No rw ay  and to P e c h e n g a  , across 
the border in the Soviet Union, to dig in. Hi tl er  
in te r v e n e d :  he orde red that Ren du lic d e s tr oy  every
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bui lding, hut, and any e q u i p m e n t  in N o r w a y ’s n o r t h e r n  
p r o vi nc e of Fi nnmark.  Stores of food and l i v e s t o c k  were  to 
be removed. If the l i v e s t o c k  could not be removed, they 
were  to be s l a u g h t e r e d .  Josef Terbove n, the Ge rm an 
R e i c h s k o m m i s a r  of Norway, o r d e r e d  the e v a c u a t i o n  of the 
c i v i l i a n  p o p u l a t i o n  en ma sse to areas wher e the W e h r m a c h t  
could pr ote ct  it. The N o r w e g i a n  Q u i s l i n g  Poli c e  Chief 
Jonas Lie, a c c o m p a n i e d  by the N o r w e g i a n  Nazi o r g a n i z a t i o n  of
Hird, r u she d to F i n n m a r k  in n o r t h e r n  Norway. Lie b e l i e v e d
/
that the R u s s i a n s  wou ld rape and pillage the area: Norway
must not fall to the i n v a d i n g  R u s si an forces. On N o v em be r
1, 1944, the G e rm an  20th M o u n t a i n  D i v i s i o n  began its
retreat. S p e cia l army d e m o l i t i o n  squads, a s s i s t e d  by the
Hird, burned and l e v e l l e d  H a m m e r f e s t  on N o v e m b e r  3 and 4,
1944. The R u s s i a n s  w o uld  find n o t hi ng  but s c o rc hed earth.
The c i v i l i a n  p o p u l a t i o n  had d e p a r t e d  either on fi shing
boats or by f o l l o w i n g  the r e t r e a t i n g  W e h r m a c h t  south on
5
Ri ksvei 50, the only ma i n  road in n o r thern Norway.
In the m e a nti me , the R u s s i a n  IC A s s au lt Corps led
four d i v i s i o n s  of a r t i ll ery, air, and ar mo u r  on O c t o b e r  7,
1944, in l e v e l l i n g  the town of Kirkenes. On O c t ober  14th,
the Rus si ans, after r e a c h i n g  the Tana River, s i x t y-five
mil es n o r t h w e s t  of Ki rkenes, s t o pp ed  to dig in for the 
6
cold winter.
SHAE F c l o s e l y  m o n i t o r e d  the s i t uati on  in n o r t h e r n 
Norway. H e r e t o f o r e  it had held back ac ti on  to av oi d German
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r e p r i s a l s  a g a i n s t  N o r w e g i a n s  and the us el ess wa ste of
lives. By December, 1944, the Allie d a d v a n c e  on the
W e s t e r n  Front slowed to a halt. SH AE F r e q u e s t e d  that S FHQ
u n d e r t a k e  the st r o n g e s t  d e l a y i n g  action  po s s i b l e  a g a i n s t
G e r m a n  t r o o p s  in No rw ay  so as to prevent or retard their
t r avel  south  to r e i n f o r c e  G e r m a n  defenses. SHAEF
als o a u t h o r i z e d  e x t e n s i v e  r a i l r o a d  damag e west of the 
7
R h i n e .
R e c o n n a i s s a n c e  for P o t e n t i a l  A t t ac ks Against N o r w e g i a n  
R a i l r o a d s ,  Tunnels, and B r i d g e s
D u r i n g  the period O c t o b e r  6-17, 1944, G u nn ar  Steen 
and Alf Bro m s t a d  a r r i v e d  in N o r w a y  to r e c o n n o i t e r  the 
r a i l r o a d  from n o rth of G r ong to Snaasa in the N o rth
T r o n d e l a g  Distr ict. Steen, who had lived in N a m d a l e n  and
B r o m s t a d ,  had been a f i r e m a n  on the r a i lr oad b e t we en
T r o n d h e i m  and Grong. St een and Bro ms ta d r e c o m m e n d e d  that
Grana B r i d g e  wo ul d be an e x c e l l e n t  target be c a u s e  its 
d e s t r u c t i o n  wou ld cau se a lo nger delay in enemy troop 
m o v e m e n t s  and a more s i g n i f i c a n t  d e r a iling to repair. 
T o m m e r a a s  T u nnel and M a a l a s a e t e r  were situated in lo nely 
p l a c e s  and the same was true  wit h the tunnel s north  and 
south of Snaasa.
St ee n and B r o m s t a d  t r a v e l l e d  On October 7 by bicycle, 
by foot aft er the b i c y c l e s  br ok e down, and then by train 
and by bus to meet their con tact, Per Strand, in Gou n d a l e n .  
Steen and Br o m s t a d  rang S t r a n d ’s doorbell, but n o body
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a n s w e r e d .  Both were soake d by the steady rain. They 
r e t u r n e d  to the r a i lway station, w h er e posing as 
l u m b e r j a c k s ,  they  told the s t a t i o n m a s t e r  they were  on their 
way to N o r d l i  and as ked him if he wou ld permit them to 
s l eep in the w a i t i n g  room, and he gave his p e r m ission.
W h e n  a t h r e e - m a n  G e r m a n  patrol en tered the w a i t i n g  room, 
S t e e n  and B r o m s t a d  did no thing. The patrol d e p ar te d  
sh o r t l y  a f t e r w a r d s .
When St een  and B r o m s t a d  woke up the next mo r n i n g ,  the 
s t a t i o n m a s t e r  told the m that there was no t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  to 
N o r d l i  that day. Stee n was su cc e s s f u l  in m e e t i n g  the 
co nt ac t, Per Strand, w h o  gave them a car and a c h a u ff eur,  
who had w it h him a sick boy and his sister who were  to go 
to the h o s p i t a l  in N a m s o s . This provi ded e x c e l l e n t  cover 
for Ste en and Bro m s t a d .  Strand also pr o v i d e d  Steen and 
B r o m s t a d  i n f o r m a t i o n  c o n c e r n i n g  the district,  cu rren t 
passes, and r a t i o n  cards.
On O c t o b e r  9, 1944, Steen and Br o m s t a d  did a 
r e c o n n a i s s a n c e  of one brid g e  and two t u n nels north of 
B u n e s  Bridge. About 200 m e te rs  north of Bunes Bri d g e  was 
a n o t h e r  b r i d g e  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  150 me ters long, wit h  four 
spans, and p i l l a r s  of iron cons t r u e t i o n . About 150 m e t e r s  
no r t h  of this b r i d g e  were two short tunnels, one a f te r the 
other. The one f a r th est no rth was the largest, about 
s e v e n t y  to eighty m e t e r s  long. The terrain  was very steep 
on both sides of the track.
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On O c t o b e r  10th, Steen and Br o m s t a d  reconno.itered the 
r a i l r o a d  points b e t we en  L u r u d a l  and Formofoss. About two 
k i l o m e t e r s  south  from F o r m o f o s s  was a stone bridge ab out 
t w e n t y - t w o  m e t e r s  long and t w el ve  met ers high. Fifty 
m e t e r s  to the south was a tunn e l  120 steps long. They 
c o n c l u d e d  that it was an e x c e l l e n t  place for an a t t a c k  for 
b o t h  a p p r o a c h  and for re tre at  b e c a u s e  of the terrain. They 
the n t r a v e l e d  sev en k i l o m e t e r s  s o ut h from the H u r m o f o s s  
S t a t i o n  to a farm where there was a tunnel about 472 steps 
long. The r a i l r o a d  tunne l c u r v e d  ma ki ng it an e x c e l l e n t  
t a r g e t  b e c a u s e  sabot eu rs c o u l d  a p p ro ach and escape 
u n d e t e c t e d .  Ste en  and B r o m s t a d  re turned  to Formof os s 
St a t i o n ,  500 m e t e r s  to the south, where there was a one- 
s pan bridge ove r  the Sa ndda River, fifty me te rs long, 
t w e l v e  m e t e r s  high. They t r a v e l l e d  to the Grong S t a t i o n  
l ate in the a f t e r n o o n  to see, 450 me ter s to the s outhwes t,  
the r o u n d h o u s e  from which four tr ack s led to a t u r n t a b l e  
( s w i n g  platf or m).
On O c t o b e r  11th, Ste en and Br oms t a d  did r e c o n n a i s s a n c e  
of the T o m m e r a a s  Tu nnel and Bu ne s Bridge. The bridge 
was of steel c o n s t r u c t i o n  and rest ed  on five pillars. One 
G e r m a n  gua rde d the bridge. T o m m e r a a s  Tunnel was 3,000 
m e t e r s  long l o c a t e d  be t w e e n  G r o n g  Stat ion and the Bunes 
B r i dge. They r e t urn ed  to F o r m o f o s s ,  then drove to about 
t h r e e  k i l o m e t e r s  south to the Snaasa Station, near which, 
as it was quite  late, they slept in a summer barn.
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On O c t o b e r  12th, they tr av elled to the ra i l r o a d
b r i d g e  over the G r a n a , four k i l o m e t e r s  s o uth from Sn aasa
St a tio n.  The bridge  was 100 m e t e r s  long, twent y mete r s
high, and inc l u d e d  se ven  spans resting on pil lar s of steel.
A Ge rm a n  i n s t a l l a t i o n  was lo ca ted on the east side of the
br idg e. B a r b e d  wire s u r r o u n d e d  the bridge and a Ge rm an
p a t r o l l e d  its a p p r o a c h e s .
S t een and B r o m s t a d  walk e d  400 me te rs  n o rth  of Snaasa
to ex a m i n e  a tu nnel 350 m e t e r s  long. Hil ly  and steep
t e r r a i n  rose on the s o u t h e a s t  side of the tracks. On the
n o r t h w e s t  side the ground was level with w o od s and big
moor s .  The y  then wa lk ed  down the west side of the
Sn a a s a  Lake and staye d o v e r n i g h t  in a barn.
On O c t o b e r  13th, Steen and Broms ta d went to their
c o n t a c t  in G o u n dalen.  Per Stra n d  hosted them until O c t o b e r
17th. On Oc t o b e r  18th, Steen and Bro ms tad van i s h e d  into
the m o u n t a i n s  to their safe area. The d e t a i l s  they
ga t h e r e d  wer e  c o u r i e r e d  by ski to M I L 0 R G  in S t o c k h o l m  in
8
Sw eden, then flown to SFHQ in London.
R e q u i r e m e n t s  for Air D r o p s - S c a n d i n a v i a
In a m e m o r a n d u m  dated O c t ober 18, 1944, C o m m a n d e r  
L e s t e r  Armour, USNR (Un ited State s Naval Res erve). 
O . S . S . E . T . O .  (Office of S t r a t e g i c  Services, E u r o p e a n  
T h e a t e r  of O p e r a t i o n s )  r e q u e s t e d  that Major Ge ne ral F, 
A n d e r s o n  of the A m e r i c a n  T r a n s p o r t a t i o n  Co m m a n d  in c r e a s e 
the fleet of B-24 L i b e r a t o r s  for Colonel Bernt B a l c h e n ’s
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D e t a c h m e n t  s t a t i o n e d  in Le u c h a r s  Air Base in Sco tland. The 
m e m o r a n d u m  r e q ue sted an i n c rease of four ai r c r a f t  to br ing 
the i n v e n t o r y  to ten.
A r m o u r  po inte d out that B a l c h e n ’s a i r c r a f t  were used 
e x c l u s i v e l y  for o p e r a t i o n s  over Norway. Be t w e e n  July 17, 
1944 and S e p t e m b e r  28, 1944, s i x t y - t h r e e  s o r t i e s  were 
a t t e m p t e d  and t h i r t y - t h r e e  were suc ce ss ful, w h i c h  res u l t e d  
in an a g g r e g a t e  of f i f t y-two tons of m a t e r i a l  dr o p p e d  to
t w e n t y - s e v e n  or g a n i z a t i o n s .  A p p r o x i m a t e l y  sixty pe rc ent of
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these fl i g h t s  were made du ri ng the daylight  or n o n - m o o n  
period s. The B r i tish  Air M i n i s t r y  r e s t r i c t e d  the R.A.F. 
(Royal Air Fo rc e) from flying d u r i n g  the d a y l i g h t  or n o n ­
m o o n  periods . Br itis h S t e rlin g a i r c r a f t  could not fly 
a b ov e s i x t y - t w o  d e g re es north l a t i t u d e  in the T r o n d h e i m  
area due to rang e l i m i t ations , w h e r e a s  the A m e rican  
L i b e r a t o r  c o u l d .
The O.S.S. was pl a n n i n g  to u n d e r t a k e  100 suc c e s s f u l  
s o r t i e s  f r o m  this date until D e c e m b e r  31, 1944, as the 
O.S.S. p r e s u m e d  that there wo uld be no c h ange in the 
i n t e r n a l  s i t u a t i o n  in Norway. Should a general u p r i s i n g 
take pla ce in Norway, O.S.S. a n t i c i p a t e d  a need for 2,400 
s u c c e s s f u l  s o r t i e s  to supply the Special F o rce s Groups, 
N o r w e g i a n  M i l i t a r y  O r g a n i z a t i o n s  there, as well as the 
c i v i l i a n  p opulat io n. Thi s would mean that more L i b e r a t o r s  
w o u l d  be nee ded, and the O.S.S. wou ld need and w e l c o m e  
s u p po rt fro m the 492nd Group.
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T h ere were t v/ent y- sev en  S.O.E. (Special O p e r a t i o n s
E x e c u t i v e )  (British) and S.O. (Special O p e r a t i o n s )
(A meric an ) pe rs onnel in the field in Norway. El ev e n  were
o p e r a t i n g  above s i x t y - t w o  d e g r e e s  north latitud e. F i f t y -
nine s e p arate r e q u e s t s  from the field o r g a n i z a t i o n s  were
9
w a i t i n g  to' be filled by air.
T r a n s m i t t a l  of A p p r e c i a t i o n
On Ja nuary 1, 1945, M a jor H.P. L a rs on of Fo rce 134,
S.F. Det . (^Special Forces  D e t a c h m e n t )  lo cated at the 
R i c c a r t o n  H o u s e  in Curr ie, Midl o t h i a n ,  Scotl and, s u b m i t t e d  
a list of rai lr oa ds, bridges, and tun nels north of 
T r o n d h e i m  as p o t e n t i a l  t a r g e t s  for sa botage  to L i e u t e n a n t  
C o m m a n d e r  G. Unger Ve tl esen, USNR (United St at es  Naval 
Re serve ),  Chief, S c a n d i n a v i a n  Section, S.O. (S pecial 
O p e r a t i o n s )  in London. La rs on  told Ve t l e s e n  that an O.S.S. 
s u c c e s s f u l  o p e r a t i o n  in this area would pl ea se SH AE F 
(S upr eme H e a d q u a r t e r s  All i e d  E x p e d i t i o n a r y  Fo rce s) b e c a u s e  
it wou ld force the G e r m a n s  to use the sea r o ute s in their 
e v a c u a t i o n  from north  to south. There was only one ra i l w a y  
out of T r o n d h e i m  that ran as far north as Nev er nes. The 
roads in that area were  in poor co ndi tio n in wi nt e r  so that 
m o v e m e n t  of troops, suppli es , and equipment, in the a b s e n c e  
of rail c o m m u n i c a t i o n s ,  would be difficult. If the r a i l w a y  
were cut be t w e e n  M o s j o e n  and Mo, the G e r ma ns wo uld have to 
make a longer sea haul from the port of Narvik, nor th of 
M o s j o e n  and Mo. By c u t t i n g  the railway b e t ween T r o n d h e i m
124
and M o s j o e n  and south of Grong, the Ge rmans w o uld have to
com e to T r o n d h e i m  by sea, well within  range of the B r i t i s h
Ro ya l Navy and the Co as tal Command.
L a r s o n  u n d e r s t o o d  that be caus e the area was in close
p r o x i m i t y  to Sweden, a n e u tr al country, Sweden could
pr o v i d e  field o p e r a t i o n s  an excellent es cape route. The
a re a  was w i t h i n  range of A m e r i c a n  air cr aft for d r o p p i n g
p e r s o n n e l  and r e s u p p l y i n g  them. The terrain was h a r s h  and
e s p e c i a l l y  so in winter, a fea ture that would be more of an
a d v a n t a g e  than a h i n d r a n c e  to the party u n d e r t a k i n g  the
o p e r a t i o n .  L a r s o n  in cl uded an a p p e n d i x  of v u l n e r a b l e
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r a i l w a y  s i t e s  betwe en Agle and Formofoss.
Use of P a r a c h u t e  Tro ops
In a l e t t e r  dated Ja n u a r y  15, ]945, M a j o r  J.E.
N o r d l i e  b r i e f e d  Gene ral H a n s t o e n  of the N o r w e g i a n  High  
C o m m a n d  in L o n d o n  about the propos ed  use of p a r a c h u t e  
t r o o p s  to h i n d e r  the e n e m y ’s ov erland e v a c u a t i o n  of troop s 
from n o r t h e r n  Norway. A troop would be placed in N o rw ay to 
d e s t r o y  the r a i l r o a d  be tw een Grong and Maj av atn. The troop  
was to be r e l e a s e d  in the co urs e of two moon periods. The 
leader, a party of ten and one radio operator would be sent 
in the J a n u a r y  period, the re m a i n d e r  of the troop, t w e n t y -  
four men, wou ld come in the F e b ru ary period. The tasks  for 
the first party were to e s t a b l i s h  c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  wit h the 
U n i t e d  K i n gdo m,  r e c o n n o i t e r  a base for the full troop, 
id e n t i f y  an area to re ceive the second party, and
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r e c o n n o i t e r  and lay plans for sa bo ta ge aga ins t the 
rail roa d. W h e n  the full troo p was a s s e m b l e d ,  the a t t a c k  
was to be u n d e r t a k e n  with the goal of m a k i n g  at least one 
la rge  break on the road and r a i lway that w o u l d  halt traffic 
for the lo ngest time.
The troo p was to re mai n in the o p e r a t i o n a l  area for
as long as po s s i b l e  in order to retard ra i l w a y  repair w or k
and bring about new breaks. The tr oo p' s base w o uld  be
r e s u p p l i e d  inso far as po s s i b l e  from Sweden, the bigg est
11
supply p r o b l e m  b e ing food.
W O O D L A R K  and the Ad vance P a rt y for RYPE
On J a n u a r y  30, 1945, L i e u t e n a n t  Hans H. Skabo,
S e c tion Chief, O.S.S. N 0 R S 0  Op er ation, sent a m e m o r a n d u m  to 
V A U D E V I L L E  (in truth, L t . C m d r . G. Unger Ve tlesen , USNR) in 
Stockholm , Sw eden about the great haste in la ying out 
O p e r a t i o n  RYPE. SHAEF was c o n t a c t e d  about O.S.S. plans. 
S H A E F  not only e n d orsed them, it urged V A U D E V I L L E  to do 
e v e r y t h i n g  po s s i b l e  to get the o p e r a t i o n  through.
Skabo kne w  that W O O D L A R K  had a m i s s i o n  to p e r f o r m  in 
the same are a  as that se l e c t e d  for the A m e r i c a n  O. G. 's  
( O p e r a t i n g  Group) oper ation. But b e c ause the W O O D L A R K  
party was small, O.S.S. be l i e v e d  that A m e r i c a n  O.G. 
a u g m e n t a t i o n  by W O O D L A R K  w o uld  prov ide  more pers on nel for 
R Y P E  r e s u l t i n g  in more damage to the ra ilways . The Swedes 
had been une asy with W O O D L A R K  on their border, and it was 
not p o s s i b l e  to expect W O O D L A R K  to be a r e c e p t i o n  c o m m i t t e e
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for RYPE to act as its guides. The ad vance party for RYPE,
Fi rs t L i e u t e n a n t  Tom Sather and S e r g ea nt s Borge L a n g e l a n d
and Arne Li steid, may have e x p e c t e d  to drop blind and were
12
w a i t i n g  in Sc o t l a n d  for the w e a t h e r  to break.
On F e b r u a r y  2, 1945, V A U D E V I L L E  sent a reply from
S t o c k h o l m  to Skab o in L o nd on abo ut the a n t i c i p a t e d
d i f f i c u l t i e s  in c o n n e c t i o n  wit h O p e r a t i o n  RYPE. W O O D LAR K,
a B r i t i s h - s p o n s o r e d  ope rati on , had been set up in Sweden
w i t h o u t  S w e d i s h  p erm is sion. So on er  or later, the S w e di sh
a u t h o r i t i e s  were bound to d i s c o v e r  its true purpose. Its
c o ver story was to be that it was a "weath er s t a t i o n ," when
in fact, it was a "little G i b r a l t a r "  of men, su pplies, and
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e x p l o s i v e s  me an t for s a b otage o p e r a t i o n s  in Norway.
T h r o u g h  a s e r i e s  of s a b otage  a c t i o n s  in Norway, W O O D L A R K
emerged. S w ed en  was i r r i t a t e d  by the h i g h h a n d e d  B r i t i s h
p r o c e e d i n g s .  T h r o u g h  r e c e n t l y  co m p l e t e d  negot i a t i o n s ,
W O O D L A R K  was r e c o g n i z e d  by Swede n with  S w e d i s h  p ro tection .
T h i s  would be i m p o r t a n t  as a p r e c e d e n t  for e s t a b l i s h i n g
other bases in the future. W O O D L A R K  wou ld not be a v a i l a b l e
to RYPE until such time as the B r i t i s h  tho ught it po s s i b l e
to re le ase  W O O D L A R K  from its ina ctiv it y. Until then,
s u p p l i e s  and co u r i e r s  wo ul d come directly to RYP E from 
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S t o c k h o l m .
N o r w e g i a n  R a i l w a y  O p e r a t i o n  - Top Secret M e e t i n g
On F e b r u a r y  2, 1945, a tec h n i c a l  planning  m e e t i n g  was
held at 88 C h i t t e r n  Court in London. P r e se nt  were: E/D
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(in the chair); E / D . 5; Col. Skabo, O.S.S.; Col. Bolen,
O.S.S .; L t . Thorn, N o r w e g i a n  A r m y ; Mg/G; SN/D; D/X.7;
15
DB /T. 2; and B/B.l. The target dis cu ss ed was a se g m e n t  of 
r a i l w a y  in n o r t h e r n  N o rwa y that co nt ained a nu mb er  of 
tu nnels . One or more of them were to be a t t a c k e d  w i t h  
e x p l o s i v e s ;  E x t e n s i v e  rail cu t t i n g  was also to be 
a c c o m p l i s h e d .  A s e v e n - s p a n  steel bridge was to be an 
a d d i t i o n a l  o b j e c t i v e  if c i r c u m s t a n c e s  p e r m i t t e d  it.
The o p e r a t i o n  Was to be ca rr ied out by the O.S.S. 
w i t h  its pe r s o n n e l  and stores. The Spec ial O p e r a t i o n s  
E x e c u t i v e  had the task of a d v i s i n g  the O.S.S. on the 
t e c h n i c a l  plan. They also had been asked to pr ov ide the 
e x p l o s i v e s .  An a d v a n c e  party of one officer and two 
e n l i s t e d  men wer e due to leave im me d i a t e l y  to r e c o n n o i t e r  
the ta rg e t  area and repor t back by w i r e l e s s  t r a n s m i s s i o n  
and c o u r i e r  th r o u g h  Sweden. The main party of two o f f i c e r s  
and th ir ty  e n l i s t e d  men were to leave on or about F e b r u a r y  
19th. The party had receiv ed  d e m o l i t i o n  t r a in ing in 
S c o t l a n d  and w o u l d  in three nights carry 3,00 0 pounds of 
e x p l o s i v e s  to the t a rget area from the dr o p p i n g  ground.
The type of e x p l o s i v e s  to be used was d i s c usse d at the 
m e e t i n g .  E / D . 5 s t r o n g l y  a d v o c a t e d  plastic e x p l o s i v e s  as 
S t a t i o n  XII was a c c u s t o m e d  to ha n d l i n g  them. No one at the 
m e e t i n g  knew w h e t h e r  or not a s u f f ic ient amoun t of that 
e x p l o s i v e  was a v a i l a b l e .  If enough plas tic e x p l o s i v e s  were 
not a v a i l a b l e ,  E x p l o s i v e  MC M (cordite) w o uld be
128
s u b s t i t u t e d .
L t . Thorn, a civil e n g ine er  who had wo rk ed on the 
d e s i g n a t e d  s t r e t c h  of railway,  p r o du ce d draw i n g s  of t y p i c a l  
tunne l c o n s t r u c t i o n  in the targe t area. The tunnel  a r c h e s  
we re  of m a s o n r y  with stone d r a i n a g e  ch a n n e l s  not less than 
4 M x 4 M c r o s s  s e c t i o n a l  area at a p p r o x i m a t e l y  the level of 
the s p r i n g i n g  of the arch. Thes e channe ls  were open at the 
face of the arch.
Those^ p r esen t at the m e e t i n g  agreed  that SOE w o ul d 
p r e p a r e  round or squar e se ction charges, co mp l e t e  wit h  
p r i m e r s  an d th r e a d e d  on c o r d t e x  (cordite). The ends of 
some of the ch a r g e s  w o ul d be fit ted with w o o d e n  f a r i n g s  to 
m a k e  it e a s i e r  to in se rt  them by means of drain rods into 
the d r a i n a g e  channels. The ch arges to be su p p l i e d  w o u l d  be 
in units of four or five pounds, for a total a m o u n t  of 
2 , 000 poun d s  for each channel. These ch arg es  w o u l d  als o be 
s u i t a b l e  for the a l t e r n a t e  target, the steel bridg e at 
Grana. The rail c u t t i n g  c h a rges wou ld be single F r e n c h  
rail c h a r g e s  to be fused by the op e r a t o r s  with either a 
t w o - m i n u t e  B i c k f o r d  or by time pencil.
The o f f i c e  of M G/G  w o ul d arr ange for the r e l e a s e  of 
the f o l l o w i n g  stores  to S t a ti on XII: 2000 pounds - p l a stic
e x p l o s i v e s  or c o r d i t e  for the main charges; 1600 poun d s  - 
pl as ti c e x p l o s i v e s  or c o r di te for subsid ia ry charges, and 
500 rail c u t t i n g  c h a rg es  to be m o d i f i e d  at Stn. XII. E/D 
wo u l d  have a dummy ch arge a v a i l a b l e  for the o p e r a t o r s  to
s t ud y and to p r a c t i c e  with. The o p e r a t i o n a l  c h a r g e s  w o u l d
be re ady for pa c k i n g  on F e b r u a r y  15th. R u c k s a c k s  w o u l d  be
16
p r o v i d e d  by the O.S.S.
F i e l d  Ord er N o . 1
On Ja n u a r y  19, 1945, M a j o r  W i l l i a m  E. Colby si gned  
F i e l d  O r d e r  No. 1, w h ic h set forth the p a r a m e t e r s  of 
o p e r a t i o n s  for the a d v a n c e  party of O p e r a t i o n  RYPE. In it, 
the S p e c i a l  O p e r a t i o n s  Branch, S c a n d i n a v i a n  Se cti on  
e s t i m a t e d  that enemy units were pa ssing from n o rth No rw ay 
to sou th N o r w a y  al on g a single  rail way line at a rate of 
on e b a t t a l i o n  (500 men) per day. Enemy troops  were  
b e l i e v e d  to be g a r r i s o n e d  along the route. The towns of 
N a m s o s  had 700, Gr on g 150, and Ekker and Formo, fewer men. 
F o r m o f o s s  had a guarded a m m u n i t i o n  dump. Nordli h o u s e d  a 
p a t r o l  of t w e n t y - t h r e e  men. Agle had h u t m e n t s  ( m a k e s h i f t  
d w e l l i n g s ) .  K r o g s g a r d  (Snaasa) had a camp  of 500 men and 
an a m m u n i t i o n  dump. M a e l e s t e r  Tunne l had a ra i l w a y  guard. 
T h e r e  wer e b i c y c l e  pa trols  twice daily a l o n g  the r a i l w a y 
line. Th er e wer e  also Al lied troops in the target area, 
the W O O D L A R K  party of eight men living at J a k g hyt ta . They 
w e r e  f a c i n g  some d i f f i c u l t y  wit h the S w edis h G o v e r n m e n t .  
W O O D L A R K  had a c o urie r se rvice to and from Stockhol m.
The a d v a n c e  p a r t y ’s m i s s i o n  was to r e c o n n o i t e r  a 
d r o p p i n g  zone for the main party that was to a r riv e du ri ng 
the next moon  pe riod  to r e c o n n o i t e r  t a r gets a l ong  the 
r a i l w a y  line b e t we en  F o r m o f o s s  and Lu rudal and to r e m a i n  in
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h i d i n g  a f t e r w a r d s  until the r e c e p t i o n  of the main party.
The W O O D L A R K  party wo uld  contact the RY P E  a d v a n c e
p a rt y at the G a u p t j e r n  Seter, a summer dairy on the
p r o m i n e n t  point of G a u p t j e r n ,  on e - h a l f  mile south of the
d r o p p i n g  zone. W r i t t e n  r e p o r t s  by RYPE w o uld be pa ssed to
W O O D L A R K  to be taken  by c o u r i e r  to Stockholm. They were to
be a d d r e s s e d  to V A U D E V I L L E ,  Stockh ol m.
R e c e p t i o n  of the main par ty was p l a nned by the field
ord er for F e b r u a r y  22, 1945 or any night the r e a f t e r .  The
B.B.C. ( B r i t i s h  B r o a d c a s t i n g  C o r p o r a t i o n )  m e s s a g e  to
i n d i c a t e  that the r e c e p t i o n  w o u l d  be for that night wo ul d
be: ’’F o x t r o t  i m a s t e t o p p ” (Fox tr ot on the top of the
ma st). B.B.C. times for t h es e m e s s a g e s  w o u l d  be 1400 and
1700 GMT ( G r e e n w i c h  Mea n Time).
The a d v a n c e  party was to o p e r a t e  in u n i f o r m s  only.
If c a p t u r e d ,  the men w o u l d  give only their name, rank, and
s e r i a l  nu mb er. The G e n e v a  C o n v e n t i o n  e n t i t l e d  the men to
t r e a t m e n t  as P r i s o n e r s  of War. If in u n i f o r m  and forced  by
the enem y into Sweden, the men should expect  de tention.
They  were to tell S w e d i s h  a u t h o r i t i e s  that they had es ca pe d
e n e m y  c a p t u r e  and they were to re que st  i n t e r n m e n t  in
n e u t r a l  Sweden. Wh e n  the men went into S w eden to resupply ,
they wer e to wear c i v i l i a n  c l o t h i n g  o b t ained  by W O O DLAR K.
17
The y were to ap pea r u n i m p o r t a n t .
A d d i t i o n a l  T a r g e t s  for First and Second N 0 R S 0  Gr oups
On F e b r u a r y  3, 1945, L t . Col. Hans H. Skabo, Se ct io n
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Ch ie f,  N O R S O  O p e r a t i o n s ,  wr ote a m e m o r a n d u m  to L t . Col. 
C h a r l e s  E. B r o gger , E x e c u t i v e  Officer, Spec ial O p e r a t i o n s  
B r a n c h ,  in w h i c h  a m e e t i n g  on F e b ru ar y 1 d e t a i l e d  
a d d i t i o n a l  t a r g e t s  for the First N O RS O G r ou p and the 
t a r g e t s  for the Second N O R S O  Group.
The f o l l o w i n g  o f f i c e r s  were  present: N o r w e g i a n  Army:
M a j o r  N o r d l i e ,  C a p t . K r i s t ensen, L t . Roeness; B r i t i s h  
S p e c i a l  O p e r a t i o n s  Ex ecutive : Major Dougl as, Capt.
C o c h r a n e ,  Capt. F r a s e r - C a m p b e l 1; American: L t . Col. Skabo,
S p e c i a l  O p e r a t i o n s .
All a g r e e d  that the st retch of ra ilway b e t we en  
L u r u d a l  and F o r m o f o s s  was the mo s t  vital and logical target 
for the First N O R S O  Group. Skabo s u g g este d an a l t e r n a t e  
t a r g e t  for this group, the s t r e t c h  of line n o rth  of Gron g  
to M a j a v a t n .  Both Major N o r d l i e  and Ma jor  D o u g l a s  p o i nt ed 
out that a N o r w e g i a n  p a r a t r o o p  unit of t h i r t y - s i x  men had 
bee n  laid on for o p e r a t i o n s  on that stretch of line and 
t he y did not be l i e v e  that N O R S O  a u g m e n t a t i o n  was nece s s a r y .  
T hey said that a d d i t i o n a l  t a r g e t s  were a v a i l a b l e  south of 
the Agle Statio n.
The d e s t r u c t i o n  of Grana Bridge south of Agle was the 
o r i g i n a l  m i s s i o n  of the W O O D L A R K  party. After 
r e c o n n a i s s a n c e  of the bridge, this group had found it too 
w e l l - g u a r d e d  for a small party of eight to attempt 
s a b o t a g e .  The party had then ch osen a ta rget farther 
south, the b r i d g e  south of Jorstad. It had d e s t r o y e d  the
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b r i d g e  in J a n u a r y , s t o p p i n g  rail traffi c for over two weeks. 
By now, the G e rmans had c o m p l e t e d  re pa irs  on the bridge. 
M e a n w h i l e ,  the W O O D L A R K  party was lying qu ietl y on the 
S w e d i s h  side of the border, w i t h  no im me diate o p e r a t i o n s  
p e n d i n g .
The Gra na B r idge w o uld be an ex cel len t target for the 
Fir st N O R S O  Group (three o f f i c e r s  and t h i r t y - t w o  e n l i s t e d  
men ), but the t e r r a i n  was very diff icu lt: in order to get
aw a y  from  the target, the men w o uld have to be e x c e l l e n t
/
sk iers.  If, upon r e c o n n a i s s a n c e ,  Grana wou ld be 
b e t t e r  gu arded by G e r m a n  t r o o p s  than what W O O D L A R K  
e n c o u n t e r e d ,  a l t e r n a t e  t a r g e t s  to be dem o l i s h e d  w e r e  the 
rail lin es be t w e e n  Sn aasa and Angle.
M a jor Do u g l a s  and Capt. F r a s e r - C a m p b e l l  said that no 
t a r g e t s  wer e yet a v a i l a b l e  south of T r o n d h e i m  for the 
S e c o n d  N O R S O  Group. Since they were not f i r s t - c l a s s  
skie rs,  they were o r d er ed to c o n t i n u e  tr a i n i n g  in S c o tl and. 
S h o u l d  spr in g pr o v i d e  less snow cover and more target
18
o p p o r t u n i t i e s ,  the Se co nd N O R S O  Gro up could then be used. 
O p e r a t i o n  RYP E High P o i n t s
On F e b r u a r y  3, 1945, Hans H. Skabo, Se ct io n Chie f of 
N O R S O  O p e r ati on s, e n u m e r a t e d  the high spots of O p e r a t i o n  
R Y P E  to C a p t a i n  A.W. Bro gg er, the Actin g Chief,
S c a n d i n a v i a n  Section, S.O.. Sk abo stated that the a d v a n c e  
pa rt y was to be drop pe d at Gau pt j e r n e t .  M I L O R G  in 
S t o c k h o l m  was n o t i f i e d  that the r e c eption  party should
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f l a s h  ”F ” for Fred. The B.B.C. m e s s a g e  to alert the r e c e p t i o n  
party w o uld be: ’’K a a l a b i r e n  er le k k e r "  (the Sw ed ish
t u r n i p s  are de li c i o u s ) .  This w o u l d  also apply to a n o n ­
m o o n  drop. Skabo also told B r o g g e r  that if the a d v a n c e d  
p a r t y  coul d not drop du rin g this moo n period, he should 
a s s u m e  t h a t  the next moon perio d w o u l d  be cons id ered.
M I L O R G  m us t send an e x p e r i e n c e d  E u re ka  op e r a t o r  w it h the 
two men who were to depart from S t o c k h o l m  to G a u p t j e r n e t ,
so that a n o n - m o o n  drop could be made p o s s i b l e . (Eur eka
/
w as  a gr oun d radio t r a n s m i t t e r  used by the r e c e p t i o n  party 
to send d i r e c t i o n  signals  to the a i r c r a f t ’s r e c e i v e r  ca ll e d  
a R e b e c c a .  Upon r e c e i v i n g  the E u r e k a  signal, the a i r c r a f t  
c o u l d  ’’home i n ” on the r e c e p t i o n  party.)
The RYPE a d v a n c e  party had been told to wait  at 
G a u p t j e r n e t  until the two men from S t o c k h o l m  coul d co nt ac t 
it. R Y P E  w o ul d not contact WOO D L A R K .  If the a d v a n c e  party 
was f o rc ed  over the border, it w o u l d  s u r r en de r to S w e dis h  
a u t h o r i t i e s ,  as A m e r i c a n  p a r a t r o o p e r s  on the run from 
c a p t u r e  by the Germans. Skabo told Brogger that the 
a d v a n c e  party wo ul d r e c o n n o i t e r  a d r o p p i n g  zone for the 
m a i n  party; r e c o n n o i t e r  ta rgets on the r a ilwa y line between  
F o r m o f o s s  and L u r u d a l ; prov ide the rec e p t i o n  for the main 
party; and rem a i n  in h i d i n g  after its r e c o n n a i s s a n c e  until 
the r e c e p t i o n  of the main party. The ad vance party would 
r e p o r t  oft en to H e a d q u a r t e r s  in Lo nd on  by w i r e l e s s  
t r a n s m i t t e r  and if po ss ib le by wr i t t e n  report in code
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t h r o u g h  V A U D E V I L L E  to London.
The a d v a n c e  party w o ul d h av e the fo l l o w i n g  e q u i pme nt : 
one c o n t a i n e r  of gasoline; one co n t a i n e r  of K Rations; nin e 
c o n t a i n e r s  of Br i t i s h  M o u n t a i n  R a t io ns  (forty rati ons per 
c o n t a i n e r ) ;  one c o n t a i n e r  of m i s c e l l a n e o u s  eq u i p m e n t  for 
ba s e  (shotgun, axe, saw, hand grenades, lathe, etc.); two 
p a c k a g e s  c o n t a i n i n g  Eurekas; one package of B-2 radio set; 
one p a c kage g a s ol in e g e n e rato r;  three packa g e s  of 
ru ck s a c k s ;  two pa ckages of skis (three per package). The 
p a s s w o r d  of the r e c e p t i o n  p a rty to the a d v a n c e  party w o u l d 
be: " H v orda n staar det til paa den andre siden av d a m m e n ? "
(How is it on the other side  of the pond?). The rep ly 
w o u l d  be: ”Vi ser lyst paa f r e m t i d e n ." (We look at the
fu tu re  p o s i t i v e l y ) .
Skabo told B r o gg er  that the main party would be
c o m p r i s e d  of two o f f i c e r s  and thirty e n l i s t e d  men. They
w o u l d  be d r o p p e d  by B-24s in the next moon  period w h i c h
beg an F e b r u a r y  20th. The O.S.S. and M I L O R G  in S t o c k h o l m
19
w o u l d  give the de ta ils b e f o r e  the drop.
F i e l d  Order No. II
On F e b r u a r y  12, 1945, Han s  H. Skabo, S e ction Chief of 
the N O RSO  Group, i d e n t i f i e d  in Field Order No. II the plane 
lo a d ings, d e p a r t u r e  and r e c e p t i o n  procedures, re supply, and 
code words for O p e r a t i o n  R Y P E ’s main party. Special 
e x p l o s i v e  c o n t a i n e r s  w o ul d house: f o r ty -1 0 pound d r a i n a g e
ch a n n e l  c h a r g e s ; /  700-one pound rail charges; 100-ten pound
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C r a m l i n g o n  b l o c k s  (standar d charges); 1500 poun ds of bulk 
e x p l o s i v e s  and a n c i l l a r i e s  (all special exp l o s i v e  
c o n t a i n e r s  c o n t a i n  plas ti c explos iv es); s i xteen extra sets 
of skis; four ext ra ruck sacks; one N i c hols  radio set; 
m i s c e l l a n e o u s  e q u i p m e n t  for the base; u n i f o r m s  and 
p e r s o n n e l  e q u i p m e n t  would also be included. I n c l u d e d  
w i t h i n  the i n d i v i d u a l  es cape kits was 100 S w e d i s h  Kroner. 
The unit kit w o ul d c o n ta in 50,000 No r w e g i a n  Kroner and 400 
S w e d i s h  Kro ne r.
S c o t l a n d  on or after F e b r u a r y  22nd. The group w o u l d  drop 
to the r e c e p t i o n  with Eu reka under co mmand  of L t . T om  
Sather. The signal letter for the r e c e p t i o n  and the Eure k a  
w o u l d  be " P ” for Peter. Re s u p p l y  would be flown on requ es t 
of the RYP E  c o m m a n d e r  to DZ ’ s (drop zones) chosen by him. 
The r e c e p t i o n  with a E u r e k a  w o uld be used. The f o l l o w i n g  
names, let ter s, and B.B.C. m e s s a g e s  wo ul d be a s s i g n e d  these 
f i e l d s  when chosen:
The group wou ld em pl ane at L e u ch ars Air Base,
1. AREA B Sterk Som Gress
(strong as grass)
2. MARS C Full av Sol
(full of sun)
3. JU P I T E R R Mere St illhe t
(more s i l e n c e )
4. ZEUS F Taus Sum T e l e f o n e n
(silent like the t e l e p h o n e )
5. DIANA G Solem Fikk en Sonn 
(Solem got a son)
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: J Rev Bak Oiet
(tongue in cheek)
: K H a l l o m a n n e n  var Stum
(the radio a n n o u n c e r  was mute)
: L B l e k khus et  Blev
(the in kw ell r e m a i n e d )
: W Mo nster Uten  Kant
(monster w i t h o u t  form)
: X Hold ilden v e d li ke
(keep the fire going)
: Y Gaa til Legen
(go to the doctor)
Q Mannen Med to An s i k t e r
(the man with two faces)
The RY P E  safe arr ival w o u l d  be re porte d to Sp eci al  Fo rces
H e a d q u a r t e r s  imme d i a t e l y .  The phrase "Fro m H e n r i k  to RYPE"
on B.B.C. wou ld  be used to p r ef ix  m e s s a g e s  pa ssed by
B . B . C . .  The cy pher s and radio would be w ith  the a d v a n c e d  
20
p a r t y .
R e n d e z v o u s  P r o c e d u r e s  and the D i f f i c u l t i e s  in N o r w a y
R e c e p t i o n  c o m m i t t e e s  for the B-24s c o m m o n l y  used as 
visu a l  aid the " C ” s y s t e m  of (three torches, u s u a l l y  red, 
in a row, wit h a wh it e s i g n a l - f l a s h i n g  light set up at the 
d o w n w i n d  end of the line). The B-24s wou ld come in upwind 
for drops. The signal li ghts would not come on until the 
f i rst plane was heard. S o m e t i m e s  the B-2 4s were asked to 
give  an i d e n t i f y i n g  signal if the r e c e p t i o n  c o m m i t t e e  
t h o ug ht that there was da ng e r  of d i s c o v e r y  by the enemy.
The c o n t a i n e r s  and p a c k a g e s  were d r o pped in train 
ov er  a target 400 feet a b s o l u t e  alti tu de (the a l t i t u d e
6. ASTARTE:
7. H E RMES
8. M E R K U R
9. ATHE N E
10. VES TA
11. H Y GEA
s
12. JUNO
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a b o v e  the t e r rai n)  at an i n d i c a t e d  ai r s p e e d  (IAS) of 135 
m i l e s  per hour at a flap s e t t i n g  of on e-h alf . A l t h o u g h  
this was near st all speed, this pr ocedure  r e d u c e d  the 
s c a t t e r i n g  of e q u i p m e n t  and gave the c o n t a i n e r  c h ut es  more 
p r o b a b i l i t y  of o p e n i n g  so the e q u ipmen t w o uld  not be 
d e s t r o y e d .-
The p e r s o n n e l  (or "J oes, " as they were c a l l e d - - a n d  
s o m e t i m e s  " J o s e p h i n e s "  or wo men), were dr opped at 600 feet 
a b s o l u t e  a l t i t u d e  at 125 m i l e s  per hour at a flap s e t t i n g  
of o n e - h a l f .
Most m i s s i o n s  wer e flown  du ring the moo n  p e rio d so
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that a i r c r e w  m e m b e r s  c o u l d  v i s u a l l y  locat e their targets.
An i n i tia l point (IP) was  c h o s e n  by the pilot at 1500 feet
a b s o l u t e  a l t i t u d e  d o w n w i n d  of the target. If the target
w as  not s p o tte d on the first pass, the B-24 w o u l d  r e tu rn to
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the IP and m a k e  the d e s c e n t  and run in again.
The m i s s i o n s  of N o r w a y  w o uld e n c o u n t e r  p r i m a r i l y
th re e large problems: (1) the terrain was m o u n t a i n o u s  and
c h a n g e d  a b r u p t l y  b e t w e e n  the hill s and valleys; (2) up and
down d r aft s could cause an u n w e lc ome e n c o u n t e r  w it h the
te rrain , and (3) all of N o r w a y  could look the same b e c ause
of the s n o w c o v e r  in the winter,  m a k i n g  the l o c at io n of
23
t a r g e t s  d i f f ic ult.
N o r t h h a m p t o n  in E n g l a n d  was the hom e base for the 
492 nd Bomb Group. Its mai n  mission, ca ll ed " C a r p e t b a g g e r , "  
was to drop pe r s o n n e l  deep b e hind  enemy lines. Its
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C a r p e t b a g g e r  d e t a c h m e n t s ,  such as the ones at L e u c h a r s  and
Ki n d loss, fac ed the lack of spe cial heavy e q u i p m e n t  for
m a i n t a i n i n g  the B-24s  and, as always, the s h o r t a g e  of
24
a d e q u a t e l y - t r a i n e d  p e r s o n n e l  to s e r vice the B-24s .
D r o p  of N o r w e g i a n  S p e ci al Forces
On 2 .March, 1945, Hans H. Skabo i n f ormed RY P E  that a 
N o r w e g i a n  G r o u p  w o u l d  be d r o pp ed nor th of the RYP E 
o p e r a t i o n a l  area. S k abo de fine d the c o n d i t i o n s  to g o ve rn
the a c t i o n s  of the R Y P E  Group in re l a t i o n  to the N o r w e g i a n
/
G r o u p .
RYPE c o u l d  c o m m u n i c a t e  wit h this group in e m e r g e n c i e s
if urgent and could join it for such a d e f e n s i v e  act ion.
R Y P E  was not to join it in a "coup de m a i n ” sa b o t a g e
o p e r a t i o n  u n l e s s  S FHQ a u t h o r i z e d  it. RYPE was not
a u t h o r i z e d  to join in a co mm o n  a c t i o n  to seize and hol d a
p o p u l a t e d  area. Fin al ly, r e c r u i t i n g  of v o l u n t e e r s  was
25
l i m i t e d  to n e c e s s a r y  gu id e s  and laborers.
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CHAPTER VI
D E P L O Y M E N T  OF O P E R A T I O N  R Y P E : OFF TO A BAD STA RT
I N T R O D U C T I O N
The air su ppor t for O p e r a t i o n  RYPE got off to a very 
bad start. Of the e i gh ty men trained for the missio n,
t h i r t y - s i x  were c h o s e n  to p a r a c h u t e  into Norway. Of these,
/
five were a c c i d e n t a l l y  d r o pp ed  into neutra l Sweden! Ten 
p a r a t r o o p e r s  and f o u r t e e n  a i r m e n  were killed  tr yi ng to get 
into Norway. Due to the foul winter, res up ply and 
r e i n f o r c e m e n t  by air w e r e  u n s u c ce ss ful: this elim i n a t e d ,
as the RYPE m i s s i o n ’s primar y target for d e s t r u c t i o n ,  the 
f o r m i d a b l e  r a i l r o a d  b r i d g e  over the Grana River.
The Abo rte d Drop of the A d v a n c e d  Party
In J a n uary, 1945, the a d v a n c e d  O p e r a t i o n  R YP E party 
t r a v e l e d  by air from S c o t l a n d  to the target area. On board 
were: L i e u t e n a n t  Tom  Sather, Tec h n i c a l  Se rg eant Bo rg e
L a n g el an d, Sta ff S e r g e a n t  Arne Listeid, and a N o r w e g i a n  
l i a i s o n  o f f i c e r  wi t h  the code name (dek kenavn ) Hoel 
( L i e u t e n a n t  He rber t Helgeseri from T r o n d h e i m ) .  The B-24 
L i b e r a t o r  a r r i v e d  over T r o n d h e i m  and so did the weather.
Th e b l o win g snow o b s c u r e d  the drop zone at G a u p t j e r n e t  and 
the r e c e p t i o n  party could not see the air craft. Sather 
de c i d e d  not to drop: the w e a t h e r  was not g e t ti ng  better
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and the fuel r e s e r v e  on the L i b e r a t o r  was low. The B-24
r e t u r n e d  to S c o tlan d and lande d with  only fuel fumes left.
E v e r y t h i n g  that was not a part of the air c r a f t  had been
1
j e t t i s o n e d  to c o n serv e fuel on the way back.
The a d v a n c e  party was for t u n a t e  it did not drop. The
N o r w e g i a n - i n - e x i l e  n e w s p a p e r s  had re ported heavy G e rm an
t r o o p  a c t i v i t y  in the targe t area. This was the first of
m a n y  " l e aks" to the public that W i l l i a m  E. Col by was to
e x p e r i e n c e  d u r i n g  his career in i n t e l l igence:  the G e r m a n s
2
m u s t  have been aware of O p e r a t i o n  RYPE. A large G e rm an
ski p a rt y was d i s p a t c h e d  from S t e i n k j a e r  to G a u p t j e r n e t
that night. L i e u t e n a n t  Haro ld La rsen of the N o r w e g i a n
u n d e r g r o u n d  ha d o b s erved  the patrol . B e c aus e he was a
s u p e r b  skier, he qu i c k l y  d i s t a n c e d  himse lf from the group
and a r r i v e d  at G a u p t j e r n e t  in time to warn the r e c e p t i o n
3
p a rty to d i s p e r s e  and d is ap pear.
A C l o s e  Call for the R e c e p t i o n  C o m m i t t e e
Kj el l Sorl i e  was a me mber of M I L O R G  M i l i t a r y  
F o r s v a r e t s  O v e r k o m m a n d o  Fire (F.O.IV) O r g a n i z a t i o n  in 
o c c u p i e d  N o r w a y  c o n t r o l l e d  by FOIV of the N o r w e g i a n  High  
C o m m a n d  in Lo nd on) and a re si dent in Nort h T r o n d e l a g . He 
had acted as a m i l i t a r y  cou rier for M I L O R G ’s S t o c k h o l m  
o f f i c e  for over six months. He would depart S t o c k h o l m  by 
rail, go as far as the train could take him to war d the 
N o r w e g i a n  fr ont ier , then ski the rest of the way to M I L O R G  
c o n t a c t s  in Norway. In the process, he had to avoid both
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4
S w e d i s h  and German  ski patrols.
His brother, Odd, was Chief of M I L O R G  for T r o n d e l a g  
and had asked Kjell to receiv e O p e r a t i o n  R Y P E  on the 
G a u p t j e r n e t  m o u n tain. He was twe n t y - o n e  years old, 
a d v e n t u r o u s ,  and said yes, but he wa nte d Erik Gaundal, 
a n o t h e r  M I L O R G  courier, to join him in the r e c e p t i o n  of 
RYPE. Odd con sen ted, and he and Gaundal proceed ed  to No rt h 
T r o n d e l a g  in Decembe r, 1944, to make co nt ac t with  Hans
L e i r m o  there. G a u nda l and So rl ie were eq u i p p e d  with
/
A m e r i c a n  items: wh ite o v e r c l o t h e s ,  two Colt 7.65 pi s t o l s
and one radio receiver. The phrase: " K a a l r a b i e n  er
l e k k e r "  ("The t u r nips are d e l i c i o u s " )  was to be b r o a d c a s t
by the B. B . C . ' s  N o r w e g i a n  News: it would mea n  to So rl i e  and
5
G a u n d a l  to expect RYPE  the ni ght of the b ro ad cast.
Le irmo was k e e p i n g  a c l os e wat ch on Ge rm a n  ski patrol
a c t i v i t y .  He o v e r h e a r d  talk in S t e i n k j a e r  that a group of
t w e n t y  Ge r m a n s  were to i n s p e c t  G a u p t j e r n e t  that nigh t and
that was whe re Ga undal and So rlie were b i v o u a c k e d .  L e irmo
got on his skis, o u t d i s t a n c e d  the German patrol, and wa rn ed
G a u n d a l  and Sorlie  to leave G a u p t j e r n e t  and ski to Sweden for 
6
sa f e  h a v e n .
Once in Sweden, Kjell Sorlie headed for the near est 
t e l e p h o n e  to call his brother, Odd, in Sto ckhol m.
F o r t u n a t e l y ,  Odd Sorlie answ ered. Kjell warned: "Do not
send those t u r n i p s — they are not d e l i c i o u s . "  Odd So rlie 
then ca lled his c o n ta ct in the Americ an  Embassy. R Y P E  was
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st o ppe d.  Kjell Sorli e s u g g e s t e d  that frozen Ja e v s j o  (a
lake) be the r e c e p t i o n  l o c ation for RYPE: it had sno w on
7
it to p r o v i d e  a soft l a n d i n g  by parachute.
The Drop on Ja ev sj o (a lake)
Five N o r w e g i a n  sk ie r s  clad in battle clothin g, 
w e a r i n g  w h i t e  parkas, were the recepti on c o m m it tee for 
O p e r a t i o n  RYPE. They had been smu ggled  in from S t o c k h o l m  
to p e r f o r m  the r e c e p t i o n  on M a r c h  24, 1945. The four
w o o d p i l e s  in an u p s i d e - d o w n  ”L ” con fi g u r a t i o n  were ready to
/
be t o r c h e d  so that the l u m b e r i n g  B-24 L i b e r a t o r s  could
see the drop point on the n o r t heas t side of Jaevsjo.
One man was st a t i o n e d  at the short end of the i n v e r t e d  ”L ”
w i t h  a flashli gh t, ready  to give the correct i d e n t i f i c a t i o n
si gnal to the plane. The rad io ope rat or was also ready to
t ra ns mit his i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  signal. They all wa ite d in
great a n t i c i p a t i o n ,  as this was to be the first r e c e p t i o n
of A m e r i c a n  forces  in Norway. They thought h o p e f u l l y  that
the l i b e r a t i o n  of N o r w a y  from German occ upat io n was near.
The r e c e p t i o n  c o m m i t t e e  had b e f o r e h a n d  scouted for Ge rm an
8
p a t r o l s  and found none. All was in readiness.
Ha ns  Le ir mo  si g h t e d  a bla ck spot to the south in the 
sky over  the m o u n ta in s. As it grew larger, the r e c e p t i o n  
c o m m i t t e e  heard the dro ne  of a four -engine  bomber. As 
L e i r m o  lit the w o o d p i l e s  and t rans mi tted signals, the 
m i d n i g h t  r e n d e z v o u s  was on. Sud de nl y the lead air cr af t 
v e e r e d  from its course, i n d i c a t i n g  that it had found the
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drop  zone. Out of nine a i r c r a f t  sc hedule d to come, only
four came. They fo l l o w e d  a c i r c u l a r  orbit, then ro ll ed out
at 600 feet a b s o l u t e  a l t i t u d e  on a n o r t h e r l y  co ur se  to the
dr op  zone. They wou ld repea t this p r o cedure to drop
9
e q u i p m e n t  a f ter the men were on the lake.
L t . T om  Sa th er had i n jure d four v e r t e r b r a e  in his
bac k on a p r e v i o u s  p a r a c h u t e  jump, but did not tell
any bod y, for fear that he w o u l d  miss the drop in his
b e l o v e d  Norway. F o r t u n a t e l y  for him, there was snow
c o v e r i n g  the h a r d - f r o z e n  lake that c u s hio ne d his la nding.
He c a rr ie d fo rged pa pers i d e n t i f y i n g  him self as ”01e
O l s e n . ” If he c a r r i e d  his c o r r e c t  id e n t i t y  and if a G e r m a n
patrol w er e to c a p t u r e  him, the Ge stapo would take
r e p r i s a l s  on his family in Tromso. His father was
pr o m i n e n t  the re and had r e p r e s e n t e d  the Br iti sh C o n s u l a t e
10
th ere  prior to the war.
F l y i n g  to N o r w a y  in side the Libe ra tor was d r afty with 
a t e m p e r a t u r e  of fifty d e g rees b e l o w  zero. The men put on 
face m a sks prior to the drop. This was to protec t them 
fr om  the s u b - z e r o  prop blast. The bo ttom hatch was 
removed . St ati c lines were c h e c k e d  by the jumpmaste r. 
W i t h o u t  the se a t t a c h e d  to the aircraft, the a t t ached 
p a r a c h u t e  wo ul d not open. Four O.S.S. pe rsonnel then sat
on the edge of the hatch. W h e n  the jump light came on, the
ju m p m a s t e r  shouted, "go." Egr e s s  from the L i b e r a t o r  came
with  a kick, all in turn: the men l i t e r a l l y  jumped on each
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o t h e r ’s s h o u l d e r s .  The c a n o p i e s  opened thirt y feet b e l o w
the a i r c r a f t  and provi de d for a very short trip to the 
11
lake .
By the tim e Kai J o h a n s e n  hit the ground, w h e r e  the
t e m p e r a t u r e  was twenty below, he felt like he had
12
e n c o u n t e r e d  a heat wave. Karl Hoffman (a.k.a. Matt i
R a i v i o )  j u mped  late from his air craft. He saw Major
W i l l i a m  E. C o l b y  land next to one of the fires. Alf
P a u l s e n  w a s ^ n o t  far behind. H o f f m a n  landed softly and
r o l l e d  down to the snow. He stood up to c o l l a p s e  and
g a t h e r  in his can opy. He was aware that he was not near
the drop zone. H o f f m a n  then took b e a rings off the t e r r a i n
w i t h  his b u t t o n  compass. He d i s c o v e r e d  he was just a c r o s s
the border. T h r e e - q u a r t e r s  of the lake was in Swe den , one-
q u a r t e r  in N o r w a y .  He sped to the re c e p t i o n  fires in the
d i s t a n c e .  He was  d e t e r m i n e d  not to be c a p t u r e d  by a
S w e d i s h  p a tr ol and face inter nment: he wan te d to be on the
13
w i n n i n g  side in this war for once!
A q u e s t i o n  and an sw er  password, ag reed  upon by M I L O R G  
t h r o u g h  S t o c k h o l m  for the final r e c o g n i t i o n  be twe en RYPE 
and the r e c e p t i o n  party, RYPE would ask: ”Er f i s k e r i e t  godt
h e r ? ” The a n s w e r  would come from the r e c e p t i o n  party:
” J a , s a e r l i g  i v i n t e r H a n s  Leirmo of the r e c e p t i o n  
party, was e i th er too ex cited to see RYPE, either forgot, 
or e x e r c i s e d  S c a n d i n a v i a n  humor with his answer: ”Nei, Fan!
Det er d a a r l i g  f i s k e r i e t  her!"  Question: "Is the fi shing
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good h e r e ? ” Pr oper answer: ”Yes, e s p e c i a l l y  in the
w i n t e r . ” L e i r m o 's answer: "No, i t ’s no d a mned  go od ." A
s t u n n e d  First L i e u t e n a n t  G l en n Fa rnsworth, who was the only
m e m b e r  of RYP E who could not spe ak much N o r w e g i a n ,  drew his
pi s tol , then asked: "H an s? " Le irmo re sponde d:  "Me H a n s . "
F a r n s w o r t h ' k n e w  that the le ad er of the r e c e p t i o n  p a r t y ’s
fir st  name w o uld be Hans.
e n o u g h  for Farn swort h.  It
14
r e a c h e d  the r e n d ez vo us.
15
d r o p  on the target were:
Sverre Aa n o n s e n  
Odd A n d e r s o n  
W i l l i a m  E. Colby 
Einar E l i a s s e n  
Glen F a r n s w o r t h  
As mund Gr avdal 
Karl H o f f m a n  
Kai Jo h a n s e n  
Fred J o h n a n s o n  
Borge L a n g e l a n d  
Arne L i s t e i d  
M a r i n i u s  M y rl and 
HaIv o r  Nipe 
Alf Pa ulsen 
Tom Sather 
Odd St ian se n
C l e a n u p  and E s t a b l i s h i n g  Rad io C o m m u n i c a t i o n s
The group had landed just before the Eas t e r  Holidays.
In No rw ay, the re  are four Eas t e r  Holidays: Holy T h u rsday,
Goo d Friday, Ea ster Sunday, and Monday. The city pe opl e
w o u l d  be d e s c e n d i n g  upon the w i l d e r n e s s  for h o l i d a y
16
o u t i n g s .  They must not st umble into O p e r a t i o n  RYPE.
N o b o d y  was to get any sleep on Palm Sunday. The sc a t t e r e d 
e q u i p m e n t  dro ppe d from the L i b e r a t o r s  had to be r e t r i e v e d
That password w o ul d be good 
was da yligh t b e f o r e  all the men 
The sixteen men who m a n a g e d  to
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and c o n c e a l e d  from any Ge rman spotter  pl anes that may have
b ee n c u r i o u s  about the n i g h t ’s noisy act ivitie s.
P a r a c h u t e s  h e l p e d  conceal the base camp on shore from the 
17
pl an es. The radio t r a n s m i t t e r  and b a t tery had been
d r o p p e d  w i t h o u t  their p a r a c h u t e s  opening, but were found
18
only s l i g h t l y  d a m age d in a deep snowdrift.
C o m m u n i c a t i o n  with E n g la nd  was not easy due to
a t m o s p h e r i c  c o n d it io ns, yet R Y P E  enjoyed al most daily
c o n t a c t  with  the young girls of the Female  A u x i l l i a r y
N u r s i n g  Y e o m a n r y  (F. A.N.Y.), wh o  had been too quic kly
t r a i n e d  in t e l e g r a p h y  and some of whom had been gra d u a t e d  
19
too soon. R Y P E ’s rad io o p e r a t i o n s  began on the frozen
lake be fore  b e ing moved to a pup tent in the woods, w h er e a
fir tree h o u s e d  the antenna: wh e n  a J a e vsjo farm hou se  was
20
ac q u i r e d ,  rad io o p e r a t i o n s  moved  there.
L a n g e l a n d  tried to e s t a b l i s h  co ntac t with  E n g la nd on 
M a r c h  25, 1945. Lo ndon heard him, but L a n g e l a n d  was not 
a w a r e  of that. On Mar ch 26th, La n g e l a n d  sent the fol l o w i n g  
m e s s a g e  :
P l a n e s  Bill, Saether, Glenn, Einer a r r i v e d  
STOP o t h e r s  not r e p ort ed  STOP e q u i p m e n t  badly 
s c a t t e r e d  and much will be lost STOP d e t a i l s  
later STO P correc t with Eu reka  STOP mus t have 
at least two more plane loads before a t t a c k i n g  
o b j e c t i v e  STOP c o n d i t i o n s  fav orable for 
r e c e p t i o n  tonight. 21
L o n d o n  replied, and L a n g e l a n d  heard:
We hear you STOP three planes  re turned, one 
dr op pe d Sweden near border STOP rep ort your 
c o n d i t i o n  STOP two of two s i x . 22
R Y P E  con s i s t e d  of only s i x t e e n  of the t h i r t y - s i x  men
w ho had left Scotland, not e n o u g h  to blow the Grana Br idg e
as plann ed. The three pl anes  that ret ur ned to S c o t l a n d
23
w o u l d  try again: RYP E w o uld  just have to wait.
R Y P E  sent its c o n d i t i o n  re port to L o n d o n  on March
27th. L a n g e l a n d  had to de co de  and encode m e s s a g e s  by hand
he had no m a c h i n e  to do it for him:
S t a y i n g  at J a e v s j o  repeat  Ja evsjo Farm  STOP 
e s t a b l i s h i n g  dum ps a r o u n d  lake STOP request 
food be sent to S w e d i s h  side of lake as 
a r r a n g e d  in S t o c k h o l m  STOP many pa c k a g e s  lost 
STO P drop was s c a t t e r e d  ove r  eight k i l o m e t e r s  
ST OP  send two c o n t a i n e r s  Brens, one con t a i n e r  
G a r a n d  Man e rifles, one c o n t a i n e r  S p r i n g f i e l d  
Ri fles, ga s o l i n e  g e n e r a t o r  Baker M a r k  two radio 
and battery, m e d i c a l  kit, twelve pair skis and 
s l e e p i n g  bags, spare c l o t h i n g  STOP send Sgt.
Kyllo, Sgt. Ausen and H a r o l d  A n d er se n to 
o p e r a t e  base STOP R p t . Kyllo, Ausen, A n d e r s e n  
S T O P  need more men for b r i d g e  job STOP will 
r e c e i v e  other pl an es  on n o r t h e a s t  c o rner of 
Jaevsjo* Rpt J a e vs jo Lake STOP  w o n d e r f u l  w e a t h e r 
S TO P  no a l ar m by G e r m a n s  yet but are m o v i n g  to 
w o o d s  to a v oid  v a c a t i o n i s t s  until M o n d a y  STOP 
hope to leave for bridge then STOP send salt, 
pepper, and c o n d e n s e d  m i l k . 24
A yo un g group of v a c a t i o n e r s  arr ive d at the farm
d u r i n g  the h o l iday period. Lt . Hoel c o n v ince d them that
th er e was n o t h i n g  going on at the farm. The group skied 
25
awa y .
The radio t r a ff ic  b e t w e e n  Lo nd on  and RYPE was
r o u t i n e  b u s i n e s s  and w e a t h e r  re ports  durin g the period
M a r c h  28-29, 1945, wit h the e x c e p t i o n  of the m e s s a g e  from
L o n d o n  about the fate of P L A N E  LEIF in the drop over 
26
S w e d e n .
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P L A N E  L E I F ’S Drop into Sweden
The five men who were dropped by one of Col. C l i f f o r d  
H e f l i n ’s ’’C a r p e t b a g g e r ” B-2 4s in Sweden due to a 
n a v i g a t i o n a l  error were: Te c h n i c a l  Serge an t Leif Oistad,
C o r p o r a l  Knut A n d r e a s s e n  , T e c h n i c i a n  Five Tom Rusdal, 
T e c h n i c i a n  Five Sivert Windh, and T e c h n i c i a n  Five Eddie 
Ho v l a n d .  They ar r i v e d  about 2:00 a.m. on M a rc h 25, 1945, 
on fr oze n L a n d o s j o e n  (a lake) in Sweden.
The men found no r e c e p t i o n  committ ee. Th ei r 
e q u i p m e n t  was s c a t t e r e d  all over the area. B e c a u s e  there 
w e r e  li ght s on the far side of the lake, the group 
c o n c l u d e d  that they w o uld meet the r e c e p t i o n  c o m m i t t e e  by 
m o r n i n g .  M o r n i n g  came and also a man on a b i c yc le  on the 
f r o z e n  lake. Si vert W i n d h  greeted him as he a p p r o a c h e d .  
W i n d h  ask ed him, w h e r e  in Norway  were they? The man 
c h u c k l e d  and told them they were in Sweden, N o r w a y  b e ing 
sixty k i l o m e t e r s  west! Shortl y th ere after, a c o m p a n y  of 
S w e d i s h  ski t r o o p e r s  a r r i v e d  to i n v e s t i g a t e  the noise of a 
l o w - f l y i n g  aircraft  over the lake a few hours before.
The Swedes were more than c u rious about why A m e r i c a n  
p a r a t r o o p e r s  were so deep in Sweden. I n t e r r o g a t i o n  
i m m e d i a t e l y  began: was this drop the b e g i n n i n g  of a large -
scale in v a s i o n ?  The men r e s p o n d e d  with only their name, 
rank, and serial number. S t o c k h o l m  was i m m e d i a t e l y  
n o t i fi ed : Sweden did not want to be drawn into war wit h
the U n i t e d  States. Rumo r s  spread about the bizarre
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i n c i d e n t  of the five A m e r i c a n  p a r a t r o o p e r s  being d r o p p e d  in 
S w e d e n .  O.S.S. Sp ec ial  O p e r a t i o n s  in S t o c k h o l m  picked up 
on the r u m o r s  and kne w it had to act swiftly.
In the me a n t i m e ,  the men went th rough the
e m b a r r a s s i n g  or de al  of d e l o u s i n g  done by three h e f t y
S w e d i s h  wonren. After that hard scr u b b i n g  , they were  given
c l o t h i n g  and t r a n s p o r t e d  to Falun, t h i r t y - f i v e  m i l e s
n o r t h w e s t  of Stoc kholm, w h ere there was a per m a n e n t
i n t e r n m e n t  camp. The men were given $3 00 .0 0 to buy
c l o t h i n g .  They also bega n r e c e i v i n g  $5.00 per diem. The
m e n  were h a p p y  abou t this, but not happy about s i t t i n g  out
the war in Sweden. The only t h i n g  they could be th a n k f u l
for wa s their h a v i n g  been c a p t u r e d  by Sw ed ish and not 
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G e r m a n  troops.
A P O L L O ’s R e p o r t  to L o nd on
APOLLO, (true name u n k now n)  an O.S.S. c o u r i e r  b e t wee n 
L o n d o n  and Sto ckh ol m, sent a m e s s a g e  from S t o c k h o l m  to 
L o n d o n  on M a r c h  28, 1945, to the DS/US ( a u t h o r ’s a s s u m p t i o n  
is that this was the r a n k i n g  A m e r i c a n  wi thin Sp ecial Fo rces 
H e a d q u a r t e r s )  and L t . Col. Hans Ska bo to report on the drop 
of O p e r a t i o n  R Y P E  in Norway. In the message, A P O L L O  said 
that he had just i n t e r v i e w e d  a member  of the RY P E  r e c e p t i o n  
c o m m i t t e e :  four planes made a s u c c e s s f u l  drop on M a r c h  25,
1945, b e t w e e n  0 1 3 0  ho urs  and 0200 hours and the men were 
safe at Jae vs jo .
The R Y P E  party be l i e v e d  that it had r e c o v e r e d  most of
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its e q u i p m e n t  but c o uld not be sure b e c au se of the last-
m i n u t e  r e s h u f f l e  of a i r c r a f t  in Sco tland. One radio was
lost and that was why i m m e d i a t e  radio co n t a c t  was not made
w i t h  London. One radio was s l i ght ly  dam aged. The RYPE
p a r t y  did not k n o w  that the fifth group had d r o pped  into
S w e d e n  a n d b e e n  int erned: it should  be told b e c a u s e  as the
G e r m a n s  may have  been a l e r t e d  by this news  from Sweden, and
as a c o n s e q u e n c e  send p a t rols to ne ar by N o r w e g i a n  ar eas to
i n v e s t i g a t e .  The r e c e p t i o n  c o m m i t t e e  was to scout the area
for po ss i b l e  G e r m a n  patrols.
Col by  r e p o r t e d  that two of the pl anes did not have
Re b e c c a s ,  a r e c e i v i n g  d i r e c t i o n  find ing  radio, and may have
c o n t r i b u t e d  to the s c a t t e r i n g  of equi pm ent. In addit ion,
t h ere was a haze up to o n e - h u n d r e d  m e t e r s  from abo ve the
terrain. C o l b y  also r e q u e s t e d  that the men still in
Sc o t l a n d  sh ould be dr o p p e d  as soon as possible.
V A U D E V I L L E  (in truth, G. Unger V e t l e s e n )  was to
r e t u r n  to S t o c k h o l m  on M a r c h  28, 1945 after his i n t e r v i e w
28
of the men d r opped  into Sweden.
V A U D E V I L L E ’S Rep o r t  to Lo ndon
On M a r c h  28, 1945, V A U D E V I L L E  r e p or te d to the DS/US 
in Lo ndon from S t o c k h o l m  that the men a c c i d e n t a l l y  dr op ped 
into Sweden  were bei ng i n t er ne d in Falun, t h i r t y - f i v e  mil es  
n o r t h w e s t  of Stoc kh olm. V A U D E V I L L E  said that all the men 
w e r e  well, but u n h a p p y  about h a v i n g  to sit out the war.
Their dro p took  place at L a n d o e s j o e n  (a lake), about
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s i x t y - s i x  k i l o m e t e r s  s o u t h e a s t  of the target. All the
e q u i p m e n t  was in S w e di sh  hands. The Swedes did not r e c over
the secret plans, co des  and c r y s t a l s  intended for the
o p e r a t i o n .  V A U D E V I L L E  r e c o v e r e d  them and took them back to
S t o c k h o l m  wi t h  him* The men wer e  to be com m e n d e d  for their
h i g h  d e g r e e  of security.
The me n said that the pilot had the Eu rek a co n t a c t
and that the signal letter ”F ” was  received. That was whe n
the men were or dered  to jump.
The d a m a g e d  radio set was sent to S t o c k h o l m  for
re p a i r  and had been al r e a d y  r e t u r n e d  to Jae vsj o for
29
o p e r a t i o n  by RYPE.
U n s u c c e s s f u l  R e s u p p l y  of RYP E  by Air
On M a r c h  30, 1945, R Y P E  re c e i v e d  a me s s a g e  that four
pl a n e s  wer e  c o m i n g  from S c o t l a n d  to it that night to
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r e s u p p l y  the o p e r a t i o n  with m en  and equipme nt. The
w e a t h e r  did not c o o p er ate, as c l o u d s  and snow mo ve d into 
the r e c e p t i o n  area. The r e c e p t i o n  c o m mi ttee was f r u s t r a t e d  
to hear the L i b e r a t o r s  o v e r h e a d  and not be able to see 
them. RYPE  was not given the m e a n s  to have t w o -w ay radio 
c o n t a c t  with the L i b e r a t o r s ,  but had the pilots known that 
t h eir pl ane s wer e di r e c t l y  a b ove RYPE, they could have 
dr o p p e d  thei r men and eq uipmen t.  The planes lo i t e r e d 
o v e r h e a d  for as long as they could, but the cl oud s would 
not lift. They were hea rd  d r o n i n g  away, and the men of 
R Y P E  kne w the planes were r e t u r n i n g  to Scotland: the drop
158
31
w as c a n c e l l e d  .
Bo rg e L a n g e l a n d  sent a m e s s a g e  to L o n d o n  on April 2,
1945, a d v i s i n g  Spec ial Force H e a d q u a r t e r s  that the lake was
too soft for the r e c e p t i o n  of men and e q u i pmen t.
L i l l e f j e l l  (Little M o u n t a i n )  was to be used instead.
H e a d q u a r t e r s  pl an ned to c o n d u c t  dawn drops a f t e r  the moon 
32
p e riod  .
W i l l i a m  E. Golby w a n t e d  to go ahead w i t h  sa b o t a g e
33
u s i n g  the r e s o u r c e s  R Y P E  then posse ssed. On April 4,
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1945, L a n g e l a n d  sent the f o l l o w i n g  m e s s a g e  to London:
D a wns drop a g r e e d  STOP but bridge must 
be b l own soon to be e f f e c t i v e  STOP r u m o r s  
that G e r m a n s  to guard for three mor e  we ek s 
only as t r affic from n o r t h  cease STOP if 
r e m a i n d e r  of party not her e wish to do bridge 
w i t h  p r e sent group plus N o r w e g i a n  f r i en ds STOP 
c o uld not r e c e i v e  at same time STOP have found 
s u f f i c i e n t  w e a p o n s  and e x p l o s i v e s  STOP full 
r e p o r t  has left via St ockholm , send c r y s t a l s  
and c o m m u n i c a t i o n  plan w it h N o r w e g i a n  g r o u p . 35
On Apr il 4, 1945, L o n d o n  radioed R Y P E  that the Second
N O R S O  G r o u p  w o u l d  be dr op ped in the next moon  period. RYPE
wa s to a s s e s s  its p r e sent  and future needs of food and
e q u i p m e n t  . P L A N E  JONES and seve n men were s t a n d i n g
36
by for a dawn drop. The w e a t h e r  still did not lift.
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L o n d o n  a u t h o r i z e d  the br idg e job with what RYPE had. On
A p r i l  6, 1945, RYPE r e c ei ved word that four pl an e s  would
38
a r r i v e  for a dawn drop on the 7th. Three plan es were 
heard, but not seen by RYPE. Again, the cloud cover 
p r e v e n t e d  a drop. RY P E  re p o r t e d  a po ss ible plane crash
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f i f t e e n  m i le s west of its base. (A reindeer h e rde r later
c o n f i r m e d  that P L ANE JON ES had crashed, i m m e d i a t e l y  k i l l i n g
40
e v e r y b o d y  on board.)
M e s s a g e  R e la ys to L o ndon from N o r w e g i a n  R e s i s t a n c e  F o r c e s
C o m m u n i c a t i o n s  to L o n d o n  from the field in No rw a y
we re  not u s u a l l y  the best either, because of poor N o r w e g i a n
l o c a t i o n s  or a t m o s p h e r i c  d i s t u r b a n c e s .  However, RYPE
e n j o y e d  a l most a daily c o n ta ct with England. As a result,
some N o r w e g i a n  Resistance, m e s s a g e s  were r e layed t h r ough
RYPE, as well as m e s s a g e s  from L o n d o n  to other units in the
field. RYP E  re c e i v e d  the f o l l o w i n g  m e ssage from L o n d o n  on
M a r c h  30, 1945:
To X-3 8  STOP m e s s a g e  re c e i v e d  STOP ac ti o n  taken 
STO P if e q u i p m e n t  not d r opp ed  this period will 
send so onest via S w e d e n  STOP g r e e t i n g s  STOP 
eight of thirty.
X- 38  was the N o r w e g i a n  l i a i s o n  officer, L i e u t e n a n t
H an s Hoel , who was a t t a c h e d  to the RYPE party. On M a rch
31, 1945, the f o l l o w i n g  m e s s a g e  was recei ve d by RYPE:
To M - 2 0  STOP Hope X - 3 8  ha s cleared 
m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g  STOP c o n s i d e r e d  useful that 
you take care of S w e d i s h  c o n n e c t i o n s  but al wa ys  
bear in mind you m u s t  not be caught by enemy 
STOP best g r e e t i n g s  STOP nine of three o n e . 41
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M - 2 0  was  also a N o r w e g i a n  R e s i s t a n c e  operator.
The C o u r i e r  from S t o c k h o l m
The co u r i e r  from S t o c k h o l m  Kjell Sorlie, a me mber of 
RYPE, was a m e m b e r  of the N o r w e g i a n  M i l i t a r y  R e s i s t a n c e  
Gr o u p  (MILORG ) who used S t o c k h o l m  in neutral Swede n as his 
home base. He r e g u l a r l y  d e p a r t e d  on mi ss i o n s  from
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S t o c k h o l m  by rail to the n o r t h w e s t  as far as the train
w o u l d  go. The n he would ski to R Y P E ’s camp, a v o i d i n g
S w e d i s h  and German ski patro ls  in the process. The
a p p r o a c h e s  to the m o u n t a i n s  were desolate. Had he b r o k e n  a
leg  in this region, there  wo uld be little c h a n c e  of s o m eo ne
c o m i n g  to his aid. The su b - z e r o  e v e r - c h a n g i n g  w e a t h e r  and
the need to ca rry li ttle food to be as m o b i l e  as pos sibl e,
m a d e  this a very d a n g e r o u s  run indeed. The c o u r i e r  run was
e s s e n t i a l  to the p a s sing back and forth of d e t ai le d
re po rt s. R Y P E ’s radio t r a n s m i s s i o n s  had to be brief and
r a pid b e c a u s e  o t h e r w i s e  Ge rm a n  signal i n t e l l i g e n c e  m i gh t be
a b l e  to p i n p o i n t  R Y P E ’s loca tion.  R Y P E ’s w r i t t e n  r e po rts
and i n c o m i n g  c o r r e s p o n d e n c e  w ere flown back and forth
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b e t w e e n  L o n d o n  and Stockholm.
P r o g r e s s  R e p o r t  from Co lb y to Skabo, April 1, 1945
On Apri l 1, 1945, M a jo r Col by  report ed  in d e t a i l  on 
R Y P E ' s  p r o g r e s s  to date to L i e u t e n a n t  Co lone l Hans H.
Skabo, S e c t i o n  Chief, N O R S O  Group, S c a n d i n a v i a n  Section, 
S.O. B r a n c h  of the O.S.S. in London.
RYPE was dropped on J a e v s j o  betw een m i d n i g h t  and 
1:30 a.m. on March  25, 1945, by PLANE S GLENN, BILL, E I N A R , 
and TRYGVE. A gr oun d mist and slow di s p a t c h  of eq u i p m e n t  
and pe r s o n n e l  from the plane s caused d i f f i c u l t i e s .  Losses 
were: one c o n ta in er t h r o u g h  the ice; an o t h e r  c o n t a i n e r
c a m e  apart in the air and was scattered; three pa c k a g e s  
w i t h  four rucksacks ; one radio and batteries; one
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gen e r a t o r ;  one c o n t a i n e r  Bren guns; one pack ag e skis; two 
p a c k a g e s  of r u c k s a c k s  for Col by and F. Johnson, and one 
p a c k a g e  of s t e m m i n g  rods.
PL A N E  L E I F  dr op ped in Sw ed en, but RYP E did not kn o w  
wh er e.  In C o l b y ’s report to S k a b o  on April 1, he sent a 
copy of a S-wedish n e w s pa pe r p r o v i d e d  by the M I L O R G  co ur ier  
that covered  the account of the event. Colby c o m m e n d e d  
th os e men for not b r e e c h i n g  the secur it y of O p e r a t i o n  RYPE.
The r e c e p t i o n  c o m m i t t e e  p r o v i d e d  a h o rs e and a sled
/
to the R YP E gro up to aid in g a t h e r i n g  its e quip me nt. 
C o n t a i n e r  d u mp s wer e placed in the woods, and co vered  with  
w h i t e  chutes, then wit h snow, to avoid d e t e c t i o n  from the 
air. A guard was at the J a e v s j o  farm house. The camp was 
c o m f o r t a b l e  and very well h i d d e n .  Sign als were a r r a n g e d  
w i t h  Al fr ed  A n d e rs en, the owner of the farm, who pla ced his 
f ar m at R Y P E ’s disposal.
B e c a u s e  the men spent m o s t  of the day cooking, RYP E  
r e q u e s t e d  that a c o o kin g c o m p l i m e n t  be obtained. Se r g e a n t  
C l i f f o r d  Kyllo, Ser ge ant Otis Ausen, and T e c h n i c i a n  Five 
H a r o l d  A n d e r s e n  came via S t o c k h o l m  to be that co mp l i m e n t .  
L i e u t e n a n t  Odd Sorlie came from S t o c k h o l m  to the re ce p t i o n .  
He wa nted to be r e t ai ned to e n a b l e  the safe passage of food 
and e q u i p m e n t  th ro ugh the S w e d i s h  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  system.
L i e u t e n a n t  H o e l , who d r o p p e d  with RYPE, found friend s 
in Th o r a l f  Lian, Bj ar ne  Alhus, Jens L e ks vik (in truth, Jon 
Moan), A n d r e a s  Andersen,  and Kjell  Sorlie: they were hired
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by R Y P E  to aid them in the tran sp ort of r e s u p p l y  items from 
the n e a re st  roads on the S w e d i s h  side of the border. They 
had the n e c e s s a r y  S w e d i s h  p e r m i t s  to move freely. Hans 
L e i r m o  of Sn aa s a  joined the unit. All the men were 
f a m i l i a r  wit h the local terrain.
A guard post was on L i l l e f j e l l e t  (Little M o u n t a i n ) .  
F r o m  this point the p r o b a b l e  ro utes of a p p r o a c h  of G e r m a n  
p a t r o l s  were: Holden; Lan gl ak e; Seisjo'en; and Sorlie.
A s y s t e m  of s i g n a l l i n g  was ag re ed  upon to warn the guard at 
the camp, s h o u l d  s t r a n g e r s  come.
Al fred And er sen, owner of the Ja evsjo  Farm, and his 
f a mi ly were e v a c u a t e d  fr o m  the farm and taken to Sw ed en  for 
re fu ge . A n d e r s e n  w o ul d r e join RYPE for his hu n t i n g  
a b i l i t i e s .
On M a r c h  30, 1945, the r e c e p t i o n  c o m m i t t e e  set itsel f 
up on the n o r t h e a s t  c o r n e r  of the lake near the S w e dish 
bo rd er . The R YP E gro up h e ar d three planes, but no drop 
too k place b e c a u s e  of a sleet storm. If no more men and 
e q u i p m e n t  w o u l d  be f o r t h c o m i n g ,  RYPE would blow the Grana  
B r i d g e  wit h its c u rrent reso ur ces. On April 1, 1945,
L a r s e n  of the W O O D L A R K  party visited the RY P E  group to give 
some tips on how W O O D L A R K  had been so su cc e s s f u l  in b l o w i n g  
up the brid ge at Jo r s t a d  in February.
Hans L e i r m o  r e c o n n o i t e r e d  the bridge. There were 
tw en ty  G e r m a n  guards, thre e on duty, one at each end and 
one at the bottom. The main g u a r dhou se  was on the south
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and a s m a ller one to the nor th also existed. An d r e a s  
A n d e r s e n  had been an e n g i n e e r  on this very line a year 
ea r l i e r .  R Y P E ’s plan was to c a p tur e an empty train 
a p p r o a c h i n g  from the south, and while in the target areas, 
d r o p  and plant ex pl o s i v e s ,  then they would climb back on 
the train wh il e A n d e r s e n  b e gan  to back it up slowly. Then 
the RYP E party w o uld  drop  from the train as A n d e r s e n  be gan 
to m o v e  it fo rward . Aft er he could jump from the train, it 
w o u l d  plu mm et  into the Grana  River. This p r o c e d u r e  w o ul d 
p r o v i d e  a b e t t e r  es cape for RYPE, as it could  ra pidly  
d i s t a n c e  i t s e l f  from the e x p l o s i o n s  and the G e r m a n  guards.
Colby a lso sent a le tter with his re port a d d r e s s e d  to 
V A U D E V I L L E .  In the letter, Col by  requested ce r t a i n  
s u p p l i e s  to r e p l a c e  tho se lost in the drop on M a rc h 25,
1945 and also at least a t w o - w e e k  supply of food. The 
m e l t i n g  snows in the days to come would make travel 
d i f f i c u l t  for resupply . Co lb y assumed that his r e q u e s t s  
c o u l d  be o b t a i n e d  in Sweden.
Colb y r e p o r t e d  that RYPE had be fr i e n d e d  a Lapp name d 
Jama, who w o u l d  p r o vi de one r e i n d e e r  per wee k to s u p p l e m e n t  
the p a r ty 's  food supply. Jama woul d also r e po rt  on G e r m a n  
t r o o p  mov e m e n t s .  Colby also desired a we ek ly mail se rvice 
from S t o c k h o l m  to keep RY PE ' s  morale  high.
Colby als o repor t e d  that Borge Lan ge la nd, the radio 
o p e r a t o r ,  kept his m e s s a g e s  as brief as possible, and sent 
t hem as q u i c k l y  as po ssi ble. He had heard i n t e r f e r e n c e ,
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w h i c h  i n d i c a t e d  that Ge rman si gnal  i n t e l l i g e n c e  was t r y i n g
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to p i n p o i n t  R Y P E ' s  location.
P r o g r e s s  R e p o r t - - C o l b y  to S k a b o - - A p r i l  3, 1943
C o l b y  su bm itted a second pro g r e s s  report to Skabo in 
L o n d o n  c o u r i e d  th rou gh Stockhol m. In this m e m o r a n d u m  
da te d April 5, 1945, Colby re p o r t e d  that most of the 
e q u i p m e n t  f ro m the March 25th drop had been found w i t h  the 
e x c e p t i o n  of one c o n tainer  from P L AN E TRYGVE, one each ski 
c o n t a i n e r s  from both PLAN E S  SAT H E R  and BILL, and the one 
c o n t a i n e r  s c a t t e r e d  in midair.
C o l b y  also rep or ted that L i e u t e n a n t  Glen F a r n s w o r t h  
had p l a n n e d  the ch ar ges to m a x i m i z e  the d a m ag es to the 
G r a n a  Brid ge. RYPE  planned to blow the bridge  wi t h  or 
w i t h o u t  a d d i t i o n a l  men. The men had mov ed from their tents 
to the J a e v s j o  farm house, as it was drier there. An ot her 
f i f t e e n  N o r w e g i a n  locals could be ab s o r b e d  by R Y P E  b e c a u s e  
they had d e m o l i t i o n  tra i n i n g  in England.
The Lier n e  Plan was a c o n t i n g e n c y  plan that , if the 
G e r m a n  W e h r m a c h t  were to use N o rwa y in a last stand, 
e x t e n d e d  t r a i n i n g  could be given N o r w e g i a n  R e s i s t a n c e  
F o r c e s  r e c r u i t e d  by RYPE in a desola te d area (called 
Li e r n e )  next to Sweden. Colby c o m m en ted that the spr ing 
thaw w o uld make  the Li erne area i n a c c e s s i b l e  to German 
f o rces  d u ri ng  the tr ai ning exe rcises. Sw e d i s h  t r a i n e e s  of 
N o r w e g i a n  o r igin could also be moved in. However, Field 
O r d e r  N u m b e r  Two would not permit the Lierne Plan and Colby
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w o u l d  want S k a b o ’s c o n c u r r e n c e  before its i m p l e m e n t a t i o n .
Upon d e s t r u c t i o n  of the Gr an a Bridge, Colby planned 
rail s a b ot ag e to be done by small groups. He r e q u e s t e d  
c o n t a i n e r  drops in the next m oon period c l o s e r  to the 
t a r ge ts. Jeeps shoul d also be d r oppe d after the sp rin g 
t h a w  to re pl ace skiing as a mode of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n .  He 
a l s o  had a sp ec ial r e q u e s t  for c a nn ed pineappl e, as the 
l o c a l s  had not en j o y e d  eati n g  any for many years. Colby 
p e r c e i v e d  the a v a i l a b i l i t y  of p i n e a p p l e  would be a 
t r e m e n d o u s  m o r a l e  bo ost er  for the Norwegia ns.
The Sec o n d  N O R S O  Group sh ould  be better arm ed  than 
R Y P E  had been wh e n  it was dropped. Each man should have an 
M-l Rifle, w i t h  every third rifle h a v i n g  a gren ade 
l au nc her. M o r t a r s  and ca n n o n s  should also  fo llow in 
r e s u pp ly .
Co lby  f i n i s h e d  his re port wit h a co mp laint. Ra ti on s
w e r e  m i s s i n g  items such as c i g a r e t t e s ,  candy, and soap. He
s u s p e c t e d  that there was theft at the a s s e m b l y  poin ts for
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the rations, and he w a n t e d  it stopped.
D i s p a t c h  of N O R S O  Gro up  on O p e r a t i o n a l  M i s s i o n s
The pl a n n e r s  of O p e r a t i o n  RYPE did not take M u r p h y ’s 
L aw into c o n s i d e r a t i o n  (if s o m e t h i n g  can go wrong, it 
wil l): an a l a r m e d  Spec ial  F o r c e s  hi gh er  echelo n staff
m e m b e r  de m a n d e d  from the S c a n d i n a v i a n  Sectio n a 
r e c a p i t u l a t i o n  of events, the statu s of the RYPE m i s s i o n  to 
date, what thin g s  did go w r o n g  in the dispa t c h  of the NOR SO
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Group, and for the S c a n d i n a v i a n  Se ctio n to propose 
s o l u t i o n s  to r e c ove r the o p e r a t i o n .  On 10 April, 1945, 
L i e u t e n a n t  C o l o n e l  Hans H. Ska bo and Lieu t e n a n t  C o l on el  
G e r h a r d  L. B o l l a n d  p r o v i d e d  a c h r o n o l o g i c a l  report on the 
d i s p a t c h  of the N0 RS0 O p e r a t i o n a l  Group to the targe t area 
for Sp ecial  F o r c e s  H e a d q u a r t e r s  in London.
Out of si x t e e n  s o r t i e s  flown, only four were 
s u c c e s s f u l .  Ai r c r e w s  were not s u f f i c i e n t l y  e x p e r i e n c e d  in
f l y i n g  in n o r t h e r n  l a t i tudes.  A i r craft  m a i n t e n a n c e  was
/
s u b s t a n d a r d .  Of t h i r t y - f i v e  men s t a nding by for the
m i s s i o n ,  thr ee off i c e r s  and t h i r t e e n  men were at the
target. Six men were k i l l e d  and four were missing.
Skabo and B o l la nd r e c o m m e n d e d  that the Army Air Force
not fly the r e m a i n i n g  p e r s o n n e l  to Norway  until s u i t a b l e
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a i r c r a f t  and p e r s onne l were mad e availab le.
It W as Time To "Do S o m e t h i n g ”
On A p ril 8, 1945, L a n g e l a n d  sent the f o l l o w i n g
m e s s a g e  to L o n d o n  from J a e v s j o :
STOP Will you drop in next six days? If so 
will leave four men r e c e pt io n. STOP Answer 
today STOP  bridge  too mu c h  for pres ent  force 
STOP a t t a c k i n g  b r i d g e s  Jorsta d to Val’oy.46
Ma jor  Col by  was g e t t i n g  impa ti ent and w a n t e d  to
s t r i k e  at lea st a l t e r n a t e  target s, but if London was to
r e s u p p l y  RYPE  soon, he w o u l d  pr ov ide a r e c e p t i o n  co m m i t t e e .
He was not a w a r e  of S k a b o ' s  and B o l l and's second th o u g h t s
47
on ae rial s u p po rt of RYPE. On the same day, Colby
r e c e i v e d  his answer:
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A t t a c k  b r i d g e s  Jo r s t a d  to Valoy STOP no drops 
until next moo n our last chance  then STOP Plane 
Jones fa il ed  to r e t u r n  to base may e x p l a i n  c r ash 
hea rd S TOP want O l m s t e d  mobi le  STOP are skis 
n e c e s s a r y  in f o r tn ight STOP ad vise us on ration, 
weapons, food c o n t a i n e r s  i m m e d i a t e l y  STOP c o n s i d e r  
y o u r s e l f  O l m s t e d  and fr ie nds STOP will s t a t i o n  
close d u r i n g  atta c k  S T O P . 48
Bo rg e L a n g e l a n d  en cod ed  C o l b y ’s reply, but
a t m o s p h e r i c  c o n d i t i o n s  p r e v e n t e d  R Y P E ’s t r a n s m i s s i o n  of it
that night. C o l b y  d e c i d e d  to a t t a c k  the b r i dges b e t w e e n
J o r s t a d  and Valoy . The m e s s a g e  wo ul d not be t r a n s m i t t e d
until RYP E r e t u r n e d  from its mission.  In the m e s s a g e ,  RYP E
said that the s t a t i o n  wo uld be closed; that skis w o u l d  be
n e c e s s a r y  u n t i l  the first we e k  of May; that there wer e no
G e r m a n s  w i t h i n  tw enty miles, and that RYP E w a n t e d  its
c o n t a i n e r s  as r e q u e s t e d  by C o l b y ’s letter to V A U D E V I L L E .
In addit io n, Odd S t i ansen w o uld go to S t o c k h o l m  p o si ng  as a
N o r w e g i a n  re fugee,  and RYP E w a n t e d  to be sure that he co uld  
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be sent back.
P l a n s  for T r a i n i n g  N o r w e g i a n  R e s i s t a n c e
On Apr il  9, 1945, V A U D E V I L L E  in S t o c k h o l m  sent a 
m e s s a g e  to the DS /U S in Lond o n  on R Y P E ’s s i t u a t i o n  and the 
q u e s t i o n  a b o u t  s e i z i n g  the L i er ne  area to begin  t r a i n i n g  of 
the N o r w e g i a n  R e s i s t a n c e  p e r s o n n e l  there. V A U D E V I L L E  
r e p o r t e d  that Major Colby had plan ned the bridge o p e r a t i o n  
and that he was going to carry it out with the men he had. 
C o l b y  was n o n e t h e l e s s  most a n x i o u s  for the men left b e h i n d  
in S c o t l a n d  to join his group.
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C o l b y ' s  plans to seize the Liern e area were in 
v i o l a t i o n  of Fiel d Orde r II, and he knew that DS/US must 
a p p r o v e  them before  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n .  The roa ds to the area 
w er e  bl o c k e d  by snow so it w o u l d  be safe to train N o r w e g i a n  
p a t r i o t s  there. The spr i n g  thaws would change the ab i l i t y  
of the d e f en se  to defend the area, so a p p r o v a l  should come 
f r o m  D S /U S as soon as possible.  L a r g e - s c a l e  r e s u p p l y  could 
come from F o r t r e s s  O p e r a t i o n s  in England. Colby also 
w a n t e d  to c o m m u n i c a t e  with the W A X W I N G  party to c o o r d i n a t e  
the s e i z i n g  of Lierne. N a t i v e  scoutin g pa rties could then 
m a k e  dis tant r e c o n n a i s s a n c e  of the area.
Col by p l a nn ed rail c u t t i n g  by small p a r ties east of
L u r u d a l  and s o u t h e a s t  of Snaas a Lake w h ich wou ld occur
a f t e r  the br idge was blown. Col by want ed c o n t a i n e r s  at
t h e s e  points, as wel l as jeeps as soon as r o ads became 
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c l e a r .
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C H A P T E R  VII 
C A R R Y I N G  OUT O P E R A T I O N  RYPE 
I N T R O D U C T I O N
The R Y P E  m i s si on  d e s t r o y e d  the r a i l r o a d  b r i d g e  at
T a n g e n  alo ng the No r d l a n d  R a i l w a y  on April 14, 1945. On
Ap ri l 24, 1945, RYPE d e s t r o y e d  two and o n e -half k i l o m e t e r s
of r a i l w a y s  in a remote area in the Lurudal Valley. Both
h i g h l y  s u c c e s s f u l  o p e r a tio ns , RYPE  thus sl owe d down Ge rman
t r o o p  m o v e m e n t s  alo ng the N o r d l a n d  Ra ilway from one
b a t t a l i o n  a w e e k  to one b a t t a l i o n  a month.
On May 6, 1945, Ge rma n forces  c a p i t u l a t e d  in Norw ay.
On May 11, 1945, SFHQ r a di oe d R YP E to come down from the
hills, report to M I L O R G  leaders, and begin to take the
o r d e r l y  s u r r e n d e r  of 4,0 00  G e r m a n  troops, as A m e r i c a n  and
B r i t i s h  o c c u p y i n g  forces did not arrive in the North
T r o n d e l a g  area until June.
A Bru ta l J o u r n e y  to the Targe t Area
On April 9, 1945, the unit de parted the J a e v s j o  farm
to trek to the target area b e t w e e n  Tang en and Jorstad.
1
The men were (their true names):
Agnar An de rsen  
Robert An d e r s e n  
Odd An d e r s o n 
Wi lli am Colby 
Ein ar Eli a s s e n  
Glen F a r n s w o r t h
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As m u n d  Gravdal 
J o r g e n  Ha vik  
H e r b e r t  H e l g e s e n  
Kai J o h a n s e n  
Borge L a n g e l a n d  
H a r a l d  La rs en  
To ralf Lian 
Hans L e i r m o  
Arne L i s teid 
Jon Moan 
M a r i n u s  M y r l a n d  
H a l v o r  Nipe 
Alf P a u l s e n  
M a tti R a iv io 
Tom Sather 
Kjell Sorlie
Leif O i s t a d ' a n d  his four men were still in Sweden, and
Odd St i a n s e n  was on his way to Stockholm. Lie u t e n a n t
H e r b e r t  He lgesen,  the N o r w e g i a n  L i a is on Office r, r e c r u i t e d
four m e m b e r s  of the local M i l i t a r y  R e s i s t a n c e  to
p a r t i c i p a t e  in R Y P E ’s m i s sion . Three men were left be hi n d
2
to guard the farm. The unit set out on a h u n d r e d - m i l e ,
3
si x- da y c r o s s - c o u n t r y  ski trip.
Every man c a r r i e d  on his back a h e a v y  r u c k s a c k
4
w e i g h i n g  sixty pound s wi t h  e x p l o s i v e s  and p rovi si ons. The
men took turns p u l li ng a t o b o g g a n  c a r r y i n g  sixty p o un ds of
5
e x p l o s i v e s ,  three  men to a tobog gan. The p r o v i s i o n s  were
6
very small and sl e e p i n g  bags, not tents, were carried.
The first d a y ’s march was made in rain ag ai nst a st rong  
7
wind. P u l l i n g  t o b o g g a n s  was not di ffi cult on level land
or downh ill, but c l i m b i n g  the m o u n t a i n s  o 11 skis and pu lli ng
the t o b o g g a n s  was most p h y s i c a l l y  ex hausti ng . D a y t i m e
skiing in sticky snow was dan ge ro us: n i g h t t i m e  was better
8
for skiing. One of C o l b y ’s co n c e r n s  was that, if one
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s h o u l d  brea k a leg, m e d i c a l  a t t e n t i o n  was not clos e by. He
told his men to sit on their skis should they lose con trol.
N o b o d y  r e c eived not eve n a s p rain  using this u n d i g n i f i e d  
9
tact ic .
In the two days fo ll owing,  a wet and sticky s n o w s t o r m
w i t h  a stron g w e s t e r l y  wind  h i n d e r e d  progress. On April
12, 1945, the st or m abated, but the wind did not. The unit
c l i m b e d  past I m s da ls  M o u n t a i n ,  went south of Flat M o u n t a i n
to avoid  a Ge rman o b s e r v a t i o n  post on the next m o u n t a i n  to
the north, and camped for the night. On April 13, 1945,
the unit m o ve d down the Rok Valley, t r a v e r s i n g  e x t r e m e l y
b r o k e n  te r r a i n  to O i i n g e n  Lake. Major Colby, L i e u tenant
H o e l , and three men went a r o u n d  Bjornli M o u n t a i n  a l o n g  the
tree line to the nor th to o b s er ve Jors tad Bridge fro m  a 
10
di s t a n c e .
On April 13, 1945, Colby and Sather picked a sm aller
b r i d g e  off the map; it was at Tangen. That was to be the
1]
t arg et for sabotage.  R e c o n n a i s s a n c e  of other b r id ges
proved that they were h e a v i l y  guarded and RYPE did not have
e n o u g h  men to a t ta ck tho se ta rget s with any prosp ec t of 
12
succes s. If the G e r m a n  en g i n e e r s  were worth their salt,
they wo ul d have the b r i d g e  r e c o n s t r u c t e d  wi th in  a m a t t e r  of
days at Tangen: ther ef ore, rail damage would also have to
13
be done.
R e c o n n a i s s a n c e  and the L a y i n g  of C h a rg es  at Tangen
The Ge rm an  gu ar d s  a p p a r e n t l y  had ob serv ed  L i e u t e n a n t
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Sa th er , L i e u t e n a n t  Larsen, and Sergeant L a n g e l a n d  wh il e
they were r e c o n n o i t e r i n g  the sta ti on at V a lo y on April
13th. They skied away in great haste as the Ge rm a n  guards
r u s h e d  out of their q u a r t e r s  w h ile put tin g on their
c l o t h e s .  The Ge rmans did not go very far, as they were
o b s e r v e d  by Sather, Larsen, and La n g e l a n d  to have
e n c o u n t e r e d  some N o r w e g i a n  w o o d c u t t e r s  d u ring their 
14
ch ase . Colby  had m i s c a l c u l a t e d  the ne ede d time to travel
f ro m  O i i n g e n  to Valoy, b e c a u s e  he had no way of 
a n t i c i p a t i n g  that the t e r r a i n  would be r o ug her than what 
the map s  i n d i ca ted. Be c a u s e  of being ob s e r v e d  by the 
G e r m a n s  at Valoy, Tang e n  was to be the target, the unit 
mo v e d  out at 2100 hours on April 13th. The unit went to 
O i i n g h e i a ,  Raus Lake, K v er n Lake, then north to the vi lla ge 
of Tangen, as the maps in d i c a t e d  this would  be the best 
route. It was not, as skis had to be fre q u e n t l y  removed 
and b o u l d e r s  climbe d over en r o u t e  in the w o o d e d  areas.
E v e n  c l i f f s  had to be de sc ended.  The men did not a r r i v e  on 
the c l i f f s  o v e r l o o k i n g  T a n g e n  until 0430 h o urs on April 14, 
1945. Major Colby and S e r ge an t La n g e l a n d  then went out on 
r e c o n n a i s s a n c e  with the rest of their unit close behind.
Colby and L a n g e l a n d  st um bled on to a house. There 
was no e v i d e n c e  of ski tr ac ks  there. They e n t ered  the 
h o u s e  and found a f a m i l y  that had been e v a c u a t e d  from 
F i n n m a r k .  They said that fre quent German pat ro ls passed 
t h r o u g h  Tange n,  but the bridge itself was not guarded.
1 78
W h i l e  L a n g e l a n d  v i s i t e d  with the family, Colby in s p e c t e d  
15
the bridge. The rest of the unit moved into the house.
T e l e p h o n e  w i res  wer e cut, i s o l a t i n g  the c o m m u n i t y  from the 
16
o u t s i d e  world. Four teams c o n v e r g e d  on the bridge.
L i e u t e n a n t  F a r n s w o r t h  led the d e m o l i t i o n  team, the three
ot h e r  team s a p p r o a c h e d  from t h ree di rections. It was
da y l i g h t ,  and the snow was glossy  enough  to alert the
c o m m u n i t y  to ski and foot m o v e m e n t s .  Once e v e ry bo dy was in
pos i t i o n ,  L i e u t e n a n t  F a r n s w o r t h  and his team set their
d e m o l i t i o n  c h a r g e s  of eighty pou n d s  of plastic e x p l o s i v e s
on the bridge. The b r id ge was twelve m e t e r s  long and had
four I - b e a m  s t r i n g e r s  of o n e - i n c h  metal. The men then
r e d e p l o y e d  on the h e i g h t s  o v e r l o o k i n g  the bridge to await a 
17
train .
The D e s t r u c t i o n  of T a n g e n  B r id ge  and the G r u e l i n g  Es ca pe
The br av ad o plan of d e s t r o y i n g  a br id ge  and d r o p p i n g
a tr ain into the river bel ow was not going to take place at
18
T a n g e n .  Major Colby posted l o o k o u t s  with w a l k i e - t a l k i e s
and b i n o c u l a r s  to insure that a s o u t hb ou nd train heard in
1 9
the d i s t a n c e  did not carry N o r w e g i a n  civilia ns.  The
g r o u p  wa nt e d  to catch a Ge rman troop train right on top of
the b r i d g e  at Ta ngen so that both could be blown up at the 
20
same time. An hour passed  and no train came t o w ar ds
T a n ge n.  Colby gave the order to blow the bridge at 0630
21
hours , April 14, 1945. A m e r i c a n  should er pa t c h e s  were 
left be hi nd so that the G e r m a n s  would not take rep r i s a l s
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a g a i n s t  the people at Tangen.
Then the a d r e n a l i n  b e gan  to pump: all the men kne w
that the G e r m a n s  w o ul d d e f i n i t e l y  be in hot pursuit of them
th i s  time. RYPE  had to ou tski  German t r o o p - c a r r y i n g  
23
tr u cks . Some of the i n l a n d  roads to Sweden had already
been cl e a r e d  of snow. A l t h o u g h  they left their t o b o g g a n s
b e h i n d  and l i g h t e n e d  their e s c a p e  loads, it would be a
g r u e l i n g  return. There was little food left. Ge rm an
24
p a t r o l s  were sighted, but no contact was made. Hans
L e i r m o , a c h a m p i o n  c r o s s - c o u n t r y  skier, set the fast 
25
pace. B e c a u s e  the men were a l r ead y tired, a short rest
stop was m a d e  at O i i n g e n  a g a i n . A sp ot ti ng plane was heard
o ve r h e a d ,  but not seen. At 2400  hours, the unit de p a r t e d
O i i n g e n  and went via L a n g r a s h e i a ,  B r a n d h e i a , and to Flaa
Lake, w h ere  a short rest stop and br ea kfast was made at
0 9 0 0  hours. At 1200 hours, April 15, 1945, the unit
d e p a r t e d  and went via Dal Lake, Aasvas Lake to G ommelie n,
a r r i v i n g  about 2200 hours. A s ubsta nt ial rest was planned,
but L i e u t e n a n t  Hoel s p o t t e d  a t w e n t y - f i v e  man Ge rm an ski
p at r o l  on the p r o min en t point of Tjo klien, and m o t i v a t e d
the unit to mov e on inste ad. At 0600 hours, the unit m o v e d
on to G r o n h a u g e n ,  a s t eep  hill that was later named
B e n z a d r i n e  Hill, (becaus e the stimula nt was needed to c l i m b
it), F i s k e l o s b o k n , N y a m o c o k k a , to the W O O D L A R K  base in 
26
Sw eden. The eight men at W O O D L A R K  we lc omed the men of 
RYPE, who were exh au sted and had had little food in three
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days, with a wo n d e r f u l  dinner of Swedis h f i s h b a l l s  in w h it e
27
s a uce and b o i l e d  po tat oes. Elk was also on the menu.
Colby,  Hoel , L a n g e l a n d ,  and La rsen left on W e d n e s d a y  to
28
r e t u r n  to J a e v s j o  to get the radio  in op e r a t i o n  again.
The rest of the unit under  L i e u t e n a n t  Sather re t u r n e d  to
J a e v s j o  via a mo r e  le i s u r e l y  route th ro ug h Sweden. On
April 18, 1945, RYP E was back at Jaevsjo. So were Se r g e a n t
Oi st ad and his four men who were m i s t a k e n l y  dropped in 
29
Sweden. S w e d i s h  I n t e l l i g e n c e ,  with a wink, had s p i r i t e d
30
t he m out of the i n t e r n m e n t  camp at Falun.
I n f i l t r a t i o n  of N O R S O  Gr ou p to Target
In a m e m o r a n d u m  on April 16, 1945, Lieuten an t C o l onel
Hans H. Skabo, S e c tion  Chief, N O RS O Op erations, o u t l i n e d
the gr adual i n f i l t r a t i o n  of the Second Gro up into N o r w a y
from S w e d e n  to the Chief of Special Op e r a t i o n s  (SO) at
Sp e c i a l  F o r c e  H e a d q u a r t e r s  in London. He stated that thr ee
o f f i c e r s  and th i r t e e n  e n l i s t e d  men were in Norway. The
five in S w e d e n  were to i n f i l t r a t e  back into Norway, as
a p p r o p r i a t e  a r r a n g e m e n t s  had been made with the S w e d i s h
S t ate Police. Four men of Major C o l b y ’s or igin al  group
we r e  still in the U n i t e d  Kingdom. They were:
T/Sgt. Knut Joa
T/5 Otto T w i n g l e y
Cpl. Ve rnon L. A u s treng
T/5 W i lt on M. Ra sm ussen
T h e s e  men were to be pr ov i d e d  passpor ts  and c l o t h i n g  for
their i n f i l t r a t i o n  to the original  group. The f o l l o w i n g
men were to follow:
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T/4 Einar M. K r i s t i a n s e n
T/4 Otis L. Ause n
T/5 H a r o l d  A n d e r s e n
C p l . Arne M . Hoff
1st L t . John W. K r oona
L t . Col. G e rhar d L. B o l l a n d
The DS/US, a t o p - r a n k i n g  A m e ric an  o f f i c e r  at Special 
F o r c e s  H e a d q u a r t e r s  in London, was to ar r a n g e  for the 
i n f i l t r a t i o n  of the f o l l o w i n g  men upon his visit to 
St o c k h o l m :
T/Sgt. C l i f f o r d  G. Kyllo
1st L t . Roger W. Hall
S / S g t / John T. H a l v o r s e n
T/5 Mo rris A. Sy rstad
T/5 J or g e n  F. A n d e r s e n
T/5 De lphis L. Bonin
T/5 Be r n a r d  W. T a l l a k s e n
T/5 T o rleif  S. Jo h a n s e n
T/5 Rolf L i l l e b y
Ma j . John M. O l m s t e d
Cpl. Karl L a r s e n
S/Sgt . Ge orge G. Bo os alis
Cpt . Otto N. Feher
T/5 D e m e t r i u s  Fr angis
S/Sgt Bor is Sp ir of f
T/5 Olav J. Eide
T/5 Elmer K v a s a g e r
T/5 H a r o l d  E. Ness
S/Sgt. E r ling  E. Olsen
T/5 Albert N o r d a n g
T/5 E rl i n g  R. S a l vesen
T/5 Paul N. Fr angas
T/5 Gus L. Pa lan s
1st Sgt . T h e o p h a n e s  G. S t r i me nos
Cpl. John Sunde
T/5 Steve P. M a r t h i a k a s
Cpl . W i l l i a m  Jo hn son
Pvt . B e r n a r d  F. Brady
P v t . Mik e M o u n t o u r i s
PFC Nol an R. Cooper
N o n - N o r w e g i a n s  wo uld sup ple me nt the group b e c a u s e  the 
p r i ma ry  source of N o r w e g i a n  vo lu nteers, the 99th In fa ntry  
B a t t a l i o n  ( s e p arate ) was u n d e r s t r e n g t h . The men wo uld  be
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m o v e d  in small gr oup s in the order listed. The men liste d 
a b o v e  were to be given r e f r e s h e r  tr a i n i n g  as radio 
o p e r a t o r s  so that they could be in con tact with London.
C o l onel G e r h a r d  B o l l a n d  would be the c o m m a n d e r  of the
a u g m e n t e d  g r oup in the field. He had been a s s i s t a n t  to the
Ch i e f  of N O R S O  Group, Spec ial  Forces H e a d q u a r t e r s  since its
i n c e p t i o n  and w o u l d  be q u a l i f i e d  to c o m m a n d  the c o m b i n e d
G r o u p  C o mm and for N O R S O  O p e r a t i o n s .  L i e u t e n a n t  John Kroo n a
wo u l d  f a m i l i a r i z e  h i m s e l f  with the supply pr o c e d u r e  and its
m o v e m e n t  to Swed en f ro m the U n i t e d  Kingdom, then join
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C a p t a i n  D a m m e n 's o r g a n i z a t i o n  in Sweden.
RYPE and Lo nd o n  had not been in radio contact for ten 
da ys  when on April 18, 1945, RYP E  report ed  that the bridge
at T a n g e n  had been d e s t r o y e d  wi th out ca su a l t i e s .  RYP E also 
r e p o r t e d  that O i s t a d ' s  group, which  was b r i efl y de t a i n e d  in
Sw eden, was with RYPE. The unit also r e q u e s t e d  drops of
food and d e m o l i t i o n s  at Fi eld  Names ARES and MARS. Ma jo r 
C o l b y  asked to meet APOLLO, an u n i d e n t i f i e d  staff memb e r  at 
Sp ecial  Forces H e a d q u a r t e r s ,  about supply of the Lierne 
are a as a po s s i b l e  l o c a t i o n  for training  N o r w e g i a n  p a t r i o t s  
in this re mo te  area and also with  the W A X W I N G  (British) 
par ty to ma k e  plans to r e c o n n o i t e r  Li erne for p o s sibl e 
G e r m a n  activity . RYPE was p l a n n i n g  to blow the rails in 
the v i c in it y of Lu ru dal next week.
On April 20, 1945, L o n d o n  t r a n s m i t t e d  a m e s s a g e  of
c o n g r a t u l a t i o n s  for a job well done: (1) S e i z i n g  the
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L i e r n e  area ne ed ed SHA EF  approv al ; (2) Air re s u p p l y  was
i m p o s s i b l e :  su p p l i e s  w o u l d  have to come t h r ough  Sweden;
and (3) R Y P E  was to pr oce ed  on the Lurudal job.
On Apri l 21, 1945, RYPE c o n tac te d London, ask ing:
(1) why Bernt B a l c h e n  could not supply it by air; (2) R Y P E
u n d e r s t o o d  - that it was not to sw eep the Lierne area of
G e r m a n  acti vi ty, but p l a n n i n g  for it should pro ceed,  and;
(3) RYPE a s ked if lar ge da ylight drops from the U n i t e d
K i n g d o m  w o ul d be p o s s i b l e  later on, a s s uming  the L i er ne
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a r e a  was secure d.
M e m o r a n d u m  of D e ta il s from C o l b y  to Skabo
On April  19, 1945, Major Col by wrote a m e m o r a n d u m  to 
L i e u t e n a n t  C o l onel  Hans Skabo in which Col by d e t a i l e d  the 
s i t u a t i o n  to date for O p e r a t i o n  RYPE. Colby o p en ed  by 
t h a n k i n g  Sk ab o for his role in get tin g T/Sgt. Leif O i s t a d ’s 
gr ou p out of Sw eden and to Jaevsjo. Becaus e they only had 
one u n i f o r m  a m on g them, Col by wanted  S g t . C l i f f o r d  Kyllo, 
the N O RSO P r o c u r e m e n t  Serge ant, to supply them with  more 
u n i f o r m s  and m i l i t a r y  equi pm ent. Colby rem ar ked that the 
men who cam e from S w e d e n  had some pretty cl ass y c i v i l i a n  
c l o t h i n g  on them. C o lby fell short of asking who their 
tailor wa s .
Colby obs er ved that a German  attack on Ja e v s j o  was 
al w a y s  a p o s s i b i l i t y .  There were rumors in Sn aas a that 
A l lied  p a r a t r o o p e r s  wer e in the area. With all of the 
a b o r t e d  drop s by our planes, the Ge rmans wou ld  most likely
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t h i n k  that a large r group was in place. In turn, the 
G e r m a n s  might send a large group to atta c k  Jaevsjo.
Colby stated that he ne ede d the Second N O R S O  Group 
badly. It c o ul d live on the Sw edish side of the border 
un ti l the sno w mel ted. Colby still wanted to ta ck le  the 
G r a n a  B r i d g e .
Colby was a g g r a v a t e d  about the W O O D L A R K  que stion.
His O.S.S. i n s t r u c t i o n s  were that since W O O D L A R K  was a 
B r i t i s h  show, W O O D L A R K  and RYPE could not p a r t i c i p a t e  in 
joint o p e r a t i o n s .  D e s p i t e  this, Colby had bor ro wed three 
m en from W O O D L A R K  to dest roy the bridge at Tangen. The 
m o r e  people that were used, the more da mage could be 
i n f l i c t e d  on the enemy. Colby stated that Br i t i s h  Sp ec ial 
O p e r a t i o n s  E x e c u t i v e  po lit i c s  had no place in the m o u n t a i n s  
of Norway. A m e r i c a n s  were in Norway whether B r i t a i n  liked 
it or not: let us wo r k  tog ether.
The next proj ect for RYPE  was to blow the r a ils in 
the v i c in it y of Lurudal . Colby planned on using small 
g r o u p s  of men to co nduct a s i m u l t a n e o u s  strike. Colby 
s u g g e s t e d  that since the U.S. Army Air For ce would not fly 
fro m the U n i t e d  K i n g d o m  after the next moon period, why not 
ma ke  the drop from Stoc k h o l m ?  (Colby assumed that Sweden 
was about to a b a n d o n  its n e u t r a l i t y  and would join the 
A l l i e s  ag a i n s t  Ger m a n y . )  Colby thought that Bernt 
B a l c h e n ’s F o r t r e s s e s  could do the job. Colby had 
i d e n t i f i e d  f o r war d bases for drops of c o n t a i n e r s  to be
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h i d d e n  until used for s a b o t a g e  oper at ions, c l oser  to the
t a r g e t s .
Colb y also s u g g e s t e d  that all the p a c k a g i n g  of
s u p p l i e s  be don e in S t o c k h o l m  so that no d u p l i c a t i o n  of
33
o r d e r s  wou ld exist.
Th e Lu r u d a l  Caper
On April 23, 1945, a r e i n f o r c e d  RYPE party p r o c e e d e d
to the S k a r t n e s  Seter (a su mm e r  dairy) via L i l l e f j e l 1 et ,
F i s k l o s a  Lake, S e i sj oen Lake, Andorsjo'en Lake, Gaos Lake,
/
S k j o r s t o h a u g e n  , Agle Seter, and Berg Seter. On April 25,
1945, the S k a r t n e s  Seter was used as a m a r s h a l l i n g  point.
34
The men were as fo llo ws (their true names):
Agn ar A n d e r s e n 
Ro be rt  A n d e r s e n  
Odd A n d e r s o n 
Knut A n d r e a s e n  
W i l l i a m  Colby 
Einar El i a s s e n 
Glen F a r n s w o r t h  
As mu nd  Gravdal 
Jo rg e n  Ha vik 
H e r b e r t  H e l g e s e n  
Ed H o v l a n d  
Fred Jo h a n s e n  
Kai Jo h a n s e n  
Borge L a n g e l a n d  
Harald Larsen 
Han s Leir m o  
Tor alf Lian 
Arne L i s teid 
Jon Moa n 
M a r i n u s  M y r l a n d  
Hal vor Nipe 
Leif Oi st a d  
Alf P a u l s e n  
Matti Raivio  
Tom Ru sda l 
Tom Sathe r 
Bertie W e s t g o t e  
Sivert Windh
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The loads c a r r i e d  by the men d u r i n g  this op eratio n were
m u c h  li g h t e r  and the d i s t a n c e  to the target area was
35
s h o r t e r  than to Tangen. The o b j e c t i v e  was to take out as
m any rails po ssible with small ch ar ge s on i s o lat ed  p o r t i o n s
36
of the N o r d l a n d  Railway. S c o u t s  found that a Ge rman
g u a r d h o u s e  - was right in the m i d d l e  of the mile and a half
37
s e gmen t of ra ilw ay to be dest r o y e d .  There was no moon
38
that would aid the escape.
The men were d i v id ed into eight teams. Hans Leirmo,
the local guide, joined S e r g e a n t  Alf P a u l s e n ’s team  as its
f ou r t h  me mber. The tea ms left S k a r t n e s  at s t a g g e r e d  times
39
to ar ri v e  on the tracks s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  at 2330 hours.
The men p r e p a r e d  the c h a r g e s  in advance. They were
d e s i g n e d  to wrap around the r a i l s  at the fish pl ates w h ere
they were joined. That w o u l d  damage the rails up to two
40
feet on each side of the joint. Every team c a r ri ed
t h irty  rail c h a r g e r s  joined in pairs and had i n s t r u c t i o n s
to place them  over a l t e r n a t e  fish plates. Tw o men were to
41
af fix  the charge, the third to set the fuse. The fuse
co uld  be a c t i v a t e d  by p u l l i n g  a small wire: d e t o n a t i o n
wou ld come ten se co nds later. One could pull one wire, run
down the track  and pull an other, until all the c h a r g e s  were
42
a c t i v a t e d  and exploded. The rails were twelve  me ters
43
long. Each team was r e s p o n s i b l e  for 200 meters of track.
The men were to i g n i t e  the ch arge s at 2345 hou rs on a 
gre en signal flare from Colby. The teams were then to
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w i t h d r a w  to S k a r t n e s s  and try to escap e as a unit. If the
f l are was not fired, the e x p l o s i o n s  on the rails would
b e g i n  at 2350 hours. This did happen: C o l b y ’s tea m was
too c l o s e  to the Ge rm an  g u a r d hou se . A c r e s c e n d o  of
e x p l o s i o n s  followed. The Ge r m a n s  were c o m p l e t e l y  caught by 
44
s u r p r i s e .  _ The e x p l o s i o n s  s o u nded like a heavy 
45
b o m b a r d m e n t .  A German flare went off fifty yar ds from
C o l b y ’s team. A bullet kick ed a pebble into C o l b y ’s face.
He i n s t r u c t e d  Sergeant Si ve rt Win dh not to r e tu rn  fire with
his B r o w n i n g  a u t o m a t i c  rifle: he did not want to tell the
46
G e r m a n s  that a regular unit was in the area. One hu n d r e d
ni n e  d o u b l e  c h a r g e s  de s t r o y e d  218 rails, for a d i s t a n c e  of
two and o n e - h a l f  k i l o m e t e r s .  The mi ssion  was a c o m p l e t e
47
su c c e s s .  R Y P E ’s es cape was next on the agenda.
The E s c a p e  Back to Ja ev sjo
In the d a r k n e s s  that same night, a German tunn el
guard had shot seve ral vo l l e y s  from his rifle t o w a r d s  Maj or
C o l b y ’s group. German m a c h i n e  gun fire was shot at
L i e u t e n a n t  S a t h e r ’s group. The Ge r m a n s  were fi ri n g  flares
to try to i l l u m i n a t e  their att a c k e r s .  The A m e r i c a n s
a s s e m b l e d  to check for c a s u a l t i e s  before mo vi n g  to escape.
The r e n d e z v o u s  at the S k a r t n e s s  Seter (summer dairy
48
b u i l d i n g )  proved that RYPE had no cas ual ti es. One RYPE 
o p t i m i s t  b o iled some wat er for co ff e e  to enjoy at the hut
49
a f t e r  the attack, but there w o uld be no time to dri nk  it.
A r e p o r t  of men m o v i n g  up the trail m o t i v a t e d  R Y P E ’s quick
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d e p a r t u r e .  The same ro ute was to be used again, except
50
that the unit passed to the east of Se i s j o e n  Lake. The
unit took  a r o u n da bout r o ute to point the German  pat rols in
the w r o n g  d i r e c t i o n  until a s n o w s t o r m  c o v ered R Y P E ’s tracks
51
in the d i r e c t i o n  they took  towar d Sweden.
The snow was c r isp and the skiing was good. When
d a y b r e a k  came, RYPE took a break and ate some B r i t i s h  field
ra t i o n s .  The pe mic an in side them was n o u r i s h i n g  but not
very  tasty. They spent the rest of the day putt in g as much
d i s t a n c e  as po ssible  b e t w e e n  them and Ge rm a n  ski patrols.
F i v e - m i n u t e  breaks were the norm. On one of these breaks,
52
one man fell as leep on his ski poles.
To slow down the Germans, live e x p l o s i v e s  wer e left
behi n d  on the trail. These were not powerf ul  enou g h  to do
s e r i o u s  h a r m  in the event they were d e t o na te d by a casual
N o r w e g i a n  skier. Hills had to be climbed; there bei ng no
way a r o u n d  them. The men were exhaust ed,  but B e n z a d r i n e
Hill was still ahead. W i t h  the aid of b e n z adrine , the unit
made it to the top. Thi s was the last m o u n t a i n  on the way
to camp. On April 26, 1945, the unit a r r ive d at Jaevsj o
a f ter a r o u n d a b o u t  tour t h r o u g h  Sweden. The men had
t r e k k e d  th ro ugh d i f f icul t terrain, had quietly a p p r o a c h e d
and d a m ag ed the target areas, and after the natural strain
of an attack, trekked their fifty k i l o m e t e r  return wi th out 
53
a whi mp er.
At Jaevsjo, a Lapp who was te n d i n g  his rei ndeer,
190
r e p o r t e d  that he had d i s c o v e r e d  a plane wre c k a g e  on
P l u k k e t j e r n  Fjell, a m o u n t a i n  nearby. The unit p l a n n e d  a
54
n i g h t ' s  rest befor e s e a r c h i n g  for PLANE JONES.
M e m o r a n d u m  to Maj or C o lb y from SN/NOR
On A p ri l 25, 1945, SN/NOR, (author a s s u m e s  that he 
was the r a n k i n g  N o r w e g i a n  of f i c e r  at Special Fo rces  
H e a d q u a r t e r s  in Lo ndo n)  sent a m e m o r a n d u m  t h r o u g h  
V A U D E V I L L E ,  W e s t f i e l d  Miss i o n ,  (Special Forces  H e a d q u a r t e r s  
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  for its S c a n d i n a v i a n  op er a t i o n s )  to Major 
Colby. It c o v er ed  the r e s ul ts so far of O p e r a t i o n  RYPE and 
also the t h i n k i n g  to date of h i gher  h e a d q u a r t e r s  tow ard 
RYPE. He t h a n k e d  C o lby  for his exc ellent w r i t t e n  r e p or ts  
and p r a i s e d  Bo rg e L a n g e l a n d  for his superior  radio reports.
S N / N O R  le ar ned  that P L A N E  BERGE had c r a s h e d  in the 
O r k n e y  Is lands.  The b o d i e s  had been flown into H a r r i n g t o n  
and b u ried at C a m b r i d g e  C e m e t e r y  on April 6, 1945. That 
was the same date for the d i s p a t c h  of the last three 
planes, two of w h i c h  c a r r i e d  per sonnel. T/Sgt. Knu te Joa 
and three men and the supply plane returned. P L A N E  JONES, 
the third, did not return. Lie u t e n a n t  Blane E. Jones, 
B e r n a r d  N. Iverson, K n u t e  J. Falck, and Ro bert  N. A n d e r s o n  
were still missin g.  The m e s s a g e  that RYPE heard a plane 
cr a s h  f i f t e e n  m i l e s  west of R Y PE's posit ion s u g g e s t e d  to 
Sp e c i a l  F o rc es  H e a d q u a r t e r s  that this may have been PL ANE  
JONES. S F H Q  c o n t e n d e d  that no more men sh ould  have to be 
put to such h igh risk of death. SFHQ made the d e c i s i o n  to
191
halt all air supplie s: they w o u l d  come to RYPE via M I L O R G
in S t o c k h o l m  only.
M I L O R G  in S t o c k h o l m  i n d i c a t e d  that all men to be 
i n f i l t r a t e d  into No rw ay  must have N o r w e g i a n  cover n a me s and 
N o r w e g i a n  p a s s p o r t s . H e a d q u a r t e r s  could then send in the 
N o r w e g i a n - S p e a k i n g  men in t e a m s  of six. Other a r r a n g e m e n t s  
wo ul d h ave to be made with M I L O R G  in S t o c k h o l m  to 
i n f i l t r a t e  n o n - N o r w e g i a n  s p e a k i n g  men, such as the G r e e k s 
and the I t a l ians .
S N / N O R  c o n g r a t u l a t e d  C o l b y  for the fine job at 
Ta ngen . The S N / N O R  thoug ht that there were three o f f i c e r s  
and t h i r t e e n  e n l is ted men, but Colby re po r t e d  that there 
w e r e  t w e n t y - f o u r .  In the f o r t h c o m i n g  report C o lb y was to 
i d e n t i f y  h o w  many N o r w e g i a n  l o c a l s  had been r e c r u i t e d  and 
w h e t h e r  they were in u n i f o r m  or not. M I L O R G  had a role for 
t h e s e  men. S N / N O R  said that the locals should not be 
r e c r u i t e d  for RYPE b e c a u s e  of possible German r e p r i s a l s  
a g a i n s t  th es e men and their families. Colby should not 
v i o l a t e  S H A E F  policy.
S N / N O R  said the L i erne Plan, to train new r e c r u i t s  
for M I L O R G  s h oul d be d o r m a n t  b e ca us e RYP E and W O O D L A R K  were 
too small in the number of men to defend Lierne, shou l d  the 
G e r m a n s  have a no tio n to take it. Sweden was the l i n c h p i n  
for N o r w a y  at the moment: C o lb y was not to e m b a r r a s s  the
S w e d i s h  G o v e r n m e n t  in front of German off i c i a l s  with 
bl at an t o p e r a t i o n s  against N o rwa y that ap p e a r e d  to come
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fr o m  S w e d e n .
S N /NOR  ordered First L i e u t e n a n t  John Kroona to
pr o c e e d  to S t o c k h o l m  to assist C a p t a i n  Dammen in the M I L O R G
sup ply  area and to be in c h a r g e  of r e s u p p l y i n g  RYPE.
R Y P E ' s  m i s s i o n  was to c o n t i n u e  h a r a s s i n g  the N o r d l a n d
Railway. Again, SN/NOR c o n g r a t u l a t e d  Op e r a t i o n  RYPE, and
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also w i shed the group the best of luck.
R e p o r t  on RYPE  by AP OL LO
On April 27, 1945, A P O L L O  of the W e s t f i e l d  M i s s i o n  
sent a m e m o r a n d u m  to Skabo , SN/US and M i l l e r  in whi ch he 
s u m m e d  up V A U D E V I L L E ’S field visit to O p e r a t i o n  RYP E on 
A p ril 23, 1945. V A U D E V I L L E  ret u r n e d  to S t o c k h o l m  on April 
27, 1945, and rep or ted that he was i m p r ess ed  with the m o r a l e  
and o r g a n i z a t i o n  of O p e r a t i o n  RYPE, whose party then 
c o n s i s t e d  of twenty A m e r i c a n s  and ten Norw egians.  The 
t o p i c s  of d i s c u s s i o n  with M a jo r Colby were mostly of 
r e s u p p l y  and future o p e r a t i o n s .  There was a q u e s t i o n  of 
a m e n d i n g  the present Field Orders, w h ic h only pr ovided for 
a t t a c k s  on the N o r d l a n d  Railway.
A P O L L O  asked in his m e s s a g e  w h e t h e r  or not the 
N o r d l a n d  Ra i l w a y  rem ai n e d  an im p o r t a n t  target for S H A E F . 
S H A E F  a p p e a r e d  to favor a more pa ssive policy of k e e p i n g  
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  n e t w o r k s  intact for the li be r a t i o n  of 
No rway. V A U D E V I L L E  thought that RYPE's franchi se  would be 
t e r m i n a t e d  should SHA EF fo llow this new policy.
V A U D E V I L L E  thought that RYPE's  Field Or de rs  shoul d be
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a m e n d e d  to i n c lude the L i er ne  co nt i n g e n c y  plan so that
local N o r w e g i a n s  c o ul d be r e c r u i t e d  to e v e n t u a l l y  dr ive the
G e r m a n s  out of cent ral Norway. The area in que st io n was
west to S t e i n k j a e r ,  n o r t h  to Namsos, and east to the S w e d i s h
border. Colby wou ld re fr ain from guerill a w a r fare until
a u t h o r i z e d 'by SHAEF. C o lb y said Lieu te nant Hans Hoel had
the w h e r e w i t h a l  to r e c r u i t  the locals. R e s uppl y by air for
such an e x p a n d e d  o p e r a t i o n  could be done during the
f o r t h c o m i n g , s u m m e r . A P O L L O  wanted  L o n d o n ’s t h o u g h t s  on the 
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m a tter  .
C o l b y ’s R e a c t i o n  to the Highe r H e a d q u a r t e r s  Rebuff
Maj or C o lby pa r r i e d  wit h the h i e r a r c h i e s  in both
S t o c k h o l m  and Lo nd on  over his Lierne Plan. In a seri e s  of
m e s s a g e s  af te r the rail d e m o l i t i o n  job, Colby was
c o n g r a t u l a t e d  for a job well done, yet told to heed to the
game plan of h i ghe r h e a d q u a r t e r s  or be dis ci plined.  In a
m e s s a g e  dated April 25, 1945, and received on the next day,
Lo nd o n  wan t e d  to know the names of the men Colby sent out
on an o r g a n i z a t i o n  missi on : M20 of M I L O R G  pr ef erred them
to go e l s e w h e r e .  In an o t h e r  me s s a g e  dated April 25, 1945,
and r e c e i v e d  by RYPE the next day, MILO R G  ordered the
W O O D L A R K  men to go back to their base. In addition, Colby
was told not to enlis t M I L O R G  members. W O O D L A R K  was to
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beg in  as a M I L O R G  p r o t e c t i o n  party.
On April 28, 1945, London radi oed c o n g r a t u l a t i o n s  on
the s u c c e s s f u l  rail d e s t r u c t i o n  and that its de c i s i o n  on
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the L i e r n e  Plan was to come next week. On May 1, 1945,
L o n d o n  r a d i o e d  that R Y P E ’s m i s s i o n  was to mak e small and
f r e q u e n t  a t t a c k s  on the r a i l r o a d ,  but not to ta ckl e the
G r a n a  Br id ge.  W O O D L A R K  r e c e i v e d  orders to p r o ce ed  on
M I L O R G ’s o r i g i n a l  orders. The L i er ne  P lan could not be
a u t h o r i z e d  for o b v i o u s  r e a s o n s .  Colby ra d i o e d  back that he
did not u n d e r s t a n d  what wa s m e a n t  by " o b v i o u s  r e a s o n s . "  On
Ma y  2, 1945, he ple ade d his c a s e  to L o n d o n  c o n t e n d i n g  that
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R Y P E  had the w h e r e w i t h a l  to o r g a n i z e  a g u e r r i l l a  force.
Wh at  C o lb y did not k n o w  was that S H A E F  was c o n d u c t i n g
a ver y  d e l i c a t e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  w i t h  the G e r m a n  High Co m m a n d
over the d i s p o s i t i o n  of its t r o o p s  in Norway. The Allies,
had they gi ve n carte b l a n c h e  to Colby, w o u l d  have r e n e g e d
on their p r o m i s e  that G e r m a n  t r o o p s  w o uld be a l l o w e d  to
m a k e  an o r d e r l y  w i t h d r a w a l  f rom Norway. A f l a m b o y a n t
a c t i o n  in L i e r n e  w o u l d  be d a m a g i n g  and i n a p p r o p r i a t e .
C o l b y  w as  then not in no p o s i t i o n  to kno w how po li cy was
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f o r m u l a t e d  at the h i g h e s t  l e vel of comman ds.
B u r i a l  of the Men of P L A N E  J O N E S
On Ap ri l 28, 1945, R Y P E  found P L A N E  JONES. It 
a p p e a r e d  to h a v e  hit the top of the m o u n t a i n ,  then slid 
down the w e s t e r n  slope. All i n d i c a t i o n s  were that all 
c r e w m e n  and p a s s e n g e r s  had bee n  killed i n s t ant ly . The 
b o d i e s  w er e i d e n t i f i e d  and r e m o v e d  from the s c a t t e r e d  
w r e c k a g e .  R YP E m e m b e r s  w r a p p e d  the b o di es  in p a r a c h u t e s  
and b u r i e d  them in a rock cave o v e r l o o k i n g  Lang Lake.
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P l a c e d  over  the grave  was an Am e r i c a n  flag. A short
s e r v i c e  i n c l u d e d  t h r e e  r i f l e  vol leys. The men took
p i c t u r e s  of the scene  for the next of kin. B u rie d in the
60
g r a v e  in the f o l l o w i n g  o r de r from south to north:
1st L t . B l a n e  E. Jon es
Cpl. Knut J. Fal ck
T/ 5  - B e r n a r d  N. I v e r s o n
T/3 R o b e r t  N. A n d e r s o n
Jac k H. Spyke r 3 6 4 5 3 5 2 3  
F/ 0 R i c h a r d  A. Bos ch  0- 7 8 3 2 3 8
U n i d e n t i f i e d  air cr ewma n 
U n i d e n t i f i e d  B o m b a r d i e r  
U n i d e n t i f i e d  Air C r e w m e m b e r  
U n i d e n t i f i e d  Of fi ce r 
A n g e l o  S a n t i n i  4 2 0 0 3 3 7 3  
W i l l i a m  H. H u d s o n  0- 8 2 9 0 2 9
I d e n t i f i e d  a f t e r w a r d s  were:
L eo n  G. D i b b l e 
A r t h u r  H. B a r d k n e c h t  
G i l b e r t  L. M a g r u d e r  
F a y e t t e  Sh e l l e d y
A m a i l b a g  f o u n d  n e a r b y  was intact and c o n t a i n e d  mail
to R Y P E  f r o m  loved ones. U s u a l l y  it was fun to r e c e i v e
m a i l  in the N o r w e g i a n  w i l d e r n e s s ,  but not m u c h  fun in this 
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i n s t a n c e .
T he  E n c o u n t e r  W i t h  a G e r m a n  Patrol
The l o c a l s  w ho r e p o r t e d  to RYPE about G e r m a n  a c t i v i t y  
w a r n e d  that a f i f t y - m a n  G e r m a n  ski patrol was l o o k i n g  for 
the unit. S p e c i a l  F o r c e s  H e a d q u a r t e r s  said that M I L O R G  had 
other uses for the N o r w e g i a n s  r e c r u i t e d  by RYPE, and 
d e m a n d e d  that C o l b y  r e l e a s e  them, whi le at the same time, 
not e x p l a i n i n g  why. W i t h  the re le ase of men to W O O D L A R K  
and to W A X W I N G ,  R Y P E  was down to twenty  e f f e c t i v e  f i g h t i n g
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men. It was  only  a q u e s t i o n  of time be fore R Y P E  w o u l d  be
63
d i s c o v e r e d .
On May 2, 1945, S e r g e a n t  M a r i n u s  M y r l a n d  w as  on guar d 
64
duty. A f i v e - m a n  G e r m a n  p a t r o l  slid down the h i l l  and
65
w e n t  i m m e d i a t e l y  to the farm. Myrdal w a lk ed a r o u n d  the
far m  h o u s e  and fo und  h i m s e l f  face to face to the patrol who
had d r a w n  t h eir  m a c h i n e  pi s t o l s .  M y r l a n d  told t he m ca lmly
that they coul d shoot him, but there were t h i r t y  A m e r i c a n
p a r a t r o o p e r s  i n s i d e  who w ere q u i t e  ca p a b l e  of k i l l i n g  the
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five i n t r u d e r s .  S e v e r a l  m e m b e r s  of RYP E  s u r r o u n d e d  the
G e r m a n s .  The G e r m a n  F e l d w e b e r  (Sergeant) a g r e e d  to 
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s u r r e n d e r .  S u d d e n l y ,  a m e m b e r  of the N o r w e g i a n
R e s i s t a n c e  came f l y i n g  out of the hous e w i t h  a d r a w n
pi s tol . A s t a r t l e d  F e l d w e b e r  fired at him, w o u n d i n g  him in 
68
the st o m a c h .  The F e l d w e b e r  fired only one shot as it was
d i s c o v e r e d  l a t e r  that hi s m a c h i n e  pistol had jammed. The
f i v e  a r m e d  G e r m a n s  w er e k i l l e d  on the spot, RYP E  u s i n g  its
T h o m p s o n  s u b - m a c h i n e  guns. The N o r w e g i a n  R e s i s t a n c e
me m b e r ,  K a r l e  Berre, was gi ven p e n i c i l l i n  by F r e n  Joh a n s e n ,
then e v a c u a t e d  by sled to S w e d e n  on a f o r t y - k i l o m e t e r  trip
69
to S w e d i s h  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n .
In W o r l d  War II both s i d e s  u n d e r s t o o d  that g u e r i l l a
o p e r a t i o n s  co uld  not be e n c u m b e r e d  with p r i s o n e r s .  The
c a p t u r e d  G e r m a n s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  had to be k i l l e d  on the 
70
spot. On May 3, 1945, R YPE rad ioed L o n d o n  a b out  the 
71
f iref ight .
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V A U D E V I L L E S  L e t t e r  to C o l b y  on May 3, 1945
V A U D E V I L L E ’S l e t t e r  to Colby on May 3, 1945 st at ed 
tha t T/ 5  Siv e r t  W i nd h had a r r i v e d  in S t o c k h o l m  the day 
b e f o r e .  W i n d h  t h o u g h t  he had a p p e n d i c i t i s ,  but the d o c t o r  
f o u n d  a b l o c k e d  i n t e s t i n e  i n s t e a d  caused by d r i n k i n g  too 
m u c h  ice w a t e r  in the m o u n t a i n s .  W i n d h  w o u l d  r e t u r n  to 
J a e v s j o  w i t h  the next c o u r i e r .
E r i k  Ga u n d a l  r e p o r t e d  to M I L O R G  early in May that
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  of s u p p l i e s  to R Y P E  was i m p o s s i b l e  b e c a u s e
/
of the s p r i n g  thaws. The s u p p l i e s  that L o n d o n  could 
f u r n i s h  h ad been ord er ed. V A U D E V I L L E  was w o r k i n g  on 
a i r d r o p s  to J a e v s j o  f r o m  S t o c k h o l m .  As soon as N o r w e g i a n  
p a s s p o r t s  w e r e  made a v a i l a b l e ,  the rest of the N O R S O  G r ou p 
w o u l d  join RYPE.
V A U D E V I L L E  had d i s c u s s e d  the L i e r n e  Plan wit h  the 
S p e c i a l  F o r c e  H e a d q u a r t e r s  but got n o w h e r e  w i t h  it. L o n d o n  
w a n t e d  to sit on it for now. V A U D E V I L L E  s e n s e d  that the 
d e c i s i o n  came from the h i g h e s t  co mma nd  and that s o m e t h i n g  
wa s goin g on that b o t h  he and C o lb y wer e  not pr ivy  to know. 
L t . Col. H a n s  S k a b o , c h ie f of the S c a n d i n a v i a n  sec ti on, 
c o u l d  not co m e  to S t o c k h o l m  b e c a u s e  he se emed to be swept 
up in all the end of w a r - i n - E u r o p e  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  pr ocess.
V A U D E V I L L E  told C o l b y  to rad io L o n d o n  if there were 
food s h o r t a g e s  at J a e v s j o .  L a r g e - s c a l e  a i r l i f t  w o u l d  not 
be a v a i l a b l e  for about a m o n t h .  The S t o c k h o l m  rad io  
o p e r a t o r  was  o v e r l o a d e d ,  and the A m e r i c a n  L e g a t i o n  was
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m o n i t o r i n g  the O.S.S. t r a n s m i s s i o n s .  V A U D E V I L L E  s u g g e s t e d  
Colby c o n t a c t  L o n d o n  d i r e c t l y .  New c o de s and c r y s t a l s  wer e 
f o r t h c o m i n g .
V A U D E V I L L E  w r ote that, if ther e sh ould be a c o m p l e t e
G e r m a n  c a p i t u l a t i o n  in No r w a y ,  Colby might be i n s t r u c t e d  to
e n c o u r a g e  G e r m a n  p r i s o n e r s  to c r o s s  the border into S w e d e n
and c l a i m  to be d e s e r t e r s .  ( V A U D E V I L L E  knev; that R Y P E  could
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not feed t h e m .)
S o m e t h i n g  Big Was in the O f f i n g
/
The N o r w e g i a n  F o r s v a r e t s  O v e r k o m m a n d o  Fire (F.O.IV)
( N o r w e g i a n  Hig h  C o m m a n d )  w h i c h  c o n t r o l l e d  M I L O R G  in No rw ay ,
sent a t h r e e - p a r t  m e s s a g e  to N o r wa y. The m e s s a g e  also
w o u l d  a p pl y to RYPE.
F . O . I V  said that s h o u l d  t h er e be a c o m p l e t e  G e r m a n
c a p i t u l a t i o n ,  e v e r y o n e  sh ou l d  r e m a i n  calm. No h a rs h
a c t i o n s  wer e  to be t a k e n  a g a i n s t  Ge rman  Army p e r s o n n e l  nor
a g a i n s t  G e r m a n  and N o r w e g i a n  Nazi s. D i s c i p l i n e  was to be
the first o r der of b u s i n e s s .  C o m m u n i c a t i o n s  be t w e e n
s u b o r d i n a t e s  and s u p e r i o r s  a l i k e  woul d be m a i n t a i n e d  to the
h i g h e s t  d e g r e e  po s s i b l e .
All u n its in the field w e r e  to r e m a i n  in place.
Sh o u l d  G e r m a n y  opt to use N o r w a y  as a place for a last
stand, M I L O R G  w o uld have to r e m a i n  i n v i s i b l e  in order to 
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fight o n .
R Y P E  Kept in the Dark
On May 4, 1945, R Y P E  t w i c e  r a d io ed  London. The first
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m e s s a g e  a c k n o w l e d g e d  that R Y P E  w o uld  do n o t h i n g  until  
f u r t h e r  o r de rs. R Y P E  als o o b s e r v e d  that G e rma n t r o o p s  were 
w a l k i n g  south; that only t h ree to four t r ai ns a day p a s s e d  
c a r r y i n g  m a t e r i a l  only, and that the RYP E party was r u n n i n g  
out of food. In the s e c o n d  m e s s a g e ,  Colby c o m p l a i n e d  that 
R Y P E  had been p r o m i s e d  a n s w e r s  to many  q u e s t i o n s  to be sent 
via couri er , but no n e  had be e n  rec ei ved. RYPE had been
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c o m p l e t e l y  k ept  in the dar k a b o u t  the s t atus of the war.
It was a p p a r e n t  to R Y P E  fro m the news b r o a d c a s t s
that the war was soon to be over and that SH AE F had no more
use for RYPE. The men w a n t e d  to get in their last lic ks
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b e f o r e  a G e r m a n  s u r r e n d e r .
The nex t d a y ’s m e s s a g e  b r o u g h t  an i m m e d i a t e  r e s p o n s e :
R Y P E  w a n t e d  C o lby and L a n g e l a n d  to go into S t e i n k j a r  w i t h  a
w h i t e  flag to n e g o t i a t e  w i t h  the  local Ge rm an c o m m a n d e r .
L o n d o n  r e p l i e d  that R YPE wa s to stay in place, not m a k e  any
c o n t a c t  w i t h  the Germans,  and not make c o n tact  w ith M I L OR G,
ei ther.  D i s c i p l i n a r y  a c t i o n  w o u l d  resul t if R YP E did not 
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f o l l o w  o r d e r s .
M e s s a g e  t r a f f i c  got h e a v i e r  on May 6, 1945. RY P E  
said the c o u r i e r  a r r i v e d  w i t h o u t  answers. RYPE sent a long 
m e s s a g e  r e q u e s t i n g  a long list of c l o t h i n g  m a t e r i a l  and 
food needs. R Y P E  o b s e r v e d  t i r e d  and hu ngr y A u s t r i a n  
m o u n t a i n  t r o o p s  w a l k i n g  south. However, a G e r m a n  g r e n a d i e r  
r e g i m e n t  that f o l l o w e d  the m a p p e a r e d  to be w e l 1 - d i s c i p i i n e d  
and he a l t h y .  R Y P E  also r e l a y e d  m e s s a g e s  to and from
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W O O D L A R K .  L o n d o n  was c u r i o u s  a b out the G e r m a n  a c t i v i t y  in
77
the Sn aasa area.
R YP E also r e p o r t e d  on May 6, 1945 that the G e s t a p o
had m ad e a m a s s  a r r e s t  of t h i r t y  to forty  M I L O R G  p e r s o n n e l
in Ve rda l: e l e v e n  had e s c a p e d  and w a n t e d  to join R Y P E  and
not go to Sweden. N o r w e g i a n  B o r d e r  P o l i c e m a n  Jon A l b e r t s e n
a s s i s t e d  the G e s t a p o  in the w h i p p i n g s  of the M I L O R G  m e m b e r s
and R Y P E  r e q u e s t e d  that the B.B.C. b r o a d c a s t  his name so
that w o u l d  not h a p p e n  a g ain.  Also, the m e s s a g e
" S t o r m v a r s e l  Paa K y s t e n "  ( s t o r m  w a r n i n g s  a l o n g  the coast)
must not be b r o a d c a s t  fr o m  the B.B.C. in L o n d o n  as the
M I L O R G  g r ou p in Verd al was d e s t r o y e d .  (Once its true
m e a n i n g  is known, the m e s s a g e  m i g h t  c a u s e  Nazi i n f i l t r a t i o n
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of o t her M I L O R G  groups).
Th e  War Up N o rth
On May 17, 1944, N o r w e g i a n ,  B r i ti sh , Am e r i c a n ,  and 
R u s s i a n  n e g o t i a t i o n s  c o n c l u d e d  an a g r e e m e n t  for O p e r a t i o n  
Ju p i t e r ,  the d e c e p t i o n  plan of i n v a s i o n  of n o r t h e r n  Norway. 
A l o n g  w i t h  the R u s s i a n  i n v a s i o n  of F i n n m a r k ,  a cad re of 250 
N o r w e g i a n  troops, the I n d e p e n d e n t  M o u n t a i n  C o m p a n y  #2 under 
the co m m a n d  of C o l o n e l  Arne Dahl, would  a l s o  p a r t i c i p a t e .  
The N o r w e g i a n s  w o u l d  i n c l u d e  c i v i l i a n  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  teams 
to r e s t o r e  or der in F i n n m a r k  and show the flag of a stro n g  
N o r w e g i a n  m i l i t a r y  pr e s e n c e .  D a hl 's  unit a r r i v e d  in 
M u r m a n s k  on N o v e m b e r  7, 1944. On N o v e m b e r  11, 1944, D a h l ’s 
unit was a s s i g n e d  r e c o n n a i s s a n c e  duty a l o n g  the Tana River
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in Fin n m a r k .  The R u s s i a n s  gave Dahl c o m p l e t e  a u t h o r i t y  in 
79
F i n n m a r k .
Dahl went into the No M a n ’s Land not k n o w i n g  w h e r e
the W e h r m a c h t  was. T h e r e  w e r e  no c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  nor
i n t e l l i g e n c e  to aid his unit. In the m e a nt ime, two
c o m p a n i e s  of N o r w e g i a n  " p o l i c e "  troops, t r a in ed  in Sweden,
were flo wn into K i r k e n e s  in A m e r i c a n  plane s by Be rnt
B a l c h e n ’s crews fro m S t o c k h o l m .  Other units in Swed en
c r o s s e d  F i n n i s h  t e r r i t o r y  to join Dahl, w h o s e  force by
80
ear ly  1945 c o n s i s t e d  of 3 , 0 0 0  men.
D a h l ' s  fr e q u e n t  a n d  d e e p e r  pa trols found muc h
d e v a s t a t i o n  c a u s e d  by the r e t r e a t i n g  Ge rma n W e h r m a c h t .  In
Vadso, e i g h t y  p e rc ent of the b u i l d i n g s  had been d e s t r o y e d .
In B e r l e v a a g  the re we r e  no h o u s e s  left. S e v e n t y  pe ople
we r e  left s e a r c h i n g  in the r u i n s  for tins of food and
lum ber . D i p h t h e r i a  w a s  p r e s e n t  as peopl e wer e  l i v i n g  in
c a v e s  and mud huts. In G a m v i k ,  no ho us es wer e  left, nor
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w e r e  the re  any people.
Dahl m ad e dee per r e c o n n a i s s a n c e  t h r o u g h o u t  the 
w i n ter. D a h l ' s  unit came  u p o n  a maj or L u f t w a f f e  base at 
S k o g a n v a r r e .  The field was u ndefen de d, but h e a v i l y  b o o b y -  
t ra pp ed. In April, 1945, the N o r w e g i a n s  re ac he d 
L y n g e n f j o r d  w h ere they c l a s h e d  with Germa n troops. By the 
first wee k  of May, 1945, all of F i n n m a r k  was under 
N o r w e g i a n  c o n tr ol . The G e r m a n  20th M o u n t a i n  Army dug in at 
L y n g e n f j o r d  for a d e f e n s i v e  stand. Dahl could not a d v a n c e
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any f u r th er. On May 6, 1945, the R u s s i a n s  m y s t e r i o u s l y
b e ga n to w i t h d r a w  th eir 4 0 , 0 0 0  t r o o p s  from e a s t e r n
F i n n m a r k .  The N o r w e g i a n s  wer e  surpris ed : they were not
a w a r e  of the A l l i e d  se cre t n e g o t i a t i o n s  not to p a r t i t i o n
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N o r w a y  a f te r G e r m a n y ’s s u r r e n d e r .
Do Not P r o v o k e  the Ger m a n s :  K e e p  No rway Intact
In the Au tum n,  1944, S O E - t r a i n e d  N o r w e g i a n  a g e n t s  
a r r i v e d  in N o r w a y  to p r e p a r e  for the day of l i b e r a t i o n  and
to h e l p  M I L O R G  o r g a n i z e  its units. The R e s i s t a n c e  also
/
b e c a m e  p r e p a r e d  to take ove r in du s t r i e s ,  p o we r plants , and
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  lines . The m e m b e r s  were o r d e r e d  not to
e n g a g e  in c o m b a t  . M I L O R G  e s t a b l i s h e d  a s e r i e s  of m i l i t a r y
ba se s in the m o u n t a i n s ,  suc h as Elg in sou th c e n t r a l
No rw ay , B j o r n w e s t ,  n o r t h  of Bergen, and Vaag, n o r t h  of
K r i s t i a n s a n d . The idea was not to pr ovoke the G e r m a n s  and
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to k e e p  N o r w a y  inta ct.
U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  M I L O R G  ha d a h o r r i b l e  i n c i d e n t  in
April 1945, as 150 G e r m a n  t r o o p s  swept t h r o u g h  Elg and
s t u m b l e d  upo n  n i n e t y  N o r w e g i a n  soldiers. The N o r w e g i a n s
stood thei r gr oun d. By the t i m e  the f i r e f i g h t  wa s over,
f i f t y  G e r m a n  s o l d i e r s  we r e  k i l l e d  or wounded.  The
N o r w e g i a n s  lost s e v e n  men. F.0. in Lon don, who c o n t r o l l e d
M I L O R G ,  was f u r i o u s  over the u s e le ss b l o o dsh ed . Peter
Hnlst, C o m m a n d e r  of Elg, had some q u e s t i o n s  to answer.
84
Holst, h o w e v e r ,  had no o t h e r  c h oic e but to fight.
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H i g h  C o m m a n d s  Also Kept in the Dark
A f t e r  Adolf H i t l e r  c o m m i t t e d  s u i c i d e  in his B e r l i n
b u n k e r  on Ap ril 30, 1945, the G e r m a n  High C o m m a n d  was
m o r e  than re ad y to s u r r e n d e r  to the Allies. On May 4,
1945, it s u r r e n d e r e d  all t r o o p s  in n o r t h w e s t  Ger ma ny,
D e n m a r k ,  H o l l a n d  and N o r w a y  to F i e l d  M a r s h a l l  B e r n a r d  L.
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Mont g o m e r y  .
L i e u t e n a n t  G e n e r a l  F r a n z  Boehm, who had r e p l a c e d
G e n e r a l  N i k l a u s  von F a l k e n h o r s t  as C o m m a n d e r  of the G e r m a n
W e h r m a c h t  in Norw a y  in J a n ua ry , 1945, was h e s i t a n t .  On May
5, 1945, he still e x p e c t e d  to e s t a b l i s h  the n o t i o n  of a
" F e s t u n g  N o r w e g e n , "  a F o r t r e s s  Norway, w h e r e  G e r m a n  fo rc e s
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w o u l d  m a k e  a last stand.
The A l l i e s  had t r ie d to reach B o ehm  by w i r e l e s s  on
May 6 and 7, 1945. E v e n  a f te r u n c o n d i t i o n a l  s u r r e n d e r  on
M ay  6, 1945, Ge n e r a l  D w i g h t  D. E i s e n h o w e r  on May 7, 1945,
c o u l d  not even get a d i r e c t  -contact by rad io  to Boehm. The
G e r m a n  H i g h  C o m m a n d  r e e m p h a s i z e d  to B o e h m  that he was to
s u r r e n d e r  his forces. B o e h m  went on Oslo R a dio and told
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his G e r m a n  troo ps to obey their new su pe rio rs.
On the a f t e r n o o n  of May 8, 1945, a S H A E F  m i s s i o n  
a r r i v e d  in Oslo h e a d e d  by a Br i t i s h  B r i g a d i e r  (a ge n e r a l  
o f f i c e r ) .  This team p r o c e e d e d  i m m e d i a t e l y  to B o e h m ’s 
h e a d q u a r t e r s  near L i l l e h a m m e r ,  eighty m i les  n o rt h of Oslo. 
The t e a m  told B o e h m  to a s s e m b l e  his troops at key po in ts  
and d e m o b i l i z e .  Thi s w o u l d  be a c o m p l e t e  c a p i t u l a t i o n  of
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all G e rman forces in Norway.
B a l c h e n 1s R e c e p t i o n  at Bodo A i r f i e l d
On May 8, ] 945, Ber nt B a l c h e n  c o m m a n d e d  a flight of
ten A m e r i c a n  C-47s from K i r k e n e s  to the a i r f i e l d  at Bodo. 
The Ge rm a n  in the tower r a d i o e d  B a l c h e n  p e r m i s s i o n  to land. 
A L u f t w a f f e  " f o l l o w  me" truc k met the C-47s upon their 
l a n d i n g  to m a r s h a l l  them to their p a r k i n g  area. W h i l e  
taxii ng , the a i r c r e w s  o b s e r v e d  G e r m a n  JU8 8s and M e l 0 4 s  all 
ne a t l y  lined up on a n o t h e r  taxiway. Upon s h u t t i n g  down his 
en gine, Ba lc hen was met by a L u f t w a f f e  staff car dr iven by 
the Ge rma n Base C o m m a n d e r .  He s a luted B a l c h e n  and B a lc hen 
r e t u r n e d  the salute. Aft er  m e s s i n g  and q u a r t e r s  
a r r a n g e m e n t s  were made, the Ge rm an  c o m m a n d e r  tu rned his
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fleet of staff cars over to the a i r c r e w s  for their use.
On May 7, 1945, L o n d o n  r a d ioed RYP E the f o l l o w i n g  
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me s sa ge :
Enemy will under s u r r e n d e r  terms be o r d e r e d  to 
c o n c e n t r a t e  in severa l places in lower Na mdal area 
at Grong, Ek ke r , Sn aasa , St ei n k j a e r ,  Verdal, 
R i n n l e i r e t ,  L e v a n g e r  H u t m e n t  camps STOP i m p o r t a n t  
av oid any contact wit h enemy  STOP to a v oid c l a sh es 
if he s t ic ks  to te rms STOP you are not to d i s a r m  
en emy  S T O P .
On May 8, 1945, RYP E sent the f o l l o w i n g  m e s s a g e  to 
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Lo nd o n  :
Give p r e cise  o r de rs  STOP can we go to valley STOP 
if so we must  c o n t a c t  G e r m a n  c o m m a n d e r s  for our 
s e c u r i t y  STOP have we any fu rther m i s s i o n ?  STOP 
pl ease get us out of hills.
The radio b r o a d c a s t s  i n d i c a t e d  that the war was over. 
The men were a n x i o u s  to p a r t i c i p a t e  in the f e s t i v i t i e s  in
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S t e i n k j a e r .  The most i m m e d i a t e  p r o b l e m  was food as people
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had joined the RYPE party and also had to be fed.
L i v e s t o c k  on the J a e v s j o  Farm were s l a u g h t e r e d  to feed the
men, but this w o u l d  hurt the A n d e r s e n s  when they woul d
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re tur n to the farm from Sweden. The radio o p e r a t o r  tried
a l t e r n a t e  times of t r a n s m i s s i o n s  to L o n d o n  and d i f f e r e n t
f r e q u e n c i e s  to a r ouse London, but to no avail. Major  Colby
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tried a d i f f e r e n t  appro ac h: food. On May 10, 1945, the
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f o l l o w i n g  m e s s a g e  was sent to London:
We are e x t r e m e l y  short of food and r e d u c e d  
r a t i o n s  STOP  we a b s o l u t e l y  must mov e to a food 
supply STOP can we leave c o n tac t here to meet 
B o l l a n d  w h i l e  we go to val le y or can we meet 
him in N o r w a y  at Sn aasa or Verdal or Hell 
w h e r e v e r  you say STOP pl ease a n s w e r  today as 
food is s e r i o u s  p r o b l e m  STOP why c a n ’t
i n s t r u c t i o n s  be sent by radio STOP.
RYPE p e r c e i v e d  that the people  m a n n i n g  the ra di os  in 
Lo nd on  were partying, as well as the high c o m m a n d e r s  who
could m ake the de ci s i o n s .  In a m e s s a g e  to L o n d o n  on May
11, 1945, Colby c o m p l a i n e d  that a r r i v i n g  Al li e d  troop s to
N or w a y  wou ld win the h e a r t s  of N o r w e g i a n s  and those in the
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hills who w o r k e d  hard w o u l d  be o v e r l o o k e d .  On the same
97
date, RYPE r e c e i v e d  the f o l l o w i n g  messa ge :
Move all RYPE p e r s o n n e l  excep t rear de tail  to 
S t e i n k j a e r  w h e r e  you shoul d report to M I L O R G  
Le ad e r  STOP his name is T o r b e r g  J o h a n s e n  STOP 
passw o r d  to hi m  is quote: " O f t e n a a s e n  Er
B r a t t ” u n q u o t e  STOP he is livi n g  at N o r d s i d a  
close to t r u n k r o a d  to T r o n d h e i m  STOP rear 
detail to r e c e i v e  B o l l a n d  and party to f o l l o w  
STOP upon a r r i v a l  at S t e i n k j a e r  R Y P E  is placed 
under C o m m a n d e r  Hans R e i d a r  H o l t e r m a n  STOP 
S.F.H.Q. o f f i c e r  is Ma jor T h o m p s o n  STOP.
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All but the four me n who had to wait for B o l l a n d  at
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J a e v s j o  were  e l a t e d  to go to S t e i nk ja er!
To the S n a a s a  Vall e y
On Ma y 11, 1945, the m e s s a g e  or d e r e d  R Y P E  down  from
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J a e v s j o  to the S n aa sa Va lley. It did not take long to
pa c k  for the trip. Four m e m b e r s  of the N o r w e g i a n  Home
F o r c e s  w e r e  left b e h i n d  by R Y P E  to wait for Co l o n e l
B o l l a n d  ' s a r r i v a l  t h r o u g h  Sw e d e n .  He w o u l d  take c o m m a n d  of
the c o m b i n e d  N 0 R S 0  Group. The men of the R Y P E  par ty  did
not get m u c h  s l e e p  that nig ht. On May 12, 1945, the men
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b e g a n  the ir jou rney.
La te  in the a f t e r n o o n  the men a p p r o a c h e d  S t e i n k j a e r .
As they a p p r o a c h e d  the c o as t of S n a a s a  Lake, they d i s c a r d e d
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t h e i r  skis, for the snow was gone. M a jor Col by chose
two six foot s e r g e a n t s  to e s c o r t  him to ma k e  c o n t a c t  with
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the loc al G e r m a n  c o m m a n d e r .  They we r e  Se r g e a n t  Odd
A n d e r s e n  and C o r p o r a l  Kai J o h a n s e n .  T h e i r  m i l i t a r y  b e a r i n g  
was a b o v e  r e p r o a c h ,  even a f t e r  six w e eks in the field of 
a t t a c k  and s u r v i v a l  c o n d i t i o n s .
T h e r e  wa s still the c h a n c e  that the local G e rman 
g a r r i s o n  m i g h t  be u n c o o p e r a t i v e ,  so only the t h re e men 
a p p r o a c h e d  it. The rest of the party was left b e hi nd  in 
c as e s o m e t h i n g  h a p p e n e d  to Colby, Ande rs en, and Joh an sen.  
M a j o r  C o l b y  met the Ge rm an c o m m a n d e r .  Colby o b s e r v e d  that 
the c o m m a n d e r  was more n e r v o u s  than he was. The c o m m a n d e r  
a s s u r e d  M a j o r  Col by  that he an d the rest of the g a r r i s o n
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w o u l d  hav e p e r f e c t  d i s c i p l i n e  and remain c o n f i n e d  to 
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camp .
We Are H a p p y  to See You
Af te r the m i l i t a r y  c o n t a c t  w ith G e r m a n  forces, the
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R Y P E  party m o v e d  to S t e i n k j a e r .  On the o u t s k i r t s  of
tow n  they w e r e  met by a b r a s s  band w h o s e  m e m b e r s  a p p a r e n t l y
had not pl ay ed t o g e t h e r  s i n c e  the war began. In town there
was a s h ort w e l c o m i n g  c e r e m o n y .  The RYPE  party
m e m b e r s  w e r e  tired and h u n g r y  and the m a yor  a s s i g n e d  them
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q u a r t e r s  f o r m a l l y  used  by Ger ma ns.
On May 13, 1945, B o r g e  L a n g e l a n d ,  by then a Seco n d
L i e u t e n a n t  by b a t t l e f i e l d  c o m m i s s i o n ,  sent a m e s s a g e  to
L o n d o n  in w h i c h  he r e p o r t e d  that all the A m e r i c a n s  wer e  in
p l a c e  at S t e i n k j a e r ;  that the G e r m a n  c o m m a n d e r  had been
c o n t a c t e d  and was c o o p e r a t i v e ;  that the H o m e  Front f o r c e s
w e r e  in c o n t a c t  w i t h  RYPE, and that M a jo r Colby was going 
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to T r o n d h e i m .  L a n g e l a n d  also told L o nd on that the R Y P E
party had r e c e i v e d  a s e n s a t i o n a l  w e l c o m e  in S t e i n k j a e r  and
to p l e a s e  send co ffee, c i g a r e t t e s ,  candy, and A m e r i c a n
flags. He als o  said that the e s t i m a t e d  6 , 0 0 0  g a r r i s o n e d
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G e r m a n  t r o o p s  were u n d e r  p e r fe ct  d i s c i p l i n e .  On May 14,
1945, L a n g e l a n d  sent a n o t h e r  m e s s a g e  to L o n d o n  to report
that t h e r e  w e r e  t h i r t y - t w o  in the RYP E party i n c l u d i n g
L i e u t e n a n t  Hoel and that m o r a l e  was high: the J a e v s j o  base
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had just bee n closed.
L i e u t e n a n t  C o l o n e l  G e r h a r d  L. B o l l a n d  ar rived in
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S t e i n k j a e r  and was i n f o r m e d  by the group that M a j o r  C o lb y 
h ad gone to T r o n d h e i m  to r e p o r t  to the D i s t r i c t  C o m m a n d e r -  
T r o n d h e i m  (DK/T), a C o l o n e l  H a n s  Reida r H o l t e r m a n n .  Colby  
r e t u r n e d  on Ma y 15, 1945 a nd b r i e f e d  B o l l a n d  that he had 
m a d e  a r r a n g e m e n t s  to p a r t i c i p a t e  in the S y t t e n d e  Mai 
( s e v e n t e e n t h  of May) p a r ade. B o l l a n d  then i n s t r u c t e d  Co lby 
to be C o m m a n d e r  of T r o o p s  an d  m a r c h  the group t h r o u g h  the 
t o w n s  of Verdal, L e v a n g e r  and S t o rdal on the way to
T r o n d h e i m .  The gro up  r e c e i v e d  a t r e m e n d o u s  o v a t i o n  from
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N o r w e g i a n s  from both s i d e s  of the street, from wi n d o w s ,  and
f r o m  the r o o f t o p s .  N o r w e g i a n s  w o uld not show  muc h em o t i o n ,
but the q u i c k  A l l i e d  p r e s e n c e  in Nor th T r o n d e l a g  c h a n g e d  
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all of that. N o r w e g i a n s  that day cried with t e ars of
joy. The n o i s e  of the c r o w d s  c o ul d be he ar d all the way to
Oslo. Som e c h a n t e d  the m a t i n g  call " r e e p a h - r e e p a h "  in
h o n o r  of RYPE, w ho had c h o s e n  the white g r o u s e — that
c h a n g e d  color to b r o w n  in the s u m m e r t i m e — as its code 
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name. The m a r c h i n g  men of R Y P E  wore silk s c a r v e s  m ad e
out of p a r a c h u t e s .  That t r i c k  really left an i m p r e s s i o n  on 
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the c r o wd s.  C r o w n  P r i n c e  O lav was in the r e v i e w i n g
s t a n d s  in Oslo. He ha d f l o w n  in from L o n d o n  to take
c o m m a n d  of the N o r w e g i a n  Fo r c e s .  The RYP E  G r o u p  had tak en
the s u r r e n d e r  of t h o u s a n d s  of Ge rma n troops g a r r i s o n e d  at
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n e a r b y  V a e r n e s  ai r p o r t .
T r o u b l e  in the Old N o r s e  Cit y  of Kings
The Fir st S e r g e a n t  of R Y P E  and a N o r w e g i a n  c i t i z e n
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a t t a c h e d  to the group c e l e b r a t e d  a litt le  too much: on the
m o r n i n g  of May 17th in T r o n d h e i m ,  they fired t h eir w e a p o n s  
in to the a i r — or so they t h o u g h t ,  as a tire wen t flat on a 
n e a r b y  a u t o m o b i l e .  L i e u t e n a n t  C o l o n e l  G e r h a r d  B o l l a n d  did 
not get w ind of the i n c i d e n t  u n ti l the next day. He was 
f u r i o u s :  a l c o h o l  wa s the c u l p r i t  and it cou ld  p o s s i b l y
r e f l e c t  very b a dl y on hi s group. He a p p r o a c h e d  the 
N o r w e g i a n  C o urt  with s t a t e m e n t s  from the men and the 
c o m p l a i n i n g  party. A l t h o u g h  the i n c i d e n t  was q u i c k l y
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r e s o l v e d  and h u s h e d  up, B o l l a n d  r e p o r t e d  it to London.
R Y P E  also  was h o u s e d  in one of the best h o t e l s  in 
T r o n d h e i m ,  to the c o n s t e r n a t i o n  of the Br itish, who wer e  in 
c o m m a n d  of the area and who  t h e m s e l v e s  t h o u g h t  they shoul d 
h a v e  the b e t t e r  q u a r ters.  An e x cuse was fou nd by the 
B r i t i s h  to send the R Y P E  p a r t y  to some r e m o t e  v i l l a g e  to 
c o n t r o l  the G e r m a n s  in that area. B r i t i s h  o f f i c e r s  q u i c k l y
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f i l l e d  the v a c u u m  c a u s e d  by R Y P E ' s  d e p a r t u r e  from T r o n d h e i m .
A F i na l "S ieg  Heil"
On May 20, 1945 the r est of the N 0 R S 0  G r o u p  had
a r r i v e d  in T r o n d h e i m .  The g r o u p  landed at V a e r n e s  Air po rt,
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c o m i n g  from Scotl an d. C o l b y  and the group were on the ir
way to N a m s o s  , sixty m i l e s  up the coast from T r o n d h e i m  for 
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g a r r i s o n  duty. The slow A l l i e d  b u i l d u p  of o c c u p a t i o n
t r o o p s  in the North T r o n d e l a g  area and N o r w e g i a n s  there 
p e r c e i v e d  that proud G e r m a n  a r m y  and nav y p e r s o n n e l  c o uld  
p r o v i d e  p r o ble ms : N a m s o s  w a n t e d  v i s i b l e  e v i d e n c e  that the
211
war was over. The date for c o m p l e t e  G e r m a n  d i s a r m a m e n t
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t h e r e  was set for May 23, 1945.
Ten t h o u s a n d  G e r m a n  t r o o p s  were in the area, and
t h i r t y  m e m b e r s  of the N O R S O  G r o u p  were g o in g to s u p e r v i s e
them. On the w ay  to N a m s o s ,  the group rode over the very
r a i l s  it d e s t r o y e d .  R u s s i a n  f o r c e d  labor had q u i ck ly
r e p a i r e d  the m ( t h o u s a n d s  of R u s s i a n  p r i s o n e r s  were in the 
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a r e a . )  The G e r m a n s  w e r e  to di sarm  t h e m s e l v e s .  The
G e r m a n s  d i s a r m e d  very s l o w l y  at first. The G e r m a n  Navy was
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m o r e  r e l u c t a n t  to do so t han the G e rm an Army.
Ma jo r C o l b y  was i n s t r u c t e d  to ’’i n s p e c t  at w i l l , "  but
not to d e t a i n  nor a r r e s t  G e r m a n  pe rs onnel . The R Y P E  men
had r e p o r t e d  b r u s h e s  w i t h  G e r m a n  troops on n a r r o w  str ee ts .
It c u l m i n a t e d  w i t h  five G e r m a n  ships c r u i s i n g  the h a r b o r
w i t h  th eir c r e w s  c h a n t i n g  " S ieg H e i l . ’’ The next  m o r n i n g
C o l b y  c a l l e d  the G e r m a n  c o m m a n d e r  to say that he w o u l d  be
i n s p e c t i n g  the s h ip s at 0900. R e l u c t a n t  c r ew s were s i le nt
as C o l b y ’s i n s p e c t i o n s  w e r e  made. The G e r m a n  cre ws
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r e c e i v e d  wo r d  from C o lby that  the war was over.
The M i s s i o n  is Over
On May 24, 1945, C o m m a n d e r  G. Un ge r V e t l e s e n  r a d i o e d
to Bor ge L a n g e l a n d  at N a m s o s  to close down L a n g e l a n d ’s
s t a tion. That was the last  t r a n s m i s s i o n  O p e r a t i o n  RYPE
rec e i v e d .  RYP E  then t u r n e d  its e q u i p m e n t  over to 
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MI L O R G .  On May 28, 1945, H a n s  Skabo and C o l o n e l  Hans
R e i d a r  H o l t e r m a n  had a m e e t i n g  in T r o n d h e i m  and d e c i d e d
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that M a j o r  C o l b y ' s  r ol e in N a msos was over and his group of
t h i r t y  me n s h o u l d  join N O R S O  O p e r a t i o n s  at V a e r n e s  A i r po rt.
On Jun e 1, 1945, the N a m s o s  group sa iled to T r o n d h e i m ,  then
w as t r u c k e d  to V a e r n e s  to b e g i n  g a r r i s o n  duty. M a j o r  C o l b y
was  p l a c e d  in c h a r g e  of the N O R S O  Group, w h ic h was split
into three' un it s.  On Jun e  2, 1945, the first c o n t i n g e n t  of
A l l i e d  O c c u p a t i o n  F o r c e s  a r r i v e d  in T r o n d h e i m  und er the
c o m m a n d  of a B r i t i s h  B r i g a d i e r  (a B r i t i s h  g e n eral  o f f i c e r ) .
On June  9, 1945, the O. S. S. N O R S O  Group act ed as an ho nor
gua rd for C r o w n  P r i n c e  Olav of Norway. The Crow n P r i n c e
f o u n d  a s t a n d i n g  o v a t i o n  and a w a r m  r e c e p t i o n  by his 
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s u b j e c t s .
The m i s s i o n  was over and all the men of N O R S O
O p e r a t i o n s  t o o k  l e a v e  to visit r e l a t i v e s  in No rw ay. One
v i si t e n d e d  on a sad note: one of the m e m b e r s  of R YP E
fo un d that hi s f a m i l y  had c o l l a b o r a t e d  wit h  the enemy, and
they  w e r e  un der ar r e s t .  C r u s h e d  by this, he b e c a m e  an
124
A m e r i c a n  c i t i z e n ,  n e v e r  to retu rn to Norway.
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C O N C L U S I O N
In the c o n d u c t  of u n c o n v e n t i o n a l  w a r f a r e  deep beh i n d  
e n e m y  lines,  the R Y P E  m i s s i o n  serv e s  as a c l a s s i c  e x a m p l e  
to m i l i t a r y  p l a n n e r s  as to its u n q u a l i f i e d  success, yet it 
p o i n t s  to the u n a c c e p t a b l y  h i g h  costs i n v o l v e d  in order to
d e l i v e r  and s u p p o r t  it.
/
On M a r c h  24, 1945, the air sup port for O p e r a t i o n  RYPE 
got off to a very bad start. Of the eig hty men tr a i n e d  for 
the m i s s i o n ,  t h i r t y - s i x  wer e c h o s e n  to p a r a c h u t e  into 
N o r w a y .  Of these, five we r e  a c c i d e n t a l l y  d r o p p e d  into 
n e u t r a l  Sw ed en. Te n p a r a t r o o p e r s  and f o u r t e e n  a i r m e n  were 
k i l l e d  t r y i n g  to get into N o r way. B-24  L i b e r a t o r s  were 
u sed to d e l i v e r i n g  O.S.S . t e a m s  at night by m o o n l i g h t  
b e h i n d  e n emy l i nes at very low al titudes . This  type of 
a i r c r a f t  was e s p e c i a l l y  s u i t a b l e  for use in N o r w a y  b e c a u s e  
its r a nge e x c e e d e d  that of any bomber in the E u r o p e a n  
t h e a t r e .  U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  m a n y  en g i n e s  m a l f u n c t i o n e d  duri n g 
f l i g h t s  and the lev el of m a i n t e n a n c e  w h i c h  the B-24 
r e q u i r e d  p l a c e d  an e x c e s s i v e  bu rd e n  on re pair crews. 
A i r c r e w s  had l i t t l e  e x p e r i e n c e  in flying the far north, and 
in w i n t e r  o p e r a t i o n s  over S c a n d i n a v i a ,  they e n c o u n t e r e d  
u n f a m i l i a r  misty  and c l o u d y  o b s t r u c t i o n s  over the drop 
zone s. B e s id es, they d i s c o v e r e d  that from an a i r c r a f t  over
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N o r w a y  in w i n t e r t i m e ,  ’’e v e r y t h i n g  on the gr oun d l o o k s  the 
s a m e .”
The field o p e r a t i o n s  of the R YPE m i s s i o n  went quit e  
well. The dro p on the s n o w - c o v e r e d  frozen Lake J a e v s j o  in 
a r e m o t e  area  nea r  the S w e d i s h  f r o n t i e r  in the N o r t h  
T r o n d e l a g  D i s t r i c t  was a c c o m p l i s h e d  as pl ann ed  on M a r c h  24, 
1945. A l t h o u g h  B r o k e n  a n k l e s  a nd legs were t y p i c a l l y  a 
part of O.S.S. d r ops b e h i n d  e n e m y  lines, s i x te en m e m b e r s  of 
R Y P E  p a r a c h u t e d  down to the lake  w i t h o u t  major i n j u r i e s .
Due to the foul w i n t e r ,  r e s u p p l y  and r e i n f o r c e m e n t  by air 
w e r e  u n s u c c e s s f u l :  thi s e l i m i n a t e d ,  as the RYPE m i s s i o n ' s
p r i m a r y  t a r g e t  for d e s t r u c t i o n ,  the f o r m i d a b l e  r a i l r o a d  
b r i d g e  over the G r an a Ri ver. I n s t e a d  on April 14, 1945, 
R Y P E  d e s t r o y e d  the N o r d l a n d  R a i l w a y  br idge  at T a n ge n. To 
re ac h T a n gen, the men had to ski as far as s.eventy-five 
m i l e s  to the ir tar get, e ach  t a k i n g  turn s pu lling si xt y 
po u n d s  of p l a s t i c  e x p l o s i v e s  on t o b o gg an s. On Apr il 25, 
1945, R Y P E  d e s t r o y e d  t w o - a n d - o n e - h a l f  k i l o m e t e r s  of 
r a i l w a y s  in a r e m o t e  a rea in the Lu rudal Valley. Up o n  
c o m p l e t i o n  of these s a b o t a g e  o p e r a t i o n s ,  the men had to 
o u t s k i  the p u r s u i n g  G e r m a n  ski pat ro ls. The RYPE m i s s i o n  
was an u n q u a l i f i e d  s u c c e s s  in m e e t i n g  O.S.S. c r i t e r i a  for a 
s u c c e s s f u l  strike: (1) a p p r o a c h  the ta rget u n d e t e c t e d ;  (2) 
d e s t r o y  the target; (3) inc ur no c a s u a l t i e s ,  and; (4) 
e s c a p e  ca p t u r e  by the p u r s u i n g  enemy. RYPE  thus s l owed  
down G e r m a n  t r oop m o v e m e n t s  a l o n g  the N o r d l a n d  R a i l w a y  from
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one b a t t a l i o n  a w e e k  to one b a t t a l i o n  a month.
Upon f u r t h e r  study of the RYPE mission, one d i s c o v e r s  
that the r a i l r o a d  b r i d g e  at T a n g e n  was not very big and its 
r e p a i r  w o u l d  r e q u i r e  no e n g i n e e r i n g  genius. Also, as it 
t u r n e d  out, R u s s i a n  f o r c e d  labor quickly r e p a i r e d  the 
r a i l w a y s  at L u r a d a l  . One may thus wond e r  how the s a b o t a g e  
o p e r a t i o n s  c o n d u c t e d  by R Y P E  a r g u a b l y  help e d  the A l l i e s  end 
the was in Eu r o p e .
To u n d e r s t a n d  why R Y P E ’s a c h i e v e m e n t s  wer e  i m p o r t a n t ,  
one must study the s t r a t e g i c  e n v i r o n m e n t  of w h i c h  it was a 
part. A f ter the A l l i e s  w on the Battle of the B u l g e  from 
D e c e m b e r ,  1944, t h r o u g h  J a n u a r y ,  1945, Su p r e m e  H e a d q u a r t e r s  
A l l i e d  E x p e d i t i o n a r y  F o r c e s  (SHAEF) p e r c e i v e d  that Nazi 
G e r m a n y  was a b o u t  to c o l l a p s e .  SHAEF was n o n e t h e l e s s  
c o n c e r n e d  that the G e r m a n  H i g h  C o m mand m i ght d e c i d e  to 
b r i n g  b a c k  to G e r m a n y  fro m  n o r t h e r n  Norway, 1 5 0 , 0 0 0  c r ack 
G e r m a n  S.S. m o u n t a i n  troops, then r e t r e a t i n g  in the face of 
R u s s i a n  a t t a c k s .  In this e v e n t  , i m p a s s a b l e  s n o w - c o v e r e d  
r o a d s  in n o r t h e r n  Norway, and B r i t i s h  c o n trol of the high 
seas w o u l d  d i c t a t e  G e r m a n  use of the N o r d l a n d  R a i l w a y  to 
t r a n s p o r t  its m o u n t a i n  D i v i s i o n s  southward. S H A E F  
c o n s e q u e n t l y  o r d e r e d  m i s s i o n s  like RYPE r e p e a t e d l y  to 
d a m a g e  thi s  and other r a i l w a y s .  In one night alone, Allied 
s a b o t e u r s  d a m a g e d  N o r w e g i a n  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  n e t w o r k s  in 750 
places. The t e a m s  of s a b o t e u r s  had radios and w i r e l e s s  
c o n t a c t  w i t h  S p e c i a l  Forc e s  H e a d q u a r t e r s  (SGHQ) in L o ndon
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to r e p o r t  their a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s  and pinpoint the l o c a t i o n s  
of G e r m a n  u n i t s .
B e c a u s e  N o r w e g i a n s ,  from 1940 on, p l e aded with the 
A l l i e s  to stop the b o m b i n g  in N o r way, s a b o t a g e  was the only 
a l l o w e d  a l t e r n a t i v e .  W i t h i n  SFKQ, the B r i t i s h  S p e cial  
O p e r a t i o n s  E x e c u t i v e  (S.O.E.), the A m e r i c a n  O.S.S. Special 
o p e r a t i o n s  (S.O.), and the F o r s v a r e t s  O v e r k o m m a n d o  Fire 
( F . O . I V )  (The N o r w e g i a n  High C o m m a n d )  c o o r d i n a t e d  the 
s a b o t a g e  a c t i v i t i e s  for Norway. F . O . I V  c o n t r o l l e d  the 
M i l i t a r y  O r g a n i z a t i o n  (MILORG), the N o r w e g i a n  Armed F o r c e s  
in h i d i n g  in N o r w a y  and Sweden.
N e u t r a l  S w e d e n ' s  role d u r i n g  W o r l d  War II shou l d  also 
be c o n s i d e r e d .  When N o r w a y  and D e n m a r k  wer e  o c c u p i e d  by 
G e r m a n  t r o o p s  on April 9, 1940, S w e d e n  feared that she 
m i g h t  also be o c c u pied. S w e d e n  b e h a v e d  c a u t i o u s l y ,  and 
its p o l i c y  to N o r w a y  was of u n f r i e n d l i n e s s .  N o r w a y  and 
S w e d e n  s h ared a long f r o n t i e r  a c r o s s  w h i c h  man y  N o r w e g i a n s  
fled the Gestapo. W h e n  the tide of war in 1943 turned 
a g a i n s t  Nazi Germany, S w e d i s h  fears of G e r m a n  o c c u p a t i o n  
su b s i d e d .  The N o r w e g i a n  G o v e r n m e n t - i n  E x ile in London, 
w i t h  the a p p r o v a l  of S w e d i s h  A u t h o r i t i e s ,  e s t a b l i s h e d  
" h e a l t h  c a m p s "  for N o r w e g i a n s  in Sweden, of m i l i t a r y  age, 
to give them two to three w e e k s  of m i l i t a r y  training.
T h e s e  e v o l v e d  into "police r e s e r v e s "  and e v e n t u a l l y  into 
r e g u l a r  M I L O R G  units. In 1944, the B r i t i s h  made an 
a g r e e m e n t  with Swed e n  and M I L O R G  to e s t a b l i s h  "weather
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s t a t i o n s ” in S w e d e n  next to the n o r t h e r n  f r o ntier of
N o r w a y .  They w e r e  in r e a l i t y ,  "little G i b r a l t a r s "  that
h o u s e d  M I L O R G  p e r s o n n e l ,  w e a p o n s  and su p p l i e s  to be used in
o p e r a t i o n s  a g a i n s t  the e n e m y  in Norway. The W O O D L A R K
party, l o c a t e d  in J a g t h y t t a  in Sweden near Lake J a e v s j o  in
Norway, a i d e d  in the r e c e p t i o n  of the RYP E  party on M a r c h
24, 1945. M I L O R G  c o u r i e r s  c a r r y i n g  w r i t t e n  c o r r e s p o n d e n c e
that c o u l d  not be t r a n s m i t t e d  by wireless, s h u t t l e d  b e t w e e n
S t o c k h o l m  and Lake J a e v s j o  for the RYPE mission. This for m
of c o m m u n i c a t i o n  w i t h  M I L O R G  in S t o c k h o l m  and e v e n t u a l l y
w i t h  SFHQ in L o n d o n  was e x c e l l e n t :  no mail was i n t e r c e p t e d
1
by a l i e n  ag e n t s .
On May 6, 1945, G e r m a n  f o rces c a p i t u l a t e d  in Norway.
On May 11, 1945, SFHQ r a d i o e d  R Y P E  to come down fro m  the
hills, r e p o r t  to M I L O R G  le a d e r s ,  and b e gin to take the
o r d e r l y  s u r r e n d e r  of 4 , 0 0 0  G e r m a n  troops, as A m e r i c a n  and
B r i t i s h  o c c u p y i n g  f o r c e s  did not a r rive in the N o r t h
T r o n d e l a g  area until June.
By itself, the R Y P E  m i s s i o n  did not win nor very much
h a s t e n  the w i n n i n g  of W o r l d  War II. But, along w i t h  other
A l l i e d  o p e r a t i o n s  in N o r way, such as W O O D  PECKER, LAPWING,
GREBE, F I E L D F A R E ,  W O O D L A R K ,  F R E E T H O R P E ,  LARK, C R A M L I N G T O N ,
W A X W I N G ,  COTON, and C O N C R E T E  MIXER, it took the s u r r e n d e r
of 1 5 0 , 0 0 0  G e r m a n  troops, who were t r a n s p o r t e d  home, by the
2
A l l i e s  to a G e r m a n y ,  c a p i t u l a t e d  and in ruin.
On May 24, 1945, M a j o r  W i l l i a m  E. Colby, the RYP E
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t e a m  leader (and a f u t u r e  d i r e c t o r  of the Central 
I n t e l l i g e n c e  A g e n c y )  w r o t e  a m e m o r a n d u m  to O.S.S. 
H e a d q u a r t e r s  in W a s h i n g t o n ,  D.C., in w h i c h  he a s s e r t e d  that 
the R Y P E  e x p e r i e n c e  c o u l d  t e ach the O.S.S. some va l u a b l e  
le s s o n s .  As we mov e  into the 1990's, C o l b y ' s  i n f l u e n c e  is 
still e v i d e n t  in A m e r i c a n  S p e c i a l  F o r c e s  doctrine.
For ex a m p l e ,  most m e m b e r s  of the Free F r e n c h  of the 
I n t e r i o r  (F.F.I.) did not h a v e  the luxury of t r a i n i n g  in 
Gr eat Britain. Colby p a r a c h u t e d  into F r ance after "D" Day 
to i m m e d i a t e l y  e n c o u n t e r  G e r m a n  forces in c o n t i n u o u s  
f i g hting. Two o f f i c e r s  did not have the time to train his 
F.F.I. force in the use of m o d e r n  weapons. What Colby 
found was a l a rge and e n t h u s i a s t i c  group, but no l e a d e r s h i p  
nor c o n c e p t s  of m i l i t a r y  s t r a t e g y  with i n  it. The actual 
l e a d e r s h i p  of the p a r t i s a n s  s h o u l d  be e x e r c i s e d  by men 
c h o s e n  from t h eir ranks.
By c o n t r a s t ,  the O.S.S. i n t e n d e d  the R Y P E  o p e r a t i o n  
to be i n d e p e n d e n t  of local N o r w e g i a n  r e s i s t a n c e  forces. 
B e c a u s e  r e i n f o r c e m e n t s  from S c o t l a n d  did not arrive, the 
R Y P E  party, to a c h i e v e  its o b j e c t i v e s ,  had to r e c ruit from 
M I L O R G  sources, men who w ere a l r e a d y  trained in 
u n c o n v e n t i o n a l  w a r fare.
Each unit of p a r t i s a n s  was to be o r g a n i z e d  as a 
c o m p a n y  w i t h  three pla t o o n s ,  each with an A m e r i c a n  
o f f i c e r  and s e r geant as a d v i s o r s .  Each p l a toon had three 
squads, each w i t h  an A m e r i c a n  serge a n t  as advisor (the
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present T e a m  ”A " , " B " , ”C ” c o n c e p t )  and i n t e r p r e t e r s  were
a s s i g n e d  at all l e vels of c o m m a n d .  Had RYPE been at full
s t r e n g t h ,  C o l b y  concluded, s m a l l e r  groups in r o t a t i o n  could
3
have kept the N o r d l a n d  r a i l w a y s  c o m p l e t e l y  out of service.
O p e r a t i o n  RYPE taught the O.S.S. that air s u p p o r t  
must be d e l i v e r e d  a c c u r a t e l y  and on time, in spite of the 
e l e m e n t s .  Less than a f i f t y - p e r c e n t  delivery rate was 
u n a c c e p t a b l e  to the O.S.S.: new n a v i g a t i o n a l  t e c h n o l o g i e s ,
a i r c r e w  t r a i n i n g  p r o c e d u r e s ,  and m a i n t e n a n c e  s u p port 
s y s t e m s  had to be d e v e l o p e d  for future O.S.S. a c t i v i t i e s  by 
the Army Air Force.
F o r t u n a t e l y ,  r e s u p p l y  by land from a n e i g h b o r i n g  
n e u t r a l  c o u n t r y  was pos s i b l e .  But, re s u p p l y  p r o c e d u r e s  
fro m  S w e d e n  s h o u l d  have been d e v e l o p e d  by the O.S.S., even 
b e f o r e  the R Y P E  party d r o p p e d  into Norway: for RYPE, the
b i g g e s t  p r o b l e m  was food. The a d v a n t a g e  of r e s u p p l y  from a 
n e i g h b o r i n g  co u n t r y  b e c a m e  most o b v ious to the O . S.S., only 
after the R Y P E  m i s s i o n  air su p p o r t  failed.
In short, the p l a n n e r s  of O p e r a t i o n  RYP E  did not take 
M u r p h y ’s Law into c o n s i d e r a t i o n :  if s o m e t h i n g  can go wrong,
it will. W i t h o u t  the c o u n s e l  of an engineer nor of one 
from a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of the Army Air Force, h a s t i l y  planned, 
s h r o u d e d  in secrecy, the R Y P E  m i s s i o n  became v u l n e r a b l e  to 
the oldest law on the books. P l a n n e r s  of future special 
fo r c e s  o p e r a t i o n s  must a n t i c i p a t e  the worst in d i f f i c u l t  
m i s s i o n s  and be c a u t i o u s  in c o m m i t t i n g  brave men to them.
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NORSO QROUP 
SCANDINAVIAN SECTION 
SPECIAL OPERATIONS BRANCH 
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES 
SUROPE'-N THEATER OF OPERATIONS.
23 T'ay 1945
APO 413.
SUBJECT: Recommended Special Operations.
TO : Chief, Special Broach, Office of
Strategic Services, Washington, D.C.
THROUGH: Chief, Special Operations Branch, OSS Detachment (Mala)
European Theater of Operations, aPO 413.
1. The undersigned has taken part in the JEDBURGH 
operation ia France as a neaber of team BRUCE, organizing 
and assisting the Frenoh Forces of the Interior of the 
Dep&rtaeat of the Tonne. He has also taken part in 
Operation Rype, leading a snail force of American soldiers, 
who were formerly under Operational Group Coxian*, in a 
sabotage mission against the Nordland Railway in North 
Trpndolog, Norway. The following recommendations ere a 
result sifting the experience gained during these two ope­
rations. It i3 hoped that they can be of some use ia 
planning adn prosecuting the war ia the Pacific theater.
i
x*
/ 2. The Jedburgh operation was intended tc furnish
/'■ military advice, leadership, a means of providing arms, 
f  and & \ connection with the overall strategic plan to forces 
which were large and enthusiastic, though untrained, dis­
organized an without experienced leaders. It was limited by 
the fact that only two officers were available to do all 
/this work. They were often swamped with work m d  had to for­
go doing certain useful work because more important thJ ngn 
arose which took all thdir time. In this manner the oppor­
tunity was lost to instruct all personae! in all modern 
weapons end battle technique. Considerable dependence, also, 
had to be placed on the knowledge and leadership of men who 
had had no military work in four yeur3 ana who used the 
,techniques which h^d lost the last campaign they had seen. 
iVhen many separate attacks were being conducted, many og the 
Ulatrained men tmd leaders hud perforce to be left to conduct 
them unassisted, relying more on enthusiasm and. courage than 
On. military knowledge.
A
j v 3* The Rype operation was intended to stop the German 
railway communications passing through its area. It was 
intended to be independent of nny resistance forces and to 
hinder the enemy only through what its members could do 
directly. Snch man thus applied his ability and training 
directly to the enemy and did not extend their effect by 
operating indirectly through many men whoa he had trained 
!-fin new methods of fighting and whom be then led.
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Du© to the small number of Hen involved in the operation 
it was necessary for security's sake to keep them togbther 
and operate only as one unit, attacking the objective on 
separate occasions and leaving it urdisturbed during the 
intervals. Had the sen been able each to lead snail pi rties 
there could have been ccntinous attacks against the objective, 
and it could have been kept out of operation completely.
4. It is realized that the men used in work involving 
leadership and training of resistance forces should have 
special training and qualifications for the job, and that 
all men who could serve as ordinary soldiers in operations 
such as Rype would not necessarily work out ia thnt charac­
ter. Hen could be found, however, and the language barrier 
should not be insurmountable, provided interpreters were 
aveilfeble to transmit advice;
5. As a result of these experiences, recommend for 
future special operations the despatching of a party con­
sisting of one field officer, four company grade officers, 
radio personnel and approximately fifteen sergeants, filth 
this party guerilla force of onehundred and fifty men eould 
be organized and brought to a high degree of training and 
could be used on separate simultaneous attabkg. l/i this \ 
manner, with the same cost and effort involved in the Ay re \ 
operation, the effect would be that of about one hundred ari V 
fifty men instead of twenty, !me actual leadership of the 
partisans should be done by men4,chosen from amongBt themselves 
and the Americans should function a3 advisors. The overall 
leader could be American, as, on a higher levdl, command oojv
be oarried through interpreters while leadership In the field 
at the NCO level cannot, though advice c m  be passed to one 
2tsader. In coordinating the activities of the force with 
the larger strategic plan, it would be better if the commander 
were of the same nationality as his headquarters so that be 
would understand its working and it would know with whoa it * 
was dealing. The unit would be organized 89 a company, with 
three paltooas, each with en “nericen officer and sergeont as 
advisors. Each platoon would have three squads, each with 
an American sergeant 89 advisor. There would then remain 
one extra officer and three sergeants to operate a headquarters 
and take care of any administrative arrangements necessary,
6. The present NORSO GROUP is available as a pod from 
which to draw the men necessary to carry cut this plan, should 
it be adopted.
filLI IAM E. COLBY 
Major,FA 
Co®®anding
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O . S.S. Comic s
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s»Tioff in vS
Q uality
> fAHifrs* MAOA1INC
TRUTH is Stranger,,a'nd a thousand times more thrilling than FICTION
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iO /T H S
3UISHED'
JNGRAT— 
•ATIONS 
IN YOUR 
*T N E S 5 !
D
HE SAME
I
CHAPTER HE IN OCTOBER, IBWH, THE 
OCCUPYING FORCE OF A HALF- 
MILLION GERMANS IN NORWAY WAS 
A SERIOUS MENACE TO THE ALUED 
CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN EUROPE 
UNTIL THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC 
SERVICES STEPPED IN.
SOON, IN SCOTLAND, UNDER THE COMMAND OF 
MAJOR WILLIAM COLBY...7 STILL 
O r
ICLES 
ID ADAMS
AT OSS HEADQUARTERS IN WASHINGTON.
ITS OUR JOB TO TRAP 
FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND 
GERMANS IN NORWAY BEFORE 
THEY REACH THE WESTERN 
FRONT FOR THEIR EXPECTED 
SPRING OFFENSIVE.
-L RIGHT 1 
0 1 9 ,360 - 
';VORLD 1
LtfESiS*;
11TRAINING OPERATIONS 
MUST BEGIN 
AT ONCE.
mm
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' FINALLY, IN JANUARY, 1945...
GUESS 
WE'LL WAVE 
TO- TURN
YCVLL EE 
WEARING FROM CANT MAKE THROUGH
IN FEBRUARY THEY WERE FORCED BACK 
AGAIN. THEN ON APRIL f , FORTY-TWO MEN 
MADE A THIRD TRY
* **I sT ’ A ■*< ~ i-ik t &
m g i M i m A
WE'RE TOO *  
PAR TO TURN 
BACK NOW.
WEATHERMAN 
REPORTS A
BLIZZARD
AHEAD
TWO TRANSPORTS CRASHED INTO a  MOUNTAIN KILLING TWENTY-ONE . MEN. FIVE MEN O r THE GROUP 
WERE FORCED TO . LAND IN NEUTRAL SWEDEN. COL3V AND FIFTEEN MEN PARACHUTED SAFELY DOWN.
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SCATTERED, AFRAID OF BEING CAUGHT, IT 
WAS HOURS LATER BEFORE THEY ALL 
REUNITED.
A RENDEZVOUS WITH NORWEGIAN UNDERGROUND 
LEADERS WAD BEEN ARRANGED. AS THEY 
NEARED THE MEETING PLACE
GUESS 
VE’LL HAVE 
TO TURN 
BACK. IS THE FISHING 
GOOD IN THIS 
LAKE?
FRIEND -  FROM 
BROOKLYN.
HANDS UP! 
FRIEND OR 
FOE?'
FOR A MOMENT, THE NORWEGIAN, AN ARDENT 
FISHERMAN, FORGOT THE PREARRANGED CODE.
THEN.
YES, THE 
FISHING IS 
GOOQ 
PARTICULARLY 
IN WINTER.
TO TELL YOU 
THE TRUTH 
ITS NOT 
GOOD AT 
ALL.
ft. 'fi'y.y /■
" w m m m
QUICKLY THE COMBINED GROUPS ORGANIZED 
FOR ACTION. f
----------------------  UNDERGROUND
REPORTS ENEMY CONCENTRATIONS 
AT POINTS CX,SX,WX-M0VEMENT 
TOWARD BOD-OBjSCnvE 
A UPCOMING.
THE NORTHLAND RAILWAY, THB SOLE LINK 
CONNECTING NORTH AND SOUTH NORWAY, VVA9 
THE FIRST OBUECTiyE, f
STiV
WE T S COME 
TWENTY-Fft'E MILES. 
ABOUT SEVENTY 
FIVE TO GO. S *
HOW MUCH 
FARTHER?
x r f * -f&\ v/w
GROUP 
V DOWN
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THAT'S T 
OP TWC 
TRAtTC
VOU KNOW THE 
MISSION- THAT BRIDGE 
MUST BE DESTROYED. 
GOOD LUCK!
GLAD IT'S SUNDAV- 
GUESS THE NAZIS. JUST 
DON'T GUARD ONf 
SUNDAY. HERE'S 
THE TIME 
FUZE.
LATER
THAT WORKED 
PERFECTLY. X
LOOK! THEY'VE 
DISCOVERED 
US.
AFTER HOURS OF SKIING. NOW 
FOR THE 
CHARGES
YES, BUT 
THOSE 
QUISLINGS ARE 
STILL ON 
OUR . TRAIL.
r , THINK 
WEVE. LOST 
THE GERMANS.
*8*36$
A FEW
FOR FOUR DAYS THB CHASE CONTINUED THROUGH I I ONE NIGHT. 
A STEADY BUZZARD.
^  % ' .
HEY, 
LOOK!
QUISLINGS!
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the  NEXT OBJECTIVE was A MILS AND A HALF O r RAILWAY 
TRACK AT A KEY JUNCTION, fTHAT'S THE LAST 
O r  THOSE 
TRAITORS! CHUCK. AS SOON AS IT STARTS TO 
SNOW, TAKE THREE MSN AND 
SNEAK THROUGH THAT STAND OP 
SPRUCE. PLANT DVNAMlTS STICKS 
ALL ALONG THE SiDE OF THE 
TRACK. WE'LL WAIT FOR
L A T E R . . . A TRAIN' QUICK.
ODWN THE
FOR THE IV EMBANKMENT! 
CHARGES.
A FEW MINUTES LATER
LINGS!
>^>>%
THE STEADV FLOW OF 
C-ERMAN TROOPS TO THE 
SOUTH WAS HALTED
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fi^ teeN'Cwours '^ateb;?;>:Btm t&zsmt
* £ THIS** NORlVEGiAN*$Sv 
; VVA3 "HUQT IN}"AnT^ .' 
r ACCIDENT, i: CA^rVCXp: 
• k^C’ET^ WIMi'TO^ A&f^
Is ^ va-.S i«isniV»V ^ Xfi2%
:STOP-i.FOR 
F GERMANS  ^BDTraT SAMBf^ St-SKllNGr-m; 
PROSPECTS- PARICS-S /v r- CHECKED-' THR-SUPPLIES,^  . 
^ | ^ “ALt;^ ;;HAVE ,left :^w BRQOKLYNtONLVt
7WEN*:;WE?HA0|‘
CXv'-.if*.e&A
& M
m
1
fed fe^w X h'D S ^S ^ AND^  HALK> STARVING/.1 £S 
WERE a !^ E O l^ T H E a .G 0 ? ^ - OCCUPATION ! 
?e&Tuife 05S*; TEAM^ NEVEPTHEtESSf CONTINUED; 
l^UTAOViilNTELUGENCE  ^B Y -RADia M.OOO.INA2I9
ITS A lt
O^VER£;H'.-gi 
^EnMANY9:^
NElT^,WONTH;:THEf.STORY OF AN. OSS . MAN AND; HOW 
HE '"KEPTS SILEKTfc-tD^THE END. ' ' ' % " -
£i£ ■•■*"■'
239
A P P E N D I X  III 
TAPS 
as of M a y , 1990 
O.S.S. N o r s o  Group
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K i l l e d  in Action:
B e r n a r d  H o a g l a n d  
Lt . B l a n e  E. J o n e s  
Knut J. Falck 
R o b e r t  N. A n d e r s o n  
B e r n a r d  N. I v e r s o n  
E d w a r d  E. K j e l n e s  
E d d i e  0. S o n d e n o  
Leif E. M e l a n d  
T r y g v e  Berge 
J o h a n n e s  S. R o r v i c k  
G e r a r d  O t t e r s l a n d  
Lt . W a l t e r  "Mo" L a r s e n  
Capt. W i l l i a m  L a r s o n
D e c e a s e d  Since the War
V e r n o n  L. A u s t r e n g  
S i g u r d  M. Baro 
Alf A r n e s o n  
N o l a n  C o o p e r  
L t . Glenn F a r n s w o r t h  
L a w r e n c e  F i s k u m  
H e r b e r t  H e l g e n s e n  
Arne I . H e r s t a d  
C l i f f o r d  G. K y l l o 
J a m e s  C. L a r s o n  
M a r i n u s  M y r l a n d  
A l bert N o r d a n g  
C o l . Serge O b o l e n s k y  
T o m  Sather
Capt. Harry L. S o l b e r g
A r n o l d  E. T v i n n e r h e i m
Capt. M e l v i n  J. H j e l t n e s s
E d d i e  M. H o v l a n d
Lt . James C. L a r s o n
S i e v e r t  Dymoe
T om G i l b e r t s e n
John Sunde
D e l p h i s  L. B o nin
Olaf Hall
B e r n h a r d  T a l l a k s o n  
K e n n e t h  J o h n s o n  
R a l p h  L i l ’leby 
H . "Bud" We h er g 
Dr. Fred B. Agee, Jr.
Arne H a r s t a d  
K nu t  Joa 
A s m u n d  G r a v d a l 
A l f r e d  A n d e r s o n
B I B L I O G R A P H Y
P R I M A R Y  S O U R C E S  
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